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The Nile perch (Lates niloticus) is a highly controversial species on Lake Victoria, East Africa.  
It is highly prized for its valuable, fleshy fillets, and its potential for food security and 
development for the countries surrounding Lake Victoria.  It is also highly destructive, with a 
voracious appetite for Lake Victoria’s diverse endemic species. The Nile perch fishery has 
been attributed to an economic boon and to the destruction of the social fabric of communities 
around the lake.  For certain, the Nile perch changed the lake’s ecosystem, the fishery, and 
the economy; it has changed fishers’ harvest behavior and the approach to fishery 
management.  The Nile perch: Savior? Villain? Fish. 
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ACRONYMS AND TERMS 
BMU – Beach Management Unit (see p. 11 for full description) 
BMU Committee – A Beach Management Unit Committee consists of 9-15 people (known as 
BMU committee leaders) from the community who have been elected by their peers to 
administer fisheries and undertake fishery management activities 
By-laws – Regulations made by BMU community and committee members to influence behavior 
of members who are a part of, or use, resources associated with that BMU.  By-laws are 
consistent with the national fisheries laws or regulations 
CBO – Community-based organization 
Cichlid – see haplochromine cichlids 
Commission – reference to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
Community – individuals or groups of individuals at the beach level who are engaged in 
fishery-related activities on Lake Victoria. Community in this study refers to members of 
the Beach Management Units (described on page 82), unless otherwise noted.  In 
Chapter 3, community and community organization can refer to either forest or fishery-
related individuals, groups, or organizations.  
Community-level – general term referring to individuals or groups of the lowest administrative 
level, those typically living in the same place and having the same laws. 
Dagaa – the term in Uganda for the species Rastrineobola argentea, see Rastrineobola 
DFO – District Forestry Officer 
DFS – District Forest Service 
DOF – Department of Fisheries, a generic term referring to the appropriate government entity in 
each of the three countries that address fishery management.  Formal names are:  
 Kenya: Fisheries Department 
 Tanzania: Fisheries Department  
Uganda: Department of Fisheries Resources 
EAIFFPA – East African Industrial Fishing and Fish Processors Association  
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GEF – Global Environmental Facility 
GLFC – Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
Haplochromine cichlids – species-rich genus of fish Haplochromis; diverse species of fish in 
the family Cichlidae.  These species provide a major fishery on Lake Victoria 
IDA – International Development Association 
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IMF – International Monetary Fund 
Landing site – A formal, dedicated area for fish to be brought in and weighed and recorded; a 
Beach Management Unit can consist of many landing sites, or just one 
LVBC – Lake Victoria Basin Commission  
LVFO – Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization  
Mukene – term in Tanzania for the species Rastrineobola argentea, see Rastrineobola 
NFA – National Forestry Authority 
Ngege – important native tilapia (Oreochromis esculentus) 
Nile Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) – introduced tilapia species on Lake Victoria 
NGO – Non-governmental organization 
Omena – term in Kenya for the species Rastrineobola argentea, see Rastrineobola. 
PFE – Permeant Forest Estate 
Rastrineobola (Rastrineobola argentea) – sardine-like fish endemic to Lake Victoria, locally 
known as dagaa (Uganda), omena (Kenya), mukene (Tanzania) 
SES – Social ecological systems 
UN – United Nations 
UNDP – United Nations Development Project 
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      ABSTRACT……. 
On Lake Victoria, East Africa, formal fishery co-management institutions are designed to 
facilitate collaboration between national governments and local communities with the intent of 
empowering the fishers and fishing communities to self-organize and conduct sustainable fishery 
management.  This dissertation investigates the challenges and successes of this approach, 
focusing on formal co-management institutions on Lake Victoria and the contributions of the 
fishing community and individuals directly involved in harvest and management of the fisheries.   
Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program was created using four concepts: 
decentralization, co-management, community participation, and self-organization.  This 
dissertation explores these characteristics to determine the program’s strengths and weaknesses.   
To determine how Lake Victoria’s fishery management program evolved, I compare two 
prevailing management approaches: top-down and bottom-up.  This comparison reveals the 
necessity and degree of community inclusion on Lake Victoria due to the nature of dependence on 
the fishery for livelihoods.  To accomplish community participation, it is necessary for devolution 
of authority—through decentralization—to occur.  As community participation requires fiscal and 
authoritative resources to administer management, I determine that one weakness in 
decentralization is the unbalanced distribution of both by the government to the community.  I 
compare Uganda’s co-management of natural resources, and determine that a balance must be 
struck between the national government’s need for profits from international markets for these 
natural resources and the required fiscal resources for community administration to manage these 
natural resources.  Further observations of the relationship between higher levels of government 
and community are often weak, absent, or unclear.  When any of these circumstances occur, 
communities must administer a large part of the fishery management program or activities on their 
own—they must self-organize.  Self-organization is the ability and will of communities and 
individuals to successfully act within the co-management program, with little or no external 
influences or incentives.  By comparing characteristics of self-organization against communities 
which had pre-existing fishery management organizations, I determine that communities exhibited 
strong self-organization characteristics more often at BMUs which had pre-existing organizations, 
than those communities that did not.  Finally, I reveal that without clear lines of authority and 
stable financial mechanisms, community organizations often lose, or do not acquire legitimacy by 
the government and fishers, resulting in the community’s inability to function as a resource 
management organization. Findings indicate that: (1) lack of support from higher political 
authorities undermine enforcement power at the local level; and, (2) lack of financial returns from 
both the fishery and higher political authorities reduce the BMU’s ability to function.  Each of 
these weaknesses de-legitimizes the local-level management organizations.  This dissertation 
concludes by providing recommendations that can be adopted by Lake Victoria’s government’s 
regarding fishery co-management.  
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CHAPTER 1:  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Part I: Overview 
Kenya’s, Tanzania’s, and Uganda’s borders all converge in the second largest lake by surface 
area in the world: Lake Victoria (Figure 1.1).  The lake is the largest in surface area in Africa, and, 
like most freshwater resources, it is an important multi-use resource, known distinctly for its 
valuable, vibrant, and diverse fisheries.  Lake Victoria employs three million people in fisheries-
related activities and contributes USD 600 million annually to the East African Community (Njiru 
et al. 2008), and contributes to food security and poverty reduction to 20 million people around the 
lake (Ugandan Department of Fisheries Resources 2003; LVFO 2011a).  Though only a single 
tropical lake, the capture fisheries produce more fish than the commercial fisheries on all five 
Laurentian Great Lakes combined1, triple the harvest of Lake Tanganyika (LTA 2012), and more 
than quadruple the harvest of Lake Malawi (FAO 2012), the second and third largest lakes in Africa, 
respectively. 
                                                 
1 Compared catch data from Great Lakes total commercial fishery catch (45,454 tons/year) source: 
(http://www.newton.dep.anl.gov/natbltn/200-299/nb295.htm) with 1999 catch data from Lake Victoria 700,000 to 
1,000,000 t of fish (FAO 2010a-e; LVFO 2012); the Great Lakes provides about 118,430 jobs in agriculture, fishing 
and food production (Vaccaro and Read 2011).  Lake Tanganyika total annual harvest is between 165,000 – 200,000 
tons (LTA 2012); Lake Malawi total annual harvest is between 40,000 – 50,000  tons/year (assuming Lake Malawi 
produces 75 percent of total fisheries catch in Malawi) years 2000-2009 (FAO 2012)  
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Like many other freshwater systems around the world, Lake Victoria has changed 
dramatically during the past 120 years due to problems associated with open-access fisheries, 
competition for common-property resources, environmental degradation (Njiru et al. 2008), 
introduction of exotic species (Njiru et al. 2005), eutrophication (Njiru et al. 2008), and overfishing 
(Mkumbo et al. 2007).  These problems emerged from heavy use from increasing human 
populations around the lake.  Fishing pressure on Lake Victoria is high, with more than 1,400 fish-
landing-sites, 194,000 fishers, and 64,000 fishing craft (LVFO 2010a).  Fishing pressure is, in part, 
driven by demand for fish protein and the resultant increasing value of fresh and processed fish, 
coupled with increasingly efficient fishing technology.   
To stay abreast of changing ecological, social, and political factors, fishery management on 
Lake Victoria has also evolved during the past century.  The major change that has influenced the 
creation of Lake Victoria’s current fishery management program is the realization that inclusion and 
participation of local fishers in the governance and management of these resources is necessary based 
on attributes of the fishers and the natural resources (Ostrom 1999).  Therefore, to protect the 
Figure 1.1: Maps of Africa detailing the Lake Victoria region. Images: Adapted from International 
Resource Center, 2015; and United Nations Map no. 4045 Rev. 4 (Jan, 2004). 
Figure 1.1: Maps of Africa detailing the Lake Victoria region. 
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fisheries, livelihoods, and well-being of those who depend upon them, formal fishery management 
institutions were developed to include fishers and other community members engaged in fisheries.   
The inclusion of communities into management of natural resources is accomplished through 
institutions, including decentralization, which is the devolution of authority from higher levels of 
government, including ministries and departments of fisheries, to lower-administrative levels, 
including Departments of Fisheries, enforcement entities, and communities.  Natural resource 
management, during the advent of colonialism, was structured in a top-down manner, meaning the 
government and other higher authorities manage the fishery with little or no input from fishers.  
Government agencies were directly responsible for managing the fishery.  This management 
approach failed for many reasons, with the most often cited reason being absence of fishers’ input.  
This lack of inclusion led to distrust of the government by fishers, and a sense that their resource was 
being taken away by outsiders (Abila et al. 2006).      
One approach to fisher inclusion is called co-management, a form of decentralization, where 
responsibility of managing the resource is shared between government and community.  Co-
management is a set of formal institutions (regulations, organizations, and roles) that have been 
created to help guide the various entities, including local communities and resource harvesters, in 
reducing over fishing through cooperation with each other.  Co-management creates formal 
relationship between communities and national governments; communities are often expected to 
manage the fishery on behalf of the national-level government.  Co-management calls upon fishers 
to establish commitments (regulations), monitor each other’s behavior (patrol), and impose 
sanctions (enforce) when commitments are broken, as well as other activities deemed necessary 
for effective fishery management.  Co-management is defined as a collaboration—sharing of 
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responsibility and authority—between higher levels of government and community (Pomeroy and 
Berkes 1997).  Challenges, however, exist that often inhibit successful management of the fishery.   
Despite creation of fishery co-management institutions on Lake Victoria, illegal fishing 
continues on Lake Victoria  (Mkumbo et al. 2009; Ogwang' et al. 2009).  Increasing local, regional, 
and international demand  have led to increased illegal fishing, often challenging both local 
communities and national governments who collectively manage the fisheries.  
Practitioners, managers, the media, and some researchers often blame communities—
whether they are a part of a formal management program or not—for failure of natural resource 
management. This dissertation focuses on Lake Victoria community organizations (called Beach 
Management Units (BMUs)) to determine the challenges associated at this level of management.  
Therefore, the reasons why some BMUs do not effectively administer fishery management and some 
do are the subject of this dissertation and are guided by arguments that Ostrom (2009) posits: that 
local-resource-harvesters’ have the ability to self-organize and maintain their natural resources 
through modes of oversight and methods for policing their own citizens without external influences.   
Natural resources are not disconnected from human interactions, rather, they are confounded 
and dependent on each other; interactions occur between ecological (biological) and human (social 
and political) systems called social-ecological systems (SES) (Ostrom 2009). Within SESs, the 
ability of local communities to successfully manage common property natural resources depends on, 
in part, the communities’ capacity to self-organize—the ability of a group of individuals to act 
voluntarily on their own behalf (Ostrom 2009).  Self-organization of communities can be central to 
successful co-management institutions because authority is ceded to community members and the 
majority of responsibility to patrol and enforce regulations which are intended to influence behavior 
of fishers, thereby limiting fish harvest and protecting the fishery resource.  During the previous 
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three decades, many studies have demonstrated that multiple and complex interactions among 
humans and between humans and the environment affect the likelihood that local communities will 
self-organize (Ostrom 2009).  SESs are made up of characteristics that can be placed into six causal 
classes: biophysical (resource mobility, visibility, reproductive capacity), institutional (enforcement 
capability, level of authority), infrastructural (access to markets), demographic (human populations, 
education), economic (value of fish, alternative livelihoods), and socio-political and cultural 
(community response and awareness to fishing regulations and enforcement), contexts that are both 
a part of, and external to, these SESs  (see Béné 2003; Ostrom 2005; Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; 
Janssen et al. 2007; Ostrom 2009).  Specifically, variables under these causal classes influence the 
ability of communities to effectively self-organize and, thereby, effectively participate in 
management of natural resources (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; Pomeroy 2007; Ostrom 2009); 
indeed, “Sustainable resource management can never be independent of sustainability of collective 
human institutions that frame resource governance” (Agrawal 2002, p. 41). 
This dissertation investigates the challenges and successes of how communities and 
individuals voluntarily self-organize through this co-management approach.  As multiple factors 
at multiple levels can either hinder or facilitate effective implementation of fishery co-management 
institutions, I used the six causal classes to inform my approach, as I developed a list of variables 
identified as influential to self-organization of local communities in natural resource management 
institutions.  Further, factors specific to Lake Victoria’s social-ecological system and the formal 
fishery co-management institutions were identified.  Data about these factors were collected through 
interviews conducted at 111 BMUs in all three countries.  This study identifies variables that 
influence behavior of fishers who are members of BMUs, and of the BMU committee leaders that 
administer fishery management. 
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Part II: Setting the Stage: Lake Victoria’s fisheries, challenges, and institutions 
The resource 
Lake Victoria’s highly productive fishery has been a valuable natural resource for 
communities living on its shores for thousands of years.  The fishery employs millions of people, 
produces valuable fish protein, and contributes millions of dollars to the East African Community 
(EAC) annually.  The lake’s fishery is a common-property, open-access natural resource system 
where it is costly (through effort, time, resources) to exclude users from the resource.  The lake is 
shared by three political states—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda occupying 6, 49, and 45 percent of 
the surface area, respectively (Njiru et al. 2008).  The lake has three prominent commercial fish 
species, the non-native Nile perch (Lates niloticus) and Nile tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus), and 
the indigenous sardine-like fish Rastrineobola argentea, called omena, mukene, or dagaa in 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, respectively. 
Over-harvest of Lake Victoria’s fisheries have been formally reported since the 1920s 
(Graham 1929), when governments and scientists relegated to managing the natural resources noted 
decreases in catches of native species (Mkumbo et al. 2009).  Incentives to over-harvest have 
increased during the past thirty years with introduction of the globally sought after and valuable Nile 
perch.  Recent stock assessments have indicated a serious decline of Nile perch populations on Lake 
Victoria due to overfishing (Mkumbo and Mlaponi 2007; Mkumbo et al. 2007; Njiru et al. 2007; 
Ojuok et al. 2007; Witte et al. 2007, and others).  Though Nile perch was the impetus for the current 
fishery management program on Lake Victoria, high fishing pressure and over- and illegal-fishing 
of all three of the Lake’s important fisheries have contributed to management efforts. 
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The institutions 
Acknowledging that fisheries harvest by one partner state will have impacts on the other 
partner states (LVFO 2005c), a fishery management approach was designed to transcend resource 
issues across national borders and to overcome differences in fishery management resulting from 
varying degrees of governance between the lake’s three national governments. Additionally, because 
of the reliance of a high number of community members on the fishery, fishers and stakeholders 
engaged in fishery activities were included in the management program, thus initiating co-
management.   
These institutions consist of formal constraints and incentives, in the form of regulations 
intended to structure human interactions and control fishing harvest behavior on Lake Victoria to 
ensure sustainable fisheries and community and country-wide development, (North 1990) allowing 
local communities to self-organize in managing their shared natural resource.   
The fishery co-management program on Lake Victoria was created to address challenges 
of over-harvest of common property resources, using current theoretical concepts of 
decentralization, co-management, community participation, and socio-political institutions.  This 
program was established to motivate and reinforce legal fishing behavior and, therefore, produce 
more sustainable fisheries and sustainable development (Bwathondi et al. 2001).  The five concepts 
on which Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management institutions were created are:  
(1) informal and formal institutions influence human behavior and interactions;  
(2) decentralization, an approach to creating institutions, where authority is formally ceded 
to lower political or administrative levels;  
(3) co-management, a result of decentralization, where responsibility of managing the 
resource is devolved and shared between government and community;  
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Figure 1.2: Institutional  Linkages  of the Lake Victoria fishery co-management program       
(4) community participation, an approach where local communities and other stakeholders 
become active in management of natural resources; and,  
5) self-organization—a concept of co-management where local actors act on behalf of the 
fishery in collective interests with little or no external assistance or influence.  
Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program consists of organizations, agencies, sets of 
rules, and regulations to guide fisher’s harvest behavior on the lake. Inclusive in this program are the 
national fishery research institutes of each partner state, regional department of fisheries officers, 
and community members engaged in fishery related activities including fish traders, net makers and 
menders, fishers, and fish sellers. All of these entities, groups, and individuals have a role, whether 
formal or informal, in management of the fishery and fall under guidance of the Lake Victoria 
Fisheries Organization (LVFO), a regional organization responsible for managing fishery resources 
 
Figure 1.2: A simplified map of institutional linkages of Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program.  The 
Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization coordinates fishery policies between the three partner states and ensures 
harmonization of these policies between higher level government and the BMUs.  Co-management, the shared 
responsibilities and movement of information is represented by the vertical lines and arrows on the far right.  Mid-
level authorities are not represented by design (see discussion in Chapter 5).  Adapted from LVFO (2005a). 
Uganda
Dept. of Fishery
Kenya
Dept. of Fishery
Tanzania
Dept. of Fishery
Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization
District Office District Office District Office District Office District Office
fishers
BMU BMU BMU BMU BMU BMU BMU BMU
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under the East African Community (EAC) (Figure 1.2). The LVFO is charged with developing 
conservation and management measures for sustainable fisheries and coordinating fishery 
management through fostering cooperation among partner states and between partner states and 
BMUs (LVFO 2011b). 
The Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization: An interjurisdictional organization  
The Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization was formed through a convention, entered into 
force in 1996 between the three EAC partner states which share Lake Victoria: Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Uganda. The LVFO is the fisheries management arm of the EAC and serves two important 
functions, first, to coordinate and harmonize fishery management and research between the three 
partner countries, and second, to coordinate fisheries management between each of the central 
government’s department of fisheries (DOFs) and their respective local fishing communities 
(BMUs).  The former function serves to address challenges that common-property, multi-
jurisdictional fisheries present.  The latter function facilitates the shared relationship, responsibilities, 
resources, and authority between the national governments and BMUs (Jentoft 1989).  
The LVFO secretariat is the executive organization of the Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organization which ensures policies and decisions created at the highest levels of government—
Council of Ministers2—are adopted (LVFO 2011c) and instituted at the local level.  The fishing 
regulations created within Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program outline the use of fishing 
gear and practices, including restrictions on fish size, fishing gear, and fishing methods. These rules 
are directed at the local user—fishermen—who make the ultimate decision about how they will 
                                                 
2 The Council of Ministers (Council), consist of ministers of the partner states’ ministries responsible for fisheries.  
The Council is presented recommendations by the Policy Steering Committee which is informed by a Fisheries 
Management Committee and Scientific Committee.  Members of all committees are engaged in fisheries, including 
heads of fisheries departments, research institutions, and permanent secretaries responsible for fisheries (LVFO 
2001; LVFO 2011c). 
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harvest the resource. The LVFO Secretariat and its partners are charged with educating fishing 
communities (BMU committees and members of BMUs around the lake) about rules and how those 
rules create sustainable fisheries and community development, the functions and responsibilities of 
BMUs and of fishers, and other functions and responsibilities of the fishing community. 
Central government: Ministries and departments  
Fishery-related central authority on Lake Victoria are the Ministries of Agriculture: Animal 
Industry and Fisheries (Uganda), Ministry of Fisheries Development (Kenya), and Ministry of 
Livestock and Fisheries Development (Tanzania).  These ministries oversee their respective 
departments of fisheries3 (DOF). Each central government around Lake Victoria—under trust law—
is obligated to hold natural resources in trust for the people of their countries (United Republic of 
Tanzania 1977; Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries 2004; Republic of 
Kenya 2008).  Legal ownership of fisheries resources is vested in the states’ central government 
authority as trustee and, therefore, the state is obliged to manage resource in the interest of 
beneficiaries, those who depend on these resources (Naluwairo 2005).  
Guidelines for fishery management on Lake Victoria state that each partner state’s 
department of fisheries promote, support, and guide BMUs ability to function, especially under 
“circumstances where local capacity alone will not be sufficient to safeguard the livelihoods of 
people depending on fisheries resources” (Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and 
Fisheries 2004, p. 12).  However, as is noted throughout this dissertation, support by government of 
community entities can be weak or non-existent.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Ugandan Department of Resources, Tanzanian Fisheries Department, Kenyan Fisheries Department. 
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Mid-level entities 
Enforcement of fishing rules at the community level is often more successful when 
partnerships between law enforcement officials occurs.  Mid-level entities are numerous around 
Lake Victoria and include the police, marine police, army, regional and district fisheries officers, 
and village committees.  These mid-level entities often assist in the administration of patrols, 
ensuring the safety of community patrol members and reinforcing the legitimacy of the BMU 
committee.  The purposes and functions of these mid-level entities, however, are either poorly 
defined or not included under BMU guidelines and other guiding materials for Lake Victoria’s 
fishery co-management program.  Specifically, the function of the marine police, army, or village 
committees is either unclear or unwritten.  Confounding the problem, not all police have fishery-
related duties.  Confusion, therefore often exists as to who has authority in fishery matters. Reports 
of police and army intervention, both helpful and hampering fishery management, have occurred at 
BMUs around the lake (see Chapter 5, Lawrence 2013). It is often unclear whether these enforcement 
entities are required to report to, or collaborate with, local BMUs.  It is also unclear whether army 
or police have any authority in fishery matters or where BMUs operate.  Often times, police or army 
authority is abused for financial gain or procure valuable fish.  
The lack of a consistent line of authority between any mid-level entities tends to disrupt the 
legitimacy of BMU committee leaders, thereby reducing their ability to conduct enforcement 
activities or other fishery-related activities. 
Local fishery management: Beach Management Units  
Beach Management Units are the foundation of Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management 
program. They are legally empowered, local organizations that are responsible for the majority of 
fishing management activities, such as patrolling, enforcement of rules, and—to a lesser degree—
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punishment, on Lake Victoria. Each BMU is located around pre-existing, local fish-landing sites 
(Ugandan Department of Fisheries Resources 2003). The BMUs are community-run governing 
organizations consisting of all users engaged in fisheries-related activities, including “boat owners, 
fishing crew members, fish mongers, artisanal fish processors, local gear makers and repairers, boat 
builders, fishing input suppliers, and industrial fish processors’ agents” (Ugandan Department of 
Fisheries Resources 2003, p. 18).  Following notions of democratic decentralization, the fishing 
community must elect a BMU committee of 9–15 members to be drawn from their population and 
be inclusive of all stakeholder groups.  Specifically, guidelines of membership of the committee 
specify that representation on the committee should follow a distribution of 30 percent boat owners; 
30 percent crew (fishing laborers); 30 percent other community groups (including fish processors, 
boat makers, local gear makers or repairers, and fish equipment sellers); and 10 percent fish mongers 
and traders (LVFO 2005a).  Efforts are in place to include those who were historically 
underrepresented or disenfranchised, including women, fish mongers, and traders (LVFO 2005a; 
LVFO 2011d). Thus, in addition to the required 10 percent fish mongers and traders, BMU 
committee guidelines require 30 percent membership of women, so as to empower women and 
consider their views in management decisions, especially based on their influence in the movement 
of fish (Ugandan Department of Fisheries Resources 2003; Kenyan Department of Fisheries 2006; 
United Republic of Tanzania 2011).   
The BMU operates within pre-determined geographic boundaries, and assist with policy 
development, rules enforcement, and administrative duties pertaining to fishery-related activities. 
The BMUs: create and enforce their own local by-laws—governed by lake-wide guidelines—for 
sustainable fisheries management; serve as resource-data collection points for better fisheries 
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management and monitoring; and increase local users’ capacity to manage their finances (Ebong et 
al. 2004).  
Fishery management, such as enforcement of rules, patrolling for illegal gear and activities, 
and tax collection, are executed by the BMU committees.  When done appropriately, these activities 
are carried out in “collaboration with the relevant authorities” (LVFO 2005a, p. 12). It is at the local 
level, the interface between the BMU committee (regulators) and fishers, that fisheries harvest is 
regulated and the resultant tax collection is conducted.  
On enforcement of fisheries rules, BMUs major charge is specifically to “ensure compliance 
with local and national regulations . . . formulate and enforce community by-laws at the local level; 
[and] monitor fishing activities within their localities” (LVFO 2005a, p. 3). BMUs are therefore 
considered the action arm of fisheries management on the lake, designating the national departments 
of fisheries to supporting roles. BMU committee members have legal authority to conduct 
enforcement and the authority to arrest offenders, but BMU committees cannot prosecute offenders. 
BMU committee members are required to transfer arrested offenders and their illegal gear or fish to 
fisheries officers or the police. In Kenya and Tanzania, the authorized officers (fisheries officer or 
police) then need a court injunction to dispose of the illegal gear or fish. In Uganda, BMU committee 
members are allowed to destroy (usually through burning) illegal gear or fish by an authorized officer 
of the BMU committee.  
The central government also bestows authority for tax collection associated with the fishery 
to the local level. Guidelines for BMUs, however, do not automatically allow BMU committees to 
collect taxes, instead, BMUs in Tanzania must apply to be the tender for tax collection; otherwise 
other entities (not the BMU committee) are in charge of tax collection. The purpose of tax and fine 
collection is to provide for sustainable and consistent operation, such as patrols for illegal activity. 
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When the central government bestows authority to BMUs to collect taxes, there is a level of trust 
that is demonstrated by the local level to conduct fisheries management operations (see Chapter 5 
for a discussion on this subject). 
Summary of Lake Victoria fishery co-management 
The fishery co-management program was developed using five concepts intended to include 
fishing communities.  These concepts include: decentralizing authority and resources from central-
level government to allow lower-administration of fishery management; community inclusion 
through co-management institutions, whereby community organizations called BMUs were granted 
authority and ownership of the fishery through formal roles; and self-organization, a result of the 
other concepts, where local actors act on behalf of the government, the resource, and the community 
to implement fishery management activities.  Each BMU on Lake Victoria is bound by the same set 
of fishing rules and guidelines, informed by all partners within the program. The LVFO guides 
BMUs in implementing fishery management policies and ensures that each BMU has the appropriate 
committee and structure outlined in BMU guidelines, and that each BMU has appropriate capacity 
(through trainings) to organize and follow established rules and guidelines for sustainable fishery 
management.  To this end, responsible management and sustainable harvest are meant to be achieved 
by changing fisher’s behavior through roles, regulations, and goals with input by the local 
communities and fishers (Stein 2008).  The BMUs are also meant to share fishery management 
authority with each national government’s fisheries department and enforce fishing regulations that 
are standardized around the lake to prevent illegal fishing.  As will be shown in this dissertation, 
inefficiencies have emerged in Lake Victoria’s co-management program; the intended processes, 
relationships, and administration do not always achieve the planned result.   
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 It should be acknowledged that the fishery co-management program on Lake Victoria is the 
result of much larger efforts by the international community to influence the development of 
developing countries.  The inefficiencies which have emerged in Lake Victoria’s co-management 
program are, in part, a reflection on much larger efforts by the international community to intervene 
in poverty alleviation and debt relief undertaken by multi-national organizations, specifically the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  These two institutions provide financial 
and technical assistance to developing countries for development with the goal of reducing poverty.  
Their approach was strongly influenced by neoliberal economic policies which diminished 
livelihood alternatives in many sectors—such as agricultural livelihoods and formal sector 
employment—contributing to the general human migration toward “open-access” natural resources 
(Stein 2008), such as Lake Victoria’s fishery.  The emergence of the valuable Nile perch, both 
domestically and internationally, further augmented economic and livelihood incentives for 
migration towards the lake and fishing in an unsustainable manner. 
The policies that these institutions provided for developing countries, including those around 
Lake Victoria, influenced the current conditions around the lake in general, and the development of 
the fishery co-management program specifically.  Funding for development improved beach sites to 
prepare fish for international movement of fish are often provided by donor international 
organizations, bringing into question whether BMUs were established for the purpose of export (and 
benefiting international demand) rather than for development of communities.  The effects of such 
policies will be seen throughout much of this dissertation, but for a more comprehensive discussion 
on the influences of development policies, how they impacted Lake Victoria’s fishery co-
management program, and the potential for perverse incentives, see Chapter 6. 
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Part III: Plan of dissertation 
Cooperation in fishery management on Lake Victoria and why and how it occurs, specifically 
at the community level, are the central themes of this dissertation.  Bottom-up approaches to fishery 
management in developing countries has been an approach during the past 30 years and is based on 
decentralization policies, where authority is devolved to lower levels of political authority, including 
the communities.  Chapter 2, in part, answers the question:  Why is it necessary to approach fishery 
management with strong community involvement?  This chapter presents a comparative analysis of 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to fishery management, comparing the approaches to inclusion 
of community and stakeholder (those who are in one way or another engaged in fisheries) 
investments in the Laurentian Great Lakes and Lake Victoria, highlighting the necessary approaches 
for each geographic resource.  This chapter establishes the necessary component of contemporary 
approaches to natural resource management in developing countries, that of community inclusion.  
Therefore, the discussion of Chapter 2 evaluates fishery management in both the Great Lakes and 
Lake Victoria Basins, with a focus on primary structures and institutions established to facilitate 
interjurisdictional cooperation, collaborative processes, and co-management.  Fishery 
management in both regions involves both “top-down” and bottom-up” elements; top-down is 
defined as the execution of fishery management by central government agencies, and bottom-up 
is defined as resource-harvesters or community member involvement in the development of policy 
and engagement in management and enforcement.  
Using the notions of bottom-up natural resource management approach from Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3 uses Uganda as a case study for investigating decentralization on natural resource 
governance, comparing forest and fish resources to determine some of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the approach.  With community participation the focus of co-management, it is essential that 
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devolution of authority to lower administrative levels, specifically community organizations, takes 
place.  The value of natural resources, however, extends well past benefiting the communities’, 
individuals, their subsistence livelihoods and development; the value often contributes to the 
government’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  The GDP benefits the country as a whole.  Therefore, 
it is important that governments, when devolving authority to community organizations, strike a 
balance between the government’s need for gaining profits from regional and international 
markets, with the communities’ required fiscal flow and authority for conducting natural resource 
management bestowed on them by the government.   
In developing countries, community members who rely on natural resources are affected 
most when a new management or governance arrangement is instituted to manage that natural 
resource.  Natural resource management programs rely on the ability and willingness of individuals 
to follow regulations, often determining success of the program, especially management programs 
that rely on the community to execute them. Chapter 4 highlights Lake Victoria’s fishery co-
management program, where inclusion of community features prominently in the administration of 
the program.  Though sharing management responsibility and authority between higher-level 
government and community, the majority of fishery management responsibilities fall on the 
community.  This chapter, thus, looks at the ability and will of communities and individuals to 
successfully act within the co-management program with little or no external influences or 
incentives.  And further, determines that experience and familiarity with self-organization, prior to 
co-management, strengthens self-organization within the co-management program.  I define the 
central characteristics of self-organization and co-management and why each is necessary.  I 
include pre-existing fishery management experience as my dependent variable.  By comparing 
characteristics of self-organization against communities which had pre-existing fishery management 
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organizations, I determined that communities exhibited stronger self-organization characteristics 
more often at BMUs which had pre-existing organizations, than those communities that did not 
have pre-existing organizations.   
Chapter 5 examines the concept of legitimacy between the BMUs and higher levels of 
government within the fisheries co-management program.  Legitimacy is the acceptance by fishers 
of the regulations, and of the authority that govern the fishery.  I evaluate how effective fishery co-
management institutions require a strong relationship between national government and 
communities, because weakness in this relationship can cause management of the fishery to be 
ineffective due to weak legitimacy.  Two factors that undermine legitimacy of the BMUs: (1) lack 
of support from higher political authorities; and, (2) lack of financial returns from both the fishery 
and higher political authorities, thus reducing the BMUs’ ability to function.  Each of these two 
factors causes delegitimization of the BMUs, rendering many of them ineffective in their charge to 
implement fishery management duties.   
Lake Victoria’s current fishery management program is a result of the region’s past and 
present social, ecological, and political influences.  These influences, and many others, offer 
solutions and challenges in effectively managing the lake’s fishery.  These four chapters present the 
fishery management program on Lake Victoria, with a focus on fisher and community participation 
within the larger co-management program.  They identify the necessity of community participation 
and how culture, norms, and resource use must be considered when instituting a management 
program; the precondition that communities have the ability to self-organize; and, requisite clear 
lines of authority and roles by all members of the institutions, to be efficacious.  Chapter 6 then, is 
a synthesis of the above chapters, while also evaluating the literature on decentralization and co-
management to determine if the failures and successes of Lake Victoria’s fishery program could be 
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due to inherent weaknesses in the approach.  Much of the data reveals weaknesses and strengths 
within the co-management program, at first glance, might be approached with institutional fixes (see 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5).  However, the concepts of decentralization and co-management must be 
investigated further to determine if there is an inherent weakness in these approaches because of 
faulty economic policies which initially influenced their creation.   
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES IN THE MANAGEMENT 
OF THE LAURENTIAN GREAT LAKES AND LAKE VICTORIA 
FISHERIES: A COMPARISON OF TWO SHARED WATER BODIES4 
 
Abstract 
 
Community participation is necessary in fishery management.  On two of the 
world’s largest freshwater systems: the Laurentian Great Lakes and Lake Victoria, 
community is included, to different degrees.  Both lakes harbor valuable fisheries, 
depended upon by community members living along their shores.  This chapter 
identifies the differences of these resources and produces a comparative analysis of 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to fishery management to determine the 
necessary investment of community inclusion in fishery management.  The 
discussion evaluates fishery management with a focus on primary structures and 
institutions established to facilitate interjurisdictional cooperation, collaborative 
processes, and co-management.  Fishery management in both regions involves both 
“top-down” and bottom-up” elements; top-down is defined as the execution of 
fishery management by central government agencies, and bottom-up is defined as 
resource-harvesters or community member involvement in the development of 
policy and engagement in management and enforcement.  Results from this chapter 
reveal the necessity for a “bottom-up” approach on Lake Victoria, where 
community inclusion is required due to the nature of dependence on the fishery for 
their livelihoods. 
  
                                                 
4 This chapter was previously published as: Gaden et al. (2012). Top-down and bottom-up approaches in the 
management of the Laurentian Great Lakes and Lake Victoria fisheries: A comparison of two shared water bodies. 
Great Lakes Great Responsibilities: Lessons in Participatory Governance. V. I. Grover and G. Krantzberg. Enfield, 
New Hampshire, Science Publishers: 364-390. 
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Introduction  
The Laurentian Great Lakes of North America and Lake Victoria of East Africa support 
thriving fisheries that provide millions of people with jobs, food, income, subsistence, and 
recreational opportunities.  The Great Lakes5 comprise the largest system of freshwater lakes on 
the planet and Lake Superior and Lake Victoria rank first and second, respectively, in surface area 
as the world’s two largest lakes.  Fishery management authority in both regions is diffuse, with 
two nations, eight states, the province of Ontario, and U.S. tribes involved in Great Lakes fishery 
management and three partner states—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda—and scores of local entities 
called “Beach Management Units” involved in Lake Victoria fishery management.  Officials in 
both regions coordinate their fishery management activities amongst themselves, while also 
understanding and incorporating stakeholder (those who are in one way or another engaged in 
fisheries) interests and needs into management actions. 
 This chapter discusses fishery management in both the Great Lakes and Lake Victoria 
Basins, with a focus on the primary structures and institutions established to facilitate 
interjurisdictional cooperation, collaborative processes, or co-management.  Fishery management 
in both regions involves both “top-down” and bottom-up” elements; top-down is defined here as 
the execution of fishery management by central government agencies, and bottom-up is defined 
here as resource-harvesters or community members involvement in the development of policy and 
engagement in management and enforcement.  In the Great Lakes region, top-down authority is 
exercised by each of the states, the province of Ontario, and U.S. tribes in that they develop and 
implement their fishery regulations on behalf of stakeholders, while bottom-up coordination is 
                                                 
5 Throughout this chapter, the term “Great Lakes” refers to the Laurentian Great Lakes: Lakes Superior, Michigan, 
Huron, Erie, Ontario, and the connecting channels.  The Great Lakes discussed in this chapter are not to be confused 
with the “great lakes of Africa,” a term used to refer to Lakes Victoria, Malawi, Tanganyika, Albert, Kivu, Turkana, 
Edward, and others as a single group.  
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done at the discretion of each jurisdiction and, thus, varies across the region.  Cooperative 
interjurisdictional management occurs as well, coordinated by the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission through a governance arrangement called A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of 
Great Lakes Fisheries (GLFC 1997), which serves to moderate unilateral, parochial action on a 
shared resource.  On Lake Victoria, the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO)—the 
fisheries management arm of the East African Community—harmonizes fisheries regulations 
between the three partner states.  The LVFO also coordinates fishery management responsibilities 
between each partner state and their respective BMUs in the co-management program (LVFO 
2001).  In both the Great Lakes and Lake Victoria regions, the established coordination structures 
were developed deliberately and over time to meet the specific needs of the respective regions. 
 
Dimensions of top-down and bottom-up 
Management of the Great Lakes and Lake Victoria fisheries ultimately comes down to 
issues of sovereignty and how best to respect that sovereignty when resources are shared among 
jurisdictions.  A “sovereign” government has defined territory, a defined population, autonomy, 
governmental powers, a legal identity, and fiscal independence (Holloway 1972). Sovereignty has 
two basic elements: the government’s ability to control its own domestic activities and its ability 
to interact autonomously and equally with other sovereigns (Haas and Sundgren 1990).  Simply, 
sovereignty allows jurisdictions to pursue their own interests (Weiss 1999).  A jurisdiction’s 
sovereignty and its ability to exercise its will is limited by its ability to defend itself from the 
encroachments of other jurisdictions, its ability to expend resources to encroach upon the 
sovereignty of others, or its willingness to give up some sovereignty to achieve a collective goal.  
Conversely, preventing the exercising of another jurisdiction’s sovereign will is difficult in the 
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absence of binding mechanisms that include enforcement or punishment.  Nevertheless, as this 
chapter will discuss, sovereign, top-down execution of a jurisdiction’s will can be tempered by 
strategic governance approaches. 
 In fishery management, sovereign actions affect and in turn are affected by fishers’ 
behavior, attitudes, and compliance.  A management decision involving a quota, for instance, will 
influence how much a commercial fisher will harvest, while that commercial fisher’s level of 
compliance with the quota will likely influence future management decisions.  Because the 
relationship between those who govern the fishery and those who are governed is somewhat 
symbiotic, the process about how decisions are made and ultimately who has the authority for the 
decisions are central to management. 
Decisions and subsequent management actions are regularly considered to be “top-down” 
or “bottom-up.”  Top-down (also called “command-and-control” or “managerial”) decisions 
descend from a central authority—usually a government agency with prevailing regulatory or 
management responsibilities—and contain often broad policies that are to be applied to specific 
cases (Rachlinski 2006).  Top-down management is driven by the sovereign will, goals, and 
responsibilities of the government entrusted to allocate the fishery in the name of the public good; 
compliance on the part of the governed for regulations is sought, regardless of whether the 
governed agree with the jurisdiction’s goals (Bryan 2004).  Throughout the world, sovereign 
authorities generally have the power requisite to carry out fishery management and, in fact, top-
down approaches to management practice like quota-setting, law enforcement, and bag limits are 
the models generally followed (Townsend and Pooley 1995; Acheson et al. 1998; Kooiman and 
Chuenpagdee 2005).  Townsend and Pooley (1995) say 
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Not only does the government determine the appropriate level of rights to allocate 
at each point in time, but it also has the sole responsibility for all other decisions 
that determine stock conditions (such as closed seasons or minimum mesh sizes).  
The only responsibility that is distributed to individuals is the right to organize 
fishing activity within the constraint of the input or quota allocation. 
 
Important here is the jurisdiction’s ability to exercise its sovereign authority and the limited 
conveyance of discretion to the individual fishers.  A jurisdiction’s laws, regulations, and other 
fishery management mechanisms do not always include provisions mandating fisher involvement 
or consultation in decision-making (Bryan 2004), thus creating the inherent tendency toward top-
down management. 
 In practice, however, government decisions are not made in a vacuum, absent of an 
understanding or consideration for socio-economic dimensions.  Indeed, while government 
authorities may make fishery policies, laws, and regulations, they usually do so in consultation 
with the governed (Kooiman and Chuenpagdee 2005).  Given the myriad interest in fisheries—
whether stakeholders are interested in maintaining their livelihoods, preserving or enhancing 
recreational opportunities, or protecting subsistence fishing rights—governments rarely are 
afforded a blank cheque to impose unfettered power. 
 The incorporation of stakeholders into the process of fishery management is a “bottom-up” 
approach, and such approaches have been on the rise in fishery management for decades (Rettig 
et al. 1989; Townsend and Pooley 1995).  Rettig et al. (1989) say: “What is . . . surprising is the 
increasing number of forums in which fishermen are seriously discussing new approaches [to 
management].”  Bottom-up decisions emerge from the resource harvesters themselves and reflect 
case-specific policies that might be applied broadly (Rachlinski 2006).  This public participation 
could spawn from citizens who, through political processes, lobbying, or coalition-building 
demand to be heard, or it could come from government actions to facilitate input (Head 2007).   
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This chapter focuses on the latter—the establishment of formal processes to ensure that 
interests beyond the individual government jurisdictions are incorporated into management.  These 
processes take many forms, from formal to informal, from enforceable to non-binding, from 
narrow in focus to lake-wide or basin-wide.  The point of bottom-up approaches on the Great Lakes 
is not to relinquish the government’s public trust responsibilities to non-governmental actors, 
rather, it is to create some mechanism to ensure that the public’s interests are heard and, to the 
greatest extent practicable, incorporated into management decisions.  And on Lake Victoria, 
similarly, not to relinquish the government’s public trust responsibilities to non-government 
actors, but to ensure the public’s interests are heard and incorporated through the inclusion of 
community members in decision making and ceding or devolving authority to conduct actual 
management actions. 
 Management processes used in Great Lakes and Lake Victoria fishery management fall 
into four broad categories: (1) interjurisdictional cooperation, (2) collaborative management, (3) 
decentralization, and (4) co-management.  These four general approaches illustrate progressively 
stronger movement toward true stakeholder empowerment.  These approaches define how people 
work together and stem from the notion that stakeholder involvement legitimizes and enhances 
management decisions (Jentoft et al. 1998; Krueger and Decker 1999).  
 
Interjurisdictional Cooperation 
Sovereign entities, whether nations or sub-national units, retain authority over their natural 
resources.  When a common property resource is involved, independent jurisdictions choose either 
to compete or cooperate when conflict arises (Kohn 1992).  Sovereigns are “jurisdictionally equal” 
(Young 1994) and, as such, can erect barriers to intervention in their affairs.  “Interjurisdictional 
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cooperation” results when jurisdictions must and do work together to protect and sustain the shared 
resource.  Undoubtedly, sovereign jurisdictions will face conflict over their fishery management 
activities, and jurisdictions often have differing management philosophies, needs, constituent 
pressures, and political dynamics.  Managers may feel conflicted over whether to satisfy their 
parochial interests or to consider the interests of other jurisdictions.  In the absence of 
communications, conflicting management philosophies could cause jurisdictions to work at cross 
purposes; to permit selfish, unsustainable harvest; or to distrust others’ motivations or intentions.  
 To transcend competition and facilitate cooperation, a typical tool is the use of an 
institution or an agreement.  On the international level, treaties are the strongest, most legalistic 
way nations cooperate.  Treaties are enforceable through international law and often are supported 
by a commission or a secretariat to facilitate compliance.  Agreements among non-federal 
governments (e.g. states, provinces, tribes) are also common.  In the United States, for example, 
“interstate compacts” are agreements among states that bind them to a shared set of laws 
addressing a shared policy.  In a non-binding or less-formal setting, governments discuss routinely 
interjurisdictional matters with each other and seek ways to harmonize regulations, share 
information, and establish reciprocal practices.  In many cases, a commission or some other body 
is formed to ensure compliance with the agreement.  The nature and level of formality of an 
agreement is, of course, highly dependent on the unique circumstances that exist and what the 
jurisdictions hope to accomplish.  The ultimate goal is to facilitate interjurisdictional cooperation 
among sovereign entities. 
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Collaborative Management 
The term “collaborative management” is often used synonymously with terms like 
“collaborative decision making,” “citizen participation,” “cooperative management,” or “public 
consultation,” but regardless of the term, such a process allows people to come together and 
address issues of mutual interest.  Collaborative management occurs when citizens, either by 
government prompting or their own initiative, have an avenue to participate in the development 
and implementation of natural resource policies (Head 2007; Ansell and Gash 2008).  Although 
the ability of citizens to be involved in bottom-up processes ranges broadly, collaborative 
processes go beyond simple information exchange and instead give participants a role in the 
decision-making process (Ansell and Gash 2008).  Collaborative management as a concept, 
however, generally stops short of the government delegating responsibilities or authorities to 
stakeholders.  Instead, collaborative management is a way for government to incorporate some 
bottom-up mechanisms into their decision-making processes.  
 
Decentralization 
“Decentralization” (also called “devolution”) of natural resource management occurs when 
a government formally cedes authority and power to lower orders of government, institutions, or 
the resource-extractors themselves (Ribot 2002b).  The logic behind decentralized management is 
that local institutions and resource-harvesters can often better determine and respond to local needs 
and aspirations because of their intimate knowledge of the resource and their proximity to it (Ribot 
2002b; Jentoft 2004).  Indeed, some say the most effective governance is the arrangement closest 
to the resource, where local knowledge will be greatest and resource harvesters will have an 
enhanced ability to interact frequently with local officials (see Krantzberg 2012 for a discussion 
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on the role of municipalities in governance of the Great Lakes).  Decentralization goes beyond 
delegation of responsibilities to local governments or resource harvesters; it is designed to increase 
the responsibility of the resource-harvester in hopes of better resource management.  It creates a 
sense of ownership, investment, and deep responsibility for the resource (Jentoft 2004); it is an 
institutionalized form of community participation (Ribot 2002b).  Decentralization, with its 
promises of effective delegation of responsibility to lower administrative levels, offers several 
challenges which can hinder effective functioning of natural resource governance.  For example, 
the central government might be unwilling or unable to relinquish control to lower-level actors, 
whether because of paternalistic tendencies (Twyman 1998; Wunsch 2001; Ribot et al. 2006), or 
perverse incentives, whereby government is receiving benefits without the perceived necessity to 
devolve financial inputs (shirking their responsibilities to lower-administrative levels) (see 
Chapter 3: Lawrence and Watkins 2012 for discussion on inefficiencies of decentralzation 
approach).   
 
Co-management 
“Co-management” is a broad, widely applied term that describes a cooperative 
arrangement whereby a traditional government agency shares power with other agencies, with 
local institutions, or even with the stakeholders themselves (Townsend and Pooley 1995; Sen and 
Nielsen 1996; Castro and Nielsen 2001; Kooiman and Chuenpagdee 2005; Armitage et al. 2007; 
Berkes 2007).  Embedded in co-management is the sharing of authority and responsibilities (either 
voluntarily or forced, as in by a court), as multiple entities manage the same resource or the same 
waters, and share accountability.  Co-management is a “horizontal” relationship, less focused on 
hierarchical control and more focused on the joint development and implementation of fisheries 
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policies between the governed and government (Pinkerton 1989; Townsend and Pooley 1995; 
Kooiman and Chuenpagdee 2005).  A jurisdiction could choose to create a co-management 
arrangement or could have that arrangement forced upon it (i.e. because another jurisdiction has 
responsibilities over the same waters or a court imposes it).  Commonly, co-management arises 
after significant conflict and serves as a way to overcome competition (Castro and Nielsen 2001).   
 A key aspect of co-management is that no one jurisdiction has complete autonomy over 
the resource (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997).  The literature discusses a wide range of co-management 
arrangements covering a variety of natural resource policies.  Most commonly in fisheries, co-
management refers to arrangements made between governments and local harvesters as a way to 
involve the community at all levels of policy development, and often including implementation of 
the management program (Kearney 1989; Gough 2006).  For instance, co-management could 
involve the government establishing broad policies and allowing local harvesters to work out 
details equitably amongst themselves (Pinkerton 1989).  Co-management is also discussed in terms 
of the relationship between governments and native6 peoples, where management authorities and 
expected responsibilities are carefully negotiated and relatively clear (Castro and Nielsen 2001).  
In many instances, treaties, agreements, court orders, or other legal mechanisms affirm or afford 
native peoples autonomous rights, which might include management responsibilities (e.g. Busiahn 
1989; Doubleday 1989).  The important point in cases of co-management between government 
and indigenous communities is the fact that, in some instances, both authorities mange the same 
waters and that co-management arrangements recognize such things as who has the right to 
harvest, who can restrict access to the fishery, and who can participate in management (Doubleday 
1989). 
                                                 
6 The term “native peoples” and “indigenous communities” in this chapter refers specifically to U.S. tribal or Native 
American, and Canadian First Nations groups, as sovereign entities. 
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 One major challenge of co-management is the potential lack of balance in the power 
relationship between the government agency and the other entities involved in co-management 
(Townsend and Pooley 1995).  In cases where the government devolves management to a local 
organization, a community, or a set of harvesters, the government still retains management 
authority and, as such, can still dominate management.  Often the local participants will need 
central governments to enforce laws and regulations or even to preserve the rights of the fisher 
(Folke and Berkes 1995).  In other cases, such as arrangements between native peoples and the 
government, the co-management regime is the result of court cases or binding negotiations 
(Busiahn 1989; Doubleday 1989).  Additionally, central governments can devolve management 
power to lower-levels of authority and not provide enough resources for effective management to 
persist (see Chapter 3: Lawrence and Watkins 2013).  Unless co-management exists under law or 
court order, governments can exercise their ability to ignore or supersede many management 
decisions made through a co-management program, given governments often have more power 
than local institutions.  Even under formal co-management arrangements, central governments 
might not provide enough direction, and inefficiencies may result (see Chapter 5) 
 Scholars have identified benefits to a bottom-up approach.  Berkes and Folke (1998), who 
discuss bottom-up actions in terms of co-management, hold the view that humans and the natural 
system are so closely linked that management decisions made without local knowledge or citizen 
input lean toward being arbitrary.  Others stress that policies made through collaborative processes 
have the potential to be more balanced than top-down policies and convey a greater sense of 
ownership among the participants in the policies; citizens feel they have an enhanced stake in the 
matter (Pinkerton 1989; Hanna 1995; Krueger and Decker 1999; Bryan 2004; Pinkerton and John 
2008; Pinkerton 2009).  Because of a sense of shared ownership, policies originating at a local 
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level are likely more accepted than top-down policies that come from a distant source, thus 
reducing conflict, enhancing compliance, and lessening the costs of implementation and 
enforcement (Pinkerton 1989; Townsend and Pooley 1995; Berkes and Folke 1998; Acheson 2003; 
Bryan 2004; Pinkerton and John 2008). 
 While many espouse the benefits of a bottom-up approach, others are not sure it serves to 
mobilize citizens effectively or even produce better policies.  For instance, while a problem might 
generate strong, local interest, stakeholders often participate with a special, parochial agenda and 
a lack of broad knowledge on the topic.  Moreover, those who participate in a bottom-up process 
are often those who are the most passionate about the issue; the bottom-up process, therefore, does 
not necessarily incorporate the range of views (Manthesian 1998; Abel and Stephan 2000; van 
Sittert 2002).  A policy that fails to take the range of view into consideration is, some argue, an 
undemocratic reflection of parochial interests; special interests are allowed to have an inordinate 
affect on policy to the detriment of those interested in larger-scale ecosystem protection 
(McCloskey 2000; Manring 2005).  If the government relies on collaborative processes to 
legitimize policies, those at the table will dictate the policy, regardless if the policy is sound (Lange 
2001).  In an attempt to establish bottom-up policies that are more participatory, strong local 
interests could work to prevent change, divert culpability, and even allow managers to avoid 
making touch decisions (Coggins 2001). 
 
Fishery Management on the Laurentian Great Lakes  
The Great Lakes are a major natural feature on the North American continent.  From east 
to west, the lakes span more than 1,200 kilometers, a distance that is doubled if the Saint Lawrence 
River is included.  Today, as historically, the Great Lakes fishery is important to the region 
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economically and culturally.  The region has a rich history of native fishing from the time of human 
inhabitation, commercial fishing since European settlement, and recreational fishing starting in the 
late 1800s and burgeoning the middle of the 20th century.  Currently, the Great Lakes fishery 
provides at least USD 7 billion (ASA 2008) in economic return to the people of Canada and the 
United States annually, and hundreds of thousands of people earn income from fish-related 
business including commercial fishing, fish processing, charter fishing, and related industries such 
as tourism, supplying bait, and boat manufacturing. 
 The lakes’ large geographic range spreads the fishery resources across many political 
jurisdictions, thus also diffusing fishery management responsibilities.  In the Great Lakes region, 
two nations, eight states, the province of Ontario, and Native American Tribes border the lakes, 
and the non-federal governments exercise sovereign control over their fisheries, including 
migratory fishes.  Because the state and provincial boundaries extend to the international border 
(Piper 1967; Bogue 2000), and because tribal fishing areas are defined by treaties (Busiahn 1985; 
Busiahn 1989; Zorn 1989; Flanagan 2000), jurisdictional authorities are usually clear.  Each 
jurisdiction formulates and executes its own policies in its own waters, illustrating that a 
jurisdiction will be motivated by its legal needs and political desires (Francis and Regier 1995).  
Through enumerated powers, ownership rights, court cases, precedent, and legislation, each of the 
non-federal jurisdictions retained or attained the authority to manage its section of the resource, 
though with some federal involvement as well.  These authorities are generally understood and 
accepted, though they are not always exclusive (Gaden et al. 2011).  In the Great Lakes region, the 
states, in managing their fisheries, behave like nations. 
 The non-federal jurisdictions operate through their own agencies (e.g. Departments of 
Natural Resources) to carry out fishery management.  These jurisdictions maintain the authority 
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to manage in their own waters and, in fact, the Great Lakes fishery are highly regulated.  The 
individual jurisdictions establish harvest regulations, issue fishing licenses, stock fish, enforce the 
law, and conduct fisheries assessment.  The individual state, provincial, and tribal legislative and 
regulatory bodies have full control over their own waters; they govern the behavior of their own 
citizens and have their own processes to develop, promulgate, and enforce their fishery regulations 
(Bence and Smith 1999; Brown et al. 1999).  As such, Great Lakes fishery management has 
inherent top-down tendencies, since sovereignty over fishery resources allows each authority to 
impose its own regulations.  Individual fishers in the Great Lakes region do not have the resource 
with each other per se, as fisher behavior is governed by the will of government; fishers have little 
ability themselves to make allocation decisions beyond those determined by their personal ethics 
(e.g. willingness to break the law, belief in harvest versus catch-and-release, etc.).  In other words, 
fishers’ behavior is governed by the top-down will of the individual jurisdictions, as determined 
and implemented through the management agencies. 
 How that authority is exercised varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  For example, in the 
State of Michigan, a Natural Resources Commission (made up of individuals appointed by the 
governor) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) are each involved in fishery matters, 
but the commission is consultative only, with the DNR retaining by law the ability to issue fishery 
rules and regulations.  In the State of Ohio, the Department of Natural Resources has the authority 
to issue administrative rules that establish such things as bag limits, open and closed seasons, and 
fish size limits, though any rule change requires formal hearings and economic analyses.  In 
Ontario, the Minister of Natural Resources maintains complete authority to issue commercial 
fishing regulations, while sport regulations are developed by the minster and formally adopted by 
the federal government.  Individual tribes each retain the authority over on-reservation fishing and 
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shares responsibilities with the states in ceded waters.  To develop management regulations, each 
tribe has its own natural-resource committee, but with varying levels of authority.  The two 
intertribal organizations work to coordinate the activities of the member tribes, but the intertribal 
organizations do not have authority beyond that which is delegated to them.  The other states each 
carry out their fishery management based on variations of these examples. 
 In practice, however, top-down management does not occur without considerable 
consultation with stakeholders.  Indeed, the diffuse nature of jurisdictional authority and heavily 
engaged constituency in the Great Lakes demand bottom-up management.  Great Lakes fishery 
managers from the non-federal jurisdictions face myriad interests and organized stakeholder 
groups.  These stakeholders, who tend to be well-organized, range from those promoting a Pacific 
salmon fishery to promoting commercial fishing to protecting native biodiversity.  The fishery 
managers must balance those interests if they wish to make their policies defensible with both the 
public and with politicians (Ferreri et al. 1999; Krueger and Decker 1999; Gaden 2007). 
 To balance interests and incorporate bottom-up actions into individual management 
decisions, each of the non-federal jurisdictions, in one way or another, has established a robust 
regime for consulting stakeholders and incorporating their desires into management.  These 
consultations vary widely in formality, from advisory-committee-type structures (whereby the 
jurisdiction assembles citizens to discuss proposed rules and regulations) to direct outreach with 
fishing clubs or business leaders to hear concerns, float new ideas, and receive other types of input.  
The cooperative arrangements between government and stakeholders that exist throughout the 
Great Lakes Basin influence, to varying degrees, the top-down decisions that are made in each 
jurisdiction.  While some of the jurisdictions are compelled by law to consult stakeholders before, 
say, the promulgation of an administrative rule, none are required to accept stakeholders’ input. 
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 Bottom-up mechanisms are designed to create some degree of transparency in the decision-
making process and allow stakeholders direct access to fishery officials.  In Michigan and Ontario, 
for instance, lake-by-lake advisory committees and zone councils, respectively, are convened 
regularly as a way for DNR and ministry officials to meet directly with stakeholders; both are 
relatively formal processes.  In Wisconsin, a “Conservation Congress,” comprising elected 
citizens, meets annually to propose fishery rules.  Approved regulations go before the Wisconsin 
Natural Resources Board, though neither the board nor the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources must accept the decisions of the Conservation Congress.  In both New York and Ohio, 
public comment periods are required for the establishment or change of administrative rules.  Some 
individual U.S. tribes retain positions on their natural resource boards for commercial fishers.  
Fishery management staff in all jurisdictions attend annual meetings of sport fishing clubs, 
commercial fishing associations, and tribal natural resource committees for one-on-one 
conversations in informal settings.  Overall, lines of communication between managers and 
stakeholders are open, regular, robust, and near-constant; each jurisdiction has its own process and 
culture dictating how those communications occur. 
 Stakeholder input is an integral component of fishery management throughout the Great 
Lakes Basin.  Fishery managers interviewed for this chapter indicated that their consultations with 
harvesters, whether required by law or not, frequently influence policy decisions, because 
managers have the ability to better gauge stakeholder acceptance and, thus, potential compliance.  
While none of the managers suggested they compromise the fishery by accepting suggestions that 
would be unsustainable, they do use the consultations to understand socio-economic needs and 
desires and then to formulate policies that are consistent with those needs.  Said one fishery manger 
“Stakeholder groups need to know their role in helping to attain goals, but managers need to know 
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the stakeholders’ desires so that alternative solutions can be proposed and evaluated.”  Indeed, 
consultation with stakeholders is one way to facilitate the development of alternative solutions that 
might be both desirable to the stakeholders and contribute to achieving the management goals. 
 Fishery managers also report considerable communication benefits from a bottom-up, 
consultative process.  Such a process is a “two-way street,” said one manager, as it not only allows 
the managers to hear from stakeholders, but it also allows the stakeholders to hear from the 
managers about the agency’s strategies and goals.  Stakeholders, by participating in the process, 
feel more vested in the outcome than with a straight top-down approach.  Managers, by consulting 
the stakeholders, have the opportunity to explain their policies and promote them directly with 
stakeholders.  In fact, fishery managers generally hold that a major benefit of consultation is it 
heightens the chances that stakeholders will accept and embrace the agencies’ policies and then 
communicate that acceptance to other members of their community (Gaden 2007).  Stakeholders 
who have been in regular contact with the management agency are stakeholders who are more 
informed and better educated on the rationale behind the agency’s decisions.  Such participants are 
more likely to talk-up the policies with others and eschew political routes that might circumvent 
the jurisdiction’s decisions.  Broad acceptance also heightens the chances that fishers’ behavior 
will be consistent with the agency’s regulations. 
 Unlike the ability to enforce the laws and regulations upon their own citizens in a top-down 
manner, the individual jurisdictions cannot coerce their neighboring jurisdiction’s behavior.  Thus, 
a process of “interjurisdictional cooperation” needs to exist to help the jurisdictions coordinate 
fishery management amongst themselves.  For much of the early history of Great Lakes fishery 
management, the many jurisdictions actually showed very little interest in harmonizing their 
fishery policies and instead exercised their sovereign will, regardless of the actions of other 
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authorities (Gallagher et al. 1942; Piper 1967; Bogue 2000; Gaden et al. 2011).  This parochial use 
of top-down authority resulted in conflicting and unsustainable practices, which in turn led to 
serious declines of fishery resources (Bogue 2000; Dempsey 2001).  This untenable fishery 
governance regime began to change during the 1960s when the binational Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission—urged by its enabling treaty to establish working relationships—formed “lake 
committees” as a place for state, provincial, and federal agencies to discuss matters and share 
information.  By 1981, noting the need to be more strategic in policy and more defensive in fending 
off federal intrusion, the jurisdictions created a regional arrangement—A Joint Strategic Plan for 
Management of Great Lakes Fisheries—to help them identify and work toward their shared 
objectives (Gaden et al. 2011).  The plan is non-binding and, as such, is only as effective as the 
signatories wish it to be.  The process is based on consensus and all members must accept (or at 
least be able to live with) a decision before the decision can move forward. 
 “Lake committees” are the mechanisms used to achieve interjurisdictional cooperation and 
to implement the plan.  Under the plan, high-ranking officials from the non-federal agencies on 
each lake meet as a group to coordinate their fishery management responsibilities.  To facilitate 
the generation of science and integrate the work of the field biologists into management, each lake 
committee has at least one technical committee, which consists of field-level professionals who 
undertake such tasks as deciding on data needs and then gathering and interpreting the data.  Unlike 
the lake committees, whose members represent agencies with management authority, technical 
committees and task groups include as members federal officials and, by invitation, outside 
experts, such as academicians.  Entities that have relevant data to share and that have suitable 
biological expertise are usually invited to participate in the technical committees.  Through the 
Joint Strategic Plan, fishery managers meet regularly to engage in three primary collective action 
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activities: to collect and share information; to decide on tasks and who carries them out; and to 
develop shared plans, policies, and objectives.  The Joint Strategic Plan helps the fishery managers 
achieve shared goals through a cooperative process. 
 The deliberations through the Joint Strategic Plan process reflect elements of bottom-up 
management, whereby the jurisdictions take more than their individual will into account as they 
formulate their fishery policies.  Although deliberations under the Joint Strategic Plan influence 
each jurisdiction’s management decisions, the Joint Strategic Plan has served to coerce the 
jurisdictions, gently, into doing things they might not otherwise have done absent a common forum 
(Gaden 2007).  The result of this interjurisdictional cooperative management is a process that 
facilitates collective action to manage a common property resource.  The lake technical committees 
further facilitate the Joint Strategic Plan process.  The technical committees, by ensuring joint 
collection and interpretation of data, ensure that no one entity has a monopoly of data and, 
therefore, can have an inordinate influence over decisions.  Moreover, as the data have been 
collected and analyzed jointly, disagreements about the underlying science and the status of fish 
stocks do not occur.  The work of the technical committees reflects the shared understanding of 
the field-level scientists because the information needs were identified and then collected and 
analyzed in a highly coordinated fashion. 
 Finally, in some areas of the Great Lakes, an arrangement that combines 
“interjurisdictional cooperation” and “co-management” exists between the States of Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota; the U.S. federal government; and Native American tribes.  The role of 
U.S. tribes in Great Lakes fishery management is relatively strong7: tribes have exclusive fishing 
                                                 
7 In Canada, although treaties between the First Nations and the federal government also include tribal rights to fish 
and hunt, the courts have ruled that federal and provincial regulations do not themselves deny tribes access to fish, a 
conclusion that has often resulted in federal and provincial management on behalf of the tribes.  In other words, co-
39 
 
rights on-reservation, where other fishing laws (e.g. state laws) are generally not applicable 
(Busiahn 1985; Cohen 1988).  Off-reservation (areas known as “ceded” or “sold” lands, which 
include adjacent waters), tribal fishing rights in the Great Lakes were recognized in two treaties—
one in 1836 and one in 1842—between the tribes and the U.S. federal government (Anonymous 
1873; Mattes et al. 2005; GLIFWC 2006; Kappler [2004] 2006). 
 While in the past, Native fishers were subjected to state fishery laws and regulations, court 
cases in the 1970s and 1980s re-affirmed tribal fishing rights; rights that could be exercised without 
a state license (Busiahn 1989; Chiarappa and Szylvian 2003; Zorn 2003).  The major case affirming 
Tribal rights is U.S. v. Michigan of 1979 (United States District Court 1979).  In this case, the 
court ruled that the state does not have exclusive management authority in the ceded waters.  The 
consequence of this and other rulings has been to allow tribes to govern their own fishing activities, 
such as issuing licenses to their members, conducting law enforcement, and otherwise managing 
their fisheries, though the tribes must still manage consistently with state conservation goals 
(Busiahn 1985; 1989; Zorn 1989; Schlender undated). 
 Tribal responsibilities in some cases, thus, overlap with state authorities, and both state and 
tribes regulate fisheries in the same waters.  To manage a shared resource in this setting, the states, 
the federal government, and the U.S. tribes have developed an arrangement that maintains a 
significant level of autonomy for tribes to manage their fisheries, delineates respective state and 
tribal activities in the same waters that they each mange, allows for deliberation to occur between 
the states and the tribes, and brings tribes to the same interjurisdictional table that is used to 
facilitate interstate/provincial management on shared lakes.  In the Great Lakes, the states and the 
tribes work together to formulate and adhere to agreements that allow licensing, open and closed 
                                                 
management between the Canadian First Nations and the federal and provincial governments does not occur nearly to 
the same degree as it does in the upper Great Lakes region between the tribes and the state and federal governments. 
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seasons, species-specific management, and law enforcement, among other things.  They 
collaborate on the development of shared policies.  The “Consent Decree,” an agreement between 
tribes, Michigan, and the federal government, governs the co-management relationship in northern 
Lakes Michigan and Huron and in eastern Lake Superior, and court-ordered tribal consensus on 
state management decisions and formal state-tribal committees govern co-management in western 
Lake Superior (United States District Court 2000; Zorn 2003). 
 Overall, each jurisdiction is responsible for its own waters, deciding on its own regulations, 
enforcing its own laws, and consulting its own citizens.  The process to consult citizens varies by 
jurisdiction, and some processes are more formal than others.  Nevertheless, all jurisdictions have 
mechanisms in place to meet with and consult stakeholders.  Even with this relatively strong ability 
to manage parochially, the jurisdictions have also recognized the shared nature of the fishery and 
established a cooperative process that at once respects sovereignty while at the same time 
facilitates cooperative fishery management.  That cooperative process is driven by the Joint 
Strategic Plan, the lake committees, and the technical committees.  This structure is intended to 
promote the emergence of science through the technical committees.  This structure is intended to 
promote the emergence of science through the technical process and to allow the independent 
jurisdictions to work together, avoid parochialism, and develop shared interjurisdictional 
management policies.  It is a way for the independent jurisdictions to engage in interjurisdictional, 
cooperative management on a common property resource.  Native American tribes are closely 
involved in management, participating in the process through interjurisdictional settings like the 
Joint Strategic Plan and exercising their rights in a co-management-like way in treaty waters. 
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Fishery Management on Lake Victoria 
Lake Victoria is second only to Lake Superior in size, by surface area, in the world.  A 
multi-use resource, it is known for its highly productive fishery, with about one million tons of 
annual fish production (LVFO 2011a).  The fishery employs more than three million people and 
brings in USD 600 million annually to the East African Community (Njiru et al. 2008).  Though 
only a single tropical lake, it produces more fish catch than all of the commercial fisheries on the 
five Laurentian Great Lakes combined.  Like many other freshwater systems around the world, 
Lake Victoria faces numerous challenges including environmental degradation, introduction of 
exotic species, eutrophication, and overfishing.  Recent stock assessments, for instance, have 
indicated a serious decline in Nile perch (Lates niloticus) due to overfishing (Mkumbo and 
Mlaponi 2007; Mkumbo et al. 2007; Ojuok et al. 2007; Witte et al. 2007; Njiru et al. 2008). 
 Like the Laurentian Great Lakes, the management of Lake Victoria is multi-jurisdictional; 
three countries—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda—share the lake, 6, 51, and 43 percent respectively 
(Njiru et al. 2008).  Whereas fishery management authority on the Great Lakes is vested in the 
non-federal governments, authority on Lake Victoria is decided at the national political level.  
Compared to the Great Lakes, where bottom-up processes are the prerogative of the management 
agencies and are largely consultative, Lake Victoria, while vesting management authority in 
national governments, nevertheless has developed a much more robust bottom-up process to 
decentralize authority and facilitate considerable co-management between the government and the 
fishing communities.  In fact, the social, political, and economic differences between the 
Laurentian Great Lakes and Lake Victoria create dynamics which change what “bottom-up” means 
and how it is implemented in each region.  Because the governments see Lake Victoria’s resources 
as a key factor in alleviating poverty, the success and failure of efforts to achieve sustainable 
42 
 
fisheries might be considered a much higher priority in that region than in the Great Lakes.  
Moreover, where interest groups and local collective action can influence fisheries policies in the 
Great Lakes, in Lake Victoria, inherent weakness in community organization disenfranchises a 
large segment of Lake Victoria’s fishing communities; fishing communities who depend on the 
resource as a relief from poverty.  Thus, it is necessary to empower Lake Victoria communities in 
a “bottom-up” arrangement, such as formalizing co-management institutions between the national-
level government and the communities.  The fisheries governance regime that has emerged on 
Lake Victoria was designed to address many of the challenges of fishery management on a 
common property resource by applying tenets of decentralization and co-management. 
 Decentralization of Lake Victoria fishery management largely evolved from a lack of 
compliance on the part of the fishers and the inability of the national governments to institute 
policies at a basin-wide level.  Historically, a centralized, top-down approach to natural resource 
management in East Africa, exercised by sovereign nations, was based on both resource and 
economic extractive policies that neither benefited the resource nor the local populations (see 
Wiebe and Dodge 1987; Stein 2008).  This led the fishers to distrust the government and it created 
a culture of fishing activity that resembled Hardin’s (1968) “Tragedy of the Commons.”  Further, 
a lack of agreement on measures to enforce shared management recommendations increased the 
level of government distrust and heavy skepticism of authority by the people who depended on the 
resource for their income (Wilson 2002; Abila et al. 2006; Mkumbo 2006; van der Knaap and 
Ligtvoet 2006).  Unsustainable, parochial fishing practices contributed to the fisheries’ 
exploitation at more than two times its sustainable level (Hecky 2003), devastating the resource, 
diminishing economic benefits, and harming livelihoods. 
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 The three countries that border the lake have acknowledged that harvest by fishers in one 
partner state will have impacts on harvest of other fishers in the lake’s partner states.  To coordinate 
their sovereign actions, the three nations formed the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization by 
convention, which entered into force on May 24, 1996.  The LVFO plays two important roles: 
first, the LVFO coordinates fishery management and research between the partner states and 
second, it develops and adopts conservation and management measures for the sustainable 
utilization of the fishery resources of the lake. 
 The LVFO is the central, harmonizing organization within Lake Victoria’s fishery 
management program.  Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are the partner states, or contracting parties 
within the fishery management program, and the other organizations included in the fishery 
management program on Lake Victoria include the three partner states’ fisheries departments, 
research institutions, and the local fishery communities that exist around the lake.  Like A Joint 
Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, the LVFO is a way to achieve 
“interjurisdictional cooperation” between the partner states. 
 The LVFO achieves its regional coordination through the organization’s statutory organs 
(LVFO 2001).  The Fisheries Management and Fisheries Research committees (constituted by 
directors of fisheries departments and research institutions from the three contracting parties) are 
the technical arms of the LVFO, which receive fisheries management and research information 
from the organization’s working groups.  The working groups conduct research and socio-
economic studies related to the status of the stocks and the welfare of the fishing communities.  
The two committees recommend measures to the LVFO’s Executive Committee (made up of the 
six directors of fisheries management and research institutions) which in turn considers and 
recommends appropriate management measures to the Policy Steering Committee, comprising 
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chief executives of the ministries dealing with fisheries matters in each of the contracting parties.  
The Policy Steering Committee submits the recommendations to the supreme body, the Council 
of Ministers (comprising ministers responsible for fisheries matters in the contracting parties), 
which adopts management and conservation measures.  The LVFO committees hold one session 
annually to review progress and compliance in implementing the agreed measures.  The measures 
are also revised as needed.  The Council of Ministers meets biennially, though special sessions are 
held as the need arises. 
 At the regional level, the LVFO plays the role of harmonizing measures, advocating for 
the resources and the fishers, and disseminating the agreed measures to the contracting parties after 
adoption by the Council of Ministers.  The convention establishing the LVFO demands the 
contracting parties provide the organization with such laws, regulations and any other related 
documents and information for the purpose of assessing compliance or any disparities which will 
warrant adjustments and harmonization. 
 Top-down exertion of authority in the Lake Victoria region is essentially used only to 
develop broad policies through the LVFO’s Council of Ministers.  The contracting parties adopt 
the agreed regional measures and formulate their national laws and regulations to fit their situations 
and enforce them in their territorial waters.  Each contracting party exercises direct (top-down) 
authority on matters regarding enforcement of laws and regulations.  Like the Joint Strategic Plan 
in the Great Lakes region, the LVFO committee structure provides the mechanism to seek and 
implement shared objectives among the parties.  However, also like the Great Lakes region, each 
of the national governments separately controls policy-making, implementation, and enforcement 
within their area of jurisdiction.  While the LVFO co-management program is non-binding, the 
ministers in each of the three contracting parties sharing Lake Victoria depend on the LVFO to 
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provide independent advice, develop sound science, and facilitate the development of policies that 
maximize the benefits of Lake Victoria stakeholders.  Additionally, Article XIII, Sect 4 of the 
convention establishing the LVFO states that “[E]ach Contracting Party shall remain free to adopt 
national laws and regulations more stringent or extensive than those required to fulfill its 
obligations” (LVFO 2001).  The three partner states report their progress in implementing agreed 
measures to the executive secretary of the LVFO.  
 Two overarching premises influence community involvement in natural resource 
management: first, the need for communities to have the opportunity to make decisions about 
management of the resource on which they rely, and second, effective resource management 
through the use of local knowledge (Coffey 2005).  The LVFO is designed to overcome the 
differences in fisheries governance between the three governments.  At the same time, local-
harvesters or community participation in natural resource management programs in developing 
countries is seen as a necessary component for effectively managing natural resources, in part 
because of the past failure of centralized resource management efforts and in part because of the 
realization that communities are essential for effective management (see Kaimowitz and Ribot 
2002). 
 While the three partner states sharing Lake Victoria exercise their sovereign will and use 
established mechanisms to work together, they also have ways to engage directly with the 
stakeholders, primarily the subsistence fishers of Lake Victoria, in a bottom-up way.  Lake Victoria 
fishing is highly localized and community-based; fishing communities are spread throughout the 
lake’s shoreline.  To ensure participation of the fishing communities and other stakeholders in 
resource management and development, the LVFO adopted in 2007 a co-management approach 
called “Beach Management Units,” or BMUs.  BMUs, which are legally recognized by each 
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contracting party, are community-run governing bodies which manage the fishery and share policy 
development, enforcement, and research duties with each national government’s fisheries 
department.  The fishers themselves throughout the Lake Victoria Basin help standardize 
regulations of fisheries extraction.  The BMU committees enforce the lake’s fishing regulations, 
serve as resource-data collection points for better fisheries management and monitoring, and 
increase members’ capacity to manage their fishing profits (Ebong et al. 2004).  BMUs have been 
established at all Lake Victoria landing sites, totaling 1,069 BMUs, with each BMU containing no 
fewer than 30 fishing boats.  Consequently, landing sites with fewer than 30 boats are required to 
amalgamate with other smaller sites to form a single BMU.  These beach-level management 
institutions operate using Harmonized Beach Management Guidelines, which were approved by 
the LVFO’s Council of Ministers in 2006 (LVFO 2005a).  According to the BMU guidelines, each 
BMU has a structured executive committee consisting of a wide range of local stakeholders (e.g. 
fishers, boat owners, traders, gear repairers); each set of guidelines is formally legalized.  
Collaborative action between neighboring BMUs is facilitated by the formation of higher level 
BMU committees aligned to government administrative systems in each country.  The BMU 
committees at district and national levels are represented regionally by a regional committee 
(called the Regional BMU Network), which is offered membership on the statutory technical 
fisheries management and scientific committees of the LVFO.  BMU’s operational funding are 
designed to come from levying equipment and fishing licensing fees, fish-catch taxes, and illegal 
fishing fines on individuals involved in the fishery (LVFO 2005a).  Fees, taxes, and fines are 
designed to be levied by the BMU committee, vetted through district-level governments, and 
returned to the BMU as a percentage of the district total.  In some cases, fishers make voluntary, 
in-kind contributions toward BMU operations, often in the form of fish to be sold, with the 
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proceeds used to pay workers for cleaning the surroundings at a given BMU, local security, or 
other social programs. 
 To include other key stakeholders in fishery management and to ensure compliance, the 
Fish Processors and Exporters Associations of the three partner states established a collaborative 
process, known as the East African Industrial Fishing and Fish Processors Association 
(EAIFFPA).  The association is given membership on the statutory technical committees of the 
LVFO.  The EAIFFPA has imposed strict guidelines parallel to those of the LVFO’s to ensure 
sustainable harvest of Nile perch in Lake Victoria.  Severe penalties are imposed on processors 
who fail to follow the guidelines.  The EAIFFPA has also established a self-monitoring team in 
each partner state to ensure compliance by fish processing factories to adhere to slot sizes—
minimum and maximum acceptable lengths—for Nile perch processing and have moved ahead to 
establish a regional self-monitoring team which is allowed in any fish factory in the three nations 
for inspections.  Any factory not complying is reported to the government authorities, which can 
deny a factory to operate for a given time as per the agreed guidelines governing self-monitoring. 
 The EAIFFPA and BMU committees play active roles in self-policing, enforcement, and 
educating their respective communities.  They are allowed to develop their own by-laws so long 
as the by-laws are consistent with the national fisheries laws or regulations.  The authority is, 
therefore, with the central government, but with elevated powers to the different stakeholder 
groups like the BMUs.  BMU committees have a mandate to protect and conserve fishery resources 
in their areas of jurisdiction, in collaboration with the fisheries officers from the local and district 
levels.  National fisheries committees, which are formed pursuant to the convention, bring in all 
the relevant stakeholders at the national level to deliberate on national fisheries matters before they 
are taken to the regional level for harmonization through LVFO structures. 
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    The Lake Victoria fishery management program is a co-management approach to 
managing Lake Victoria’s fisheries.  The institutions are based on decentralization, which include 
a formal relationship between the national government and local communities through the BMUs.  
This co-management program incorporates the concepts that active citizen participation at all 
levels of fisheries governance can protect the diverse interests of those affected by environmental 
problems (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Nunan 2006); that natural resources are a source of 
livelihood and income, and, therefore, are best managed by the local people (self-governance) 
(Kaimowitz and Ribot 2002; Ostrom 2009); and, that rather than being an expense for central 
governments, natural resources become a major source of revenue and poverty alleviation when 
the appropriate property rights and management scheme is instituted (Kaimowitz and Ribot 2002). 
 Bottom-up processes of fishery management are indeed stronger and more formalized in 
the Lake Victoria region than in the Great Lakes region.  Through the fisheries governance 
program on Lake Victoria, the three nations include all fisheries stakeholders in decision-making, 
incorporate the needs of the poor and disenfranchised, and employ bottom-up, community-based 
development in management plans.  These design elements are intended to motivate and reinforce 
legal fishing behavior and, therefore, a sustainable fishery.  Like the non-federal jurisdictions on 
the Great Lakes, the three nations of Lake Victoria have also developed processes for 
interjurisdictional cooperative management.  The three partner states have agreed to work together 
to achieve shared objectives, but in a way that respects their sovereignty and their individual 
constitutional procedures and national laws.  And, like the Great Lakes jurisdictions, they agree to 
implement any decisions that arise through the consensus-based, cooperative process.  
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Conclusion 
Neither the Lake Victoria nor Laurentian Great Lakes fisheries are strictly “open access” 
resources; rather, governments hold the fisheries in public trust, determine the rules and regulations 
governing fishers’ behavior, carry out fishery management actions, and enforce the regulations.  
Authorities in both the Great Lakes and Lake Victoria regions decide on the level of public 
involvement or devolution to communities in management.  The Lake Victoria and Great Lakes 
fisheries are “common property resources” to the extent that nations and sub-national jurisdictions, 
with sovereign rights and responsibilities, share the fisheries.  Resource-extractors are the 
jurisdictions themselves who, in the case of the Great Lakes, decide how much of the resource 
they will allocate to individual fishers8 and in the case of Lake Victoria, control harvest by limiting 
the type of gear, harvest techniques, and fishing in area of spawning habitat. 
 In both the Great Lakes and Lake Victoria Basin, multiple jurisdictions and stakeholders 
share the resource, each with varying views about how the fisheries should be managed.  
Governments in both basins—whether federal or non-federal—strongly retain their sovereignty 
over their fishery resources and exert top-down authority as they manage fishers’ behaviors.  Even 
with multi-jurisdictional agreements like A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes 
Fisheries and the LVFO’s Fisheries Management Plan, day-to-day management decisions that 
affect fishers’ behavior—decisions related to licensing, harvest, gear—remain the prerogative of 
the governments, and the governments generally remain willing and able to exert their will as they 
see fit. 
                                                 
8 In the Great Lakes, jurisdictions establish individual commercial fishing quotas or individual bag limits for 
recreational anglers.  In Lake Victoria, there is no system of allocation to individual fishers, but once a fisher has a 
fishing license, he fishes throughout the year. 
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 Nevertheless, both basins to varying degrees maintain cooperative management between 
the governments and the stakeholders.  In the Great Lakes region, interjurisdictional cooperation 
and co-management exists between government and the U.S. tribes.  Interjurisdictional 
cooperation also exists among the non-federal agencies through the Joint Strategic Plan, and each 
of the non-federal jurisdictions incorporates bottom-up collaborative processes into their 
management decisions through the use of advisory council-type arrangements.  On Lake Victoria, 
the three partner states have established a formal co-management program administered by the 
Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization.  Local participation is incorporated into policy through the 
legally recognized Beach Management Units, which reflect decentralization of authority and co-
management.  Indeed, in Lake Victoria, local governance arrangements serve as the foundation of 
influencing fishers’ behavior and to instill a sense of ownership in the resource. 
 In both the Great Lakes and Lake Victoria, the management structures reflect the history, 
composition of the fisheries, and particular socio-economic needs of the fishers.  In the Great Lakes 
region, non-federal sovereignty allows each jurisdiction to promulgate its own fishery regulations, 
while the shared nature of the fishery mandates co-management with the U.S. tribes and 
cooperation among the non-federal entities.  The growth of educated, capable stakeholders, 
representing myriad interests, mandates a high level of consultation with the stakeholders so that 
policies are better accepted.  In Lake Victoria, a lack of financial resources at the national level to 
enforce fishery regulations has led to the emergence and sanction of the local Beach Management 
Unit as the primary community-level fishery management arrangement.  Moreover, the nature of 
dependence on fisheries by fishing communities on Lake Victoria necessitates a more-robust co-
management relationship between the national government and fishers than on the Great Lakes. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
 
IT TAKES MORE THAN A VILLAGE: THE CHALLENGE OF CO-
MANAGEMENT IN UGANDA’S FISHERY AND FORESTRY SECTORS9 
 
Abstract 
 
Decentralization approaches have emerged in response to failed centralized natural 
resource management programs, which are often bereft of community involvement.  
Decentralization is the devolution of authority and resources by central government 
authorities to lower political levels for the purpose of administering resource 
management.  Decentralization programs in Uganda—the focus of this chapter—
were realized through co-management programs, relationships between the central 
government and community organizations.  The successful administration of 
Uganda’s natural resource management program, as promised through 
decentralization approach, relies on adequate authority, communications, and 
financial resources being devolved or distributed to the communities.  Focusing on 
Uganda’s highly valued forests and fisheries, we noted weakness in Uganda’s 
approach: revenue from these resources are distributed unequally, with the central 
government keeping disproportionately more than lower level management 
entities; and, the central government remains overwhelmingly in charge of policy 
development and had failed to support lower-level management entities adequately.  
These weaknesses highlight some of the weaknesses in the decentralized program, 
and result in ineffective community participation and allow for maximum resource 
extraction activities to take precedence over ecosystem health, resource 
sustainability and longevity, and community development.  We determined that 
successful natural resource decentralization requires strengthening local natural 
resource organizations with increased fiscal flow, enforcement, monitoring, and 
judicial powers. To accomplish this, central government priorities toward 
community management organizations must change.    
                                                 
9 This chapter was previously published as: Lawrence, T. and C. Watkins (2012). "It takes more than a village: The 
challenges of co-management in Uganda's fishery and forestry sectors." International Journal of Sustainable 
Development & World Ecology 19(2): 144-154. 
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Introduction  
During the past 200 years, approaches to natural resource management in many developing 
countries  have transformed from locally devised indigenous self-governance, to state-centered 
governance, to current notions of shared responsibilities between local communities and central 
government (Agrawal and Lemos 2007). In this article, we review current governance approaches 
used to manage forest and fishery resources in Uganda. We argue that the relationship between 
central government and local communities in forest and fishery resource management is 
unbalanced, and thus ineffective. Despite attempts at decentralizing management of forest and 
fishery resources in Uganda, market often value takes priority over local development and resource 
sustainability. We argue that successful decentralization of any natural resource requires an active 
and compromising central government that will empower local communities by sharing fiscal 
benefits and by legitimating judicial power beyond rhetorical policies. Biologically diverse 
resources need strong institutions at multiple government scales to (1) overcome high market value 
as the dominant influence on resource management and (2) consider subsistence and ecological 
values, which benefit development and livelihood of local communities and increase sustainability 
of the resource.  
Our argument is guided by the concept of social-ecological systems, which acknowledges 
that natural resources are embedded in complex interactions occurring between ecological 
(biological) and human (social and political) systems (Ostrom 2009). This concept recognizes that 
social and political institutions (formal and informal organizations, rules, regulations, sanctions, 
and taboos and customs) matter too. Institutions are affected by their biophysical, infrastructural, 
demographic, economic and socio-political contexts (see Béné 2003; Ostrom 2005; Agrawal and 
Chhatre 2006; Janssen et al. 2007). Our analysis of data collected in both forest and fishery sectors 
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of Uganda and of the literature, emphasizes the role of market pressures and socio-cultural aspects 
of governance to explain variations in resource governance and resource conditions (see also 
Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Agrawal 2006; Nunan 2006) in Uganda.  
  
The case for decentralization  
Past natural resource management strategies in developing countries often failed because 
centralized policies were intrusive yet unable to enforce the underlying regulations, and frequently 
interfered with local institutions that managed natural resources (Gibson et al. 2000; Agrawal 
2003; Kajembe et al. 2003; Ribot et al. 2006; Larson and Soto 2008). Furthermore, such 
management policies have the potential to be biased in favor of market-based preferences while 
downplaying ecosystem health or resource sustainability (Ben-Yami 2007; Nelson and Agrawal 
2008), which can lead to deterioration of the resource and undermine development of local 
communities (e.g. see Harris 1999; Bavington 2010). 
Recalling from Chapter 2, decentralization is defined as any act of formally ceding powers 
from a central government to lower-level institutions and actors within a political-administrative 
and territorial hierarchy (Agrawal and Ribot 1999).  Democratic decentralization refers to power 
being transferred to lower-level governments whereby officials are elected by and accountable to 
those they represent (Ribot 2002b).  Devolution broadens power transfer to include 
nongovernmental institutions such as community-based organizations (CBOs). Agrawal and 
Lemos (2007) categorize decentralization and its variants as a form of ‘hybrid governance’, in 
which there is no one lead authority but rather a partnership between local, non-government, state 
or market organizations. Contemporary decentralization strategies, they argue, have focused 
particularly on institutional arrangements that can motivate individuals at the local level to 
cooperate, while minimizing the risk of powerful individuals co-opting the process.  Haley and 
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Clayton (2003) argue, however, that effective hierarchical organization is still a prerequisite for 
bringing about effective solutions, particularly where central government change (e.g. policy or 
fiscal) is required. Uganda’s forest and fish co-management programs exemplify a situation in 
which central government is a significant stakeholder, holding the resources in trust, and thus 
continues to play an important role in the management of these resources.  
Kaimowitz and Ribot (2002) argue that natural resources are viable candidates for 
decentralized management for several reasons. First, natural resources are utilized for subsistence, 
livelihood and income, at both local and national levels; they are ‘wealth generators’. Natural 
resources that are wealth generators create incentives for those who benefit directly from the 
resource to manage it sustainably, whereas social services and infrastructure, or ‘financial sinks’, 
result in unregulated use. Second, while social services and infrastructure can be designed at a 
country-wide scale, natural resources are location-specific, and include variations in biophysical 
characteristics: species types, growth rates, breeding and fruiting cycles, and harvest times. 
Kaimowitz and Ribot thus argue that these characteristics make natural resources ‘less amenable 
to central standardization’.  
Although natural resources, generally, are responsive to decentralization, forests and fish 
are different biophysically and thus have different transaction costs, or social, economic and 
political costs related to undertaking their management (Nielsen 2003). In Uganda, transaction 
costs are lower for forest management than fishery management. Given that forests have distinct 
borders, there is a greater potential for the community of a particular forest to interact with one 
another to establish regulations and conduct enforcement. In contrast, it is more complicated to 
physically delineate distinct management areas on a lake, especially in the absence of GPS 
technology, and the size of Lake Victoria is too large to have all fishing communities or fishers to 
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meet. There must be a greater effort, or higher level of coordination for effective management to 
take place. Without an effective mechanism to coordinate management (resulting in larger 
transaction costs), inefficiencies emerge and often lead to tragedy-of-the-commons-type (Hardin 
1968) harvest of the resource. It is within this context of transaction costs that the ‘achievable 
scope’ against which the failures of the fishery and forestry sector should be judged.  
Despite the importance of transaction costs, Ostrom (2007) posits that social-ecological 
problems are rarely due to a single cause and that the imposition of ‘standard optimal solutions’ is 
the problem rather than the solution. To determine success of a decentralization policy, the 
relationship between community, the resource, and the institutional arrangements that incentivize 
resource use, must all be assessed. Institutional arrangements that include local communities in 
natural resource management are crucial given that many people living in developing countries are 
often knowledgeable about, and directly dependent on, locally harvested natural resources for their 
livelihoods and subsistence needs, and for other ecosystem functions (Wilson et al. 1999; Béné 
2003; Ostrom 2005; Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; Janssen et al. 2007). Active citizen participation 
can enhance input from those affected by the challenges of natural resource governance (Lemos 
and Agrawal 2006; Nunan 2006). Recognition of and reliance on institutions—and the ways in 
which several institutions interact and in some cases ‘nest’10—can promote management success 
and ensure the proper transfer of power (Eggertson 1996; Ostrom 2005). In other words, the central 
government still has a crucial role in local-level natural resource management, indeed, they hold 
the natural resources in public trust (Chapter 2: Gaden et al. 2012). The challenges, however, of 
defining and implementing decentralized management, and unwillingness or inability of central 
governments to relinquish control (Wunsch 2001; Ribot et al. 2006) to lower-level actors, has often 
                                                 
10 Become a part of, or more inclusive in, the institutions. 
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hindered the integration of community participation and rendered the management approach 
paternalistic and quasi-colonial (Twyman 1998). 
While there are plenty of examples of failed or failing decentralized regimes (see, for 
example Vazquez and Vaillancourt 2011), there are also examples of successful, or at least 
partially successful, regimes (e.g. Gibson et al. 2000; Pomeroy 2001). Successful decentralization 
must include the transfer of sufficient and appropriate powers, accountable representation (Ribot 
2002b) and an understanding of the extent to which fiscal, administrative and political control is 
transferred (Schneider 2003). Datta and Varalakshmi (1999) find that a forest co-management 
program in India is sustainable and successful because locals have developed institutions to 
generate and fairly distribute funds. Hayes and Persha (2010) suggest that successful resource 
management depends on institutional arrangements that: 
(1) establish local residential rulemaking autonomy, (2) facilitate flow of external 
financial and institutional assistance for monitoring and enforcement of local rules, 
and (3) buffer residents and their respective local institutions from more powerful, 
and at times corrupt, actors and agencies involved in forest exploitation. 
 
When these conditions are not met, they argue, external non-government organizations (NGOs) 
can help support local institutions that are nested within larger central government systems.  
Our analysis of Uganda’s decentralized management program of forest and fishery 
resources reveal some of the challenges associated with the decentralization approach, likely 
associated with the unwillingness of central governments to relinquish total control: (1) failure to 
transfer an appropriate amount of authority to resource harvesters or representatives of those 
harvesters, (2) inefficient collection of revenue at the local level due to higher political-level 
authorities superseding this function, (3) inefficient distribution of revenue collected by higher 
political authorities returned to local communities and local resource management entities for 
development and further resource management, and (4) prioritization of market value of natural 
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resources over social development at the community level and sustainable management of the 
resource. The current institutional arrangements that govern Uganda’s forestry and fishery 
resources allow for maximum resource extraction to take precedence over ecosystem health and 
resource sustainability and longevity.  
 
Development and decentralization in post-independence Uganda  
Post-colonial development and natural resource management in East Africa is heavily 
influenced by international aid agencies, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (Stein 2008). During the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank and IMF instituted structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs) that sought to overcome development-limiting conditions in the market 
that many developing countries encounter. To procure loans, SAPs require that developing 
countries adjust their economies through stabilization, liberalization, and privatization11 (Owusu 
1998). The policies were designed to reduce the role of government by replacing state control with 
market incentives and by requiring political and economic reforms before loans from the IMF and 
the World Bank were released to the target country. SAPs, however, have been severely criticized 
for their failure to consider polities, demography, and institutions (Hauser 1999; Platteau 2000; 
Mwenda and Tangri 2005) and for their rationale that says those who consume services are those 
who should pay, which in developing countries often excludes the poor because of high costs 
(Stein 2008). SAPs have also been criticized for their failure to recognize developing countries ill-
prepared state of development, a problem caused, in part, by the failure of colonial systems to carry 
                                                 
11 These structural adjustment policies, based on economic models of developed countries and limited scope (e.g. 
two-country, two-good models) had the opposite effect intended.  For example: stabilization, borrowing money to 
cover export deficit which reduces demand of exports and domestic jobs, ultimately reducing the quality of life for 
many; liberalization, where government intervention is removed, providing incentives for a prosperous private 
sector, creating user fees that the poor can’t afford; and privatization, selling the government’s assets to the private 
sector (see Stein 2008) 
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over to independent states (Bauer 1972). Thus, the ability, or willingness, of the central 
government to empower local resource management is embedded in post-colonial international 
‘development’ programs.  
Uganda’s fisheries and forestry resources share a common history rooted in a development 
trajectory from British protectorate to independent country to a ‘darling’ of the donor community 
(Cargill 2004). Uganda’s forest and fishery resources are biologically diverse, both types of 
resources were relied upon historically for subsistence, are wealth generators for local 
communities and the state and have cultural importance. The national-level government’s natural 
resource management policies, therefore, include contemporary wording that suggests sustainable 
management to benefit local communities (NFA 2008; LVFO 2011a). Through the two case 
studies below, however, we demonstrate that market value of natural resources (ultimately 
beneficial to the central government) continues to take precedence over these natural resources’ 
historical values and importance to local-communities, discourages sustainable resource harvest 
and inhibits development at the local level. As a result, devolution of power to the local fish and 
forestry management institutions is unsuccessful. 
 
Case studies: decentralization of natural resource governance in Uganda 
Uganda’s Decentralization Statute of 1993 and Local Government Act of 1997 promised 
to cede power to local officials and communities. The constitution calls for reduced central 
government control and increased local discretionary powers, including the creation of new local 
laws, revenue collection and the appointment of committees to carry out local-level priorities 
(Mugabi 2004). Despite multiple legislative efforts, however, the central government continues to 
suppress local capacity in several ways (Mugabi 2004): (1) local resource management institutions 
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and governments are funded by the central government, but grants must be used in ways deemed 
appropriate by the grantor, not the grantee; (2) local revenue collection is uneven, sporadic and 
unreliable, especially in rural areas and is often undermined by higher-level governments 
collecting revenue first at the local level (see Chapter 5); (3) ineffective distribution to local, 
regional, or interjurisdictional management organizations, of revenue collected—by the central 
government—through formal export lines; (4) external donor support often has the same 
restrictions that central government grants require; and (5) the judicial system is weak when 
pertaining to formal laws and regulations established to protect the natural resource, making 
community and government enforcement efforts impotent. 
 
Case I: Uganda’s forestry sector 
Centralized forestry management was established by the British colonialists in 1898 under 
the Forestry Service, which became the Forest Department in 1927. Large swathes of land were 
declared Crown land via the Bunyoro Agreement of 1933, while smaller land blocks were kept 
private and were owned and controlled by their respective kingdoms. Crown land included forest 
vegetation, savannah grassland and woodland areas, the use of which required a permit (Hamilton 
1984). In 1945, decentralized forest management was instituted via the creation of Local Forest 
Reserves (Turyahabwe et al. 2007). A 1948 statement by the governor of Uganda announced the 
main goal of the Forest Department: ‘to foster, by education and propaganda, a real understanding 
among the people of Uganda of the value of forest to them and their descendants’ (Forest policy 
1948). This devolution of management was limited, however, to ‘minor reserves of purely local 
significance’ (Forest policy 1948) that were expected ‘not to detract from the value of Central 
Forest Reserves’, which still belonged to the colonial government (Hamilton 1984). Moreover, 
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although the colonial government’s Forest Department encouraged tree planting and the 
establishment of local tree plantations as early as 1930 (Hamilton 1984), the exotic and water and 
nutrient depleting Eucalyptus was highly favored (Karani 1972). This choice suggests economic, 
rather than ecological priorities. 
Decentralization continued after independence until 1966, when governance structures and 
management policy changed drastically (Mugabi 2004). The Forest Act of 1967 revoked local, 
decentralized power over forest reserves (Hamilton 1984; Turyahabwe et al. 2007). Then, as a 
result of country-wide political chaos during the 1970s, corruption within the Forest Department 
skyrocketed, widespread mistrust of the entire government ensued, and forest cover was lost 
(Hamilton 1984). With rampant local encroachment on government-owned forested land, 
provision of central government extension services (e.g. agricultural and livelihood support) was 
almost impossible, given the mistrust of the centralized management regime. Further, the planting 
of exotic species such as Pinus, Cupressus and Eucalyptus grandis continued to be encouraged by 
the Forest Department (Struhsaker 1987). Thus, while indeed reducing the pressure on highland 
forest, centrally imposed management policies aided in diminishing hundreds of indigenous 
species.  
In 1998, the Forest Department became the National Forestry Authority (NFA) and the 
District Forest Services (DFS). Policies emerging after the split decreed that sustainable resource 
use and collaborative forest management between the NFA, local governments (DFS) and local 
communities were important priorities (National Forestry Policy of 2001, National Forest Plan of 
2001, National Forestry and Tree Planting Act of 2003). Currently, 24 percent of the total land 
area (4.9 million ha) in Uganda is forested (MWLE 2002). About 70 percent of Uganda’s forested 
area is private or customary land and contains the largest part of tropical highland forest (38 
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percent). Although this suggests that the majority of forests are in ‘the people’s hands’, very few 
individuals actually hold legal land titles and are thus susceptible to tenure security issues/removal 
(Place 1995; van den Brink et al. 2006). Perhaps due to this tenure insecurity, conversion to 
agriculture happens at a higher rate on customary land than on public land (Place and Otsuka 
2002). The remaining 30 percent is considered Permanent Forest Estate (PFE), primarily managed 
by NFA, with the exception of 0.3 percent (5000 ha composed of small fragments) and is 
considered Local Forest Reserve and managed by the local DFS (Banana and Gombya-
Ssembajjwe 2000; Kayanja and Byarugaba 2001).  
The PFE is ‘held in trust’ by the government for the people of Uganda. Furthermore, PFE 
forest reserves are further demarcated into strict nature reserves (20 percent), low-impact buffer 
zones (30 percent) and areas managed for sustainable extraction of forest products (50 percent) 
(Howard et al. 2000) suggesting that the government is still managing ‘the people’s’ forests for 
economic gains, rather than with regard to biological characteristics of forested land and the socio-
economic needs of resource-dependent peoples. 
As a result of both colonial control and a period of ‘post-independence governmental 
adjustment’, decreased incentives and increased risks of punitive measures have led to an overall 
lack of local participation in resource management (Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000). 
While there have been many attempts at collaborative forest management among communities, 
local governments, NGOs, CBOs and the central government, results have been consistently 
disappointing. Although partnerships enhance local management potential, financial and legal 
means to implement local resource extraction policies are lacking (Turyahabwe et al. 2006). There 
are weak relationships between local institutions and centrally devised policy (Turyahabwe et al. 
2007; Hartter and Ryan 2010) and between people’s perceptions and actual uses of forest resources 
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(Watkins 2009a; 2009b). In regard to perceptions and uses, people, particularly women, did not 
know the full extent of their rights: not only did many wrongly believe firewood collection was 
illegal, they allegedly endured harassment by forestry officials for collecting it (Watkins 2009b). 
These findings support Ribot et al.’s (2006) conclusion that central governments in multiple 
developing countries ‘erect imaginative obstacles’ in front of decentralized institutions, such that 
downward accountability and local-level discretionary power are lacking.  
Importantly, this period of intense vacillation between decentralization and recentralization 
of forest management policies coincides with World Bank and IMF investments marked by 
particularly strict conditionalities (1992–1998) (Banana et al. 2007). Years of policies that claimed 
to increase local control, yet reduced local funding, have no doubt impeded the effectiveness of 
local government forest services, let alone village-level management capacity. The NFA lacks the 
monetary means and manpower to monitor Uganda’s forests effectively as many are patchy and 
scattered. Further, political will is lacking and the chain of command between the NFA and DFS 
is confusing: District Forest Officers (DFOs) are central government employees, yet local 
government council members supervise them. On the other hand, Forest Rangers and Forest 
Guards who provide technical support to the DFOs are employees of District Local Councils 
(Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000). The World Bank’s involvement in the forestry sector 
remains contentious, given its lack of attention to poverty, inequity, local capacity and issues of 
control and ownership of, and access to, forest resources (Seymour and Dubash 2000; Francis and 
James 2003; Stein 2008).  
Although the NFA recognizes that policing forests is an ineffective management strategy 
and that the inclusion of harvesters and community members can increase sustainable resource use 
(MWLE 2001), less than 1 percent of the total tree-covered area in Uganda is managed under 
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collaborative initiatives between the central government and communities (NFA 2008).While 40 
percent of profits made from revenues, licenses and permits generated from the sale of Central 
Forest products (0.3 percent of the PFE) is given back to local government, it is used in the general 
district budget rather than specifically on forest management activities (e.g. monitoring and 
enforcement), and even then it makes up only 10 percent (Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000). 
The other 90 percent of local government budget comes from NGOs, which, although could act as 
an incentive for local governments to participate in collaborative management, is still unable to 
enact policy change at the central government level (Haley and Clayton 2003; Turyahabwe et al. 
2007). Several studies have documented the importance, yet dearth, of forest use enforcement in 
Uganda (Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000; Turyahabwe and Banana 2008).  
According to Turyahabwe et al. (2007), collaborative forest management is limited in 
several ways. First, local organizations often lack technical and financial capacity to fully conduct 
management activities; confusion exists over who owns what type of land, which leads to 
disinterest in investing in tree planting and overall land management. Second, corruption and 
disrespect for formal laws undermine honest and legal attempts at collaborative management 
(Turyahabwe et al. 2007). Finally, the variety of forest benefits that people are concerned about 
(e.g. household consumable resources like firewood and water, economically advantageous 
resources like timber and ecological benefits such as wildlife habitat and climate control 
mechanisms) may hinder group consensus on the best forest management approach. All of these 
inefficiencies point to the lack of attention given to locale-specific needs and the local institutions 
that could enhance forest management—a task which otherwise is too large and diffuse for what 
is still essentially a centralized management approach.  
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While stakeholder linkages presumably may stimulate the movement of money to the local 
level, NGOs and CBOs do not have legal power to control forest-related activities. These 
responsibilities lie with the DFS, which is charged with the heavy burden of linking the legislative 
desires of the central government with the subsistence and livelihood requirements of local 
communities (Turyahabwe et al. 2007). The DFS, which, again, legally manages only 5000 ha (0.3 
percent) of local forest reserves, is also responsible for the needs of, or at least seen as a liaison to 
the central government for, local communities and harvesters. Watkins (2009b) found one DFO 
defeated: ‘I feel useless. I have a cell phone but no motorcycle [with which to get to the villages] 
. . . even if I did go there, what could I do?’ This anecdote emphasizes the inability of the central 
government to facilitate local government capacity to manage forests and enforce policies.  
Further evidence of the central government’s priorities on forest management can be found 
in the NFA mission, which purports ‘to contribute to a sufficiently forested, ecologically stable 
and economically prosperous Uganda’ and ‘to manage Central Forest Reserves on a sustainable 
basis and to supply high-quality forestry-related products and services to government, local 
communities and the private sector’ (NFA 2008). People use many types of trees (Watkins (2009a) 
documents over 20 types) for firewood, including exotic, indigenous, forest, woodland and 
plantation species (Tabuti et al. 2003; Watkins 2009a). To achieve the latter goal, however, the 
NFA continues to focus on a small set of species that are market-favored—mostly eucalyptus and 
pine (Uganda Policy, 2002, cited in MWLE (2009)). 
In summary, forest management continues to be spread thinly across Uganda, leading to a 
disparate relationship between local and central governmental institutions and resulting in a lack 
of management in support of basic needs for livelihoods. Despite the necessary and ubiquitous 
need for firewood or charcoal at a local level, the central government has remained unable or 
65 
 
unwilling to share financial and judicial control of forests. As Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 
(2000, p. 17) stress, after 
four decades of minimal involvement of local institutions and communities in forest 
management . . . it is going to take a long time and a lot of effort for . . . local 
communities to organise locally, develop the rules, develop a sense of legitimacy, 
and put in place a mechanism to monitor and enforce forest rules. 
 
Case II: Uganda’s Lake Victoria fishery sector 
The largest freshwater fishery in Africa, Lake Victoria is known for producing annual 
catches of around 1 million tons, contributing over USD 600 million to the East African 
Community annually (Njiru et al. 2008), and providing food security for over 20 million people 
(LVFO 2011a). Like many other freshwater systems around the world, Lake Victoria faces 
numerous threats, including environmental degradation, introduction of exotic species, 
eutrophication and overfishing. Recent stock assessments indicate that unsustainable fishing 
practices have caused a serious decline of fish populations (Mkumbo et al. 2007).  Exacerbating 
these stresses is a high human migration rate (~3 percent per year, Njiru et al. 2006) into many of 
the basin’s cities as a result of erratic rains, poor soils, crop failures and high unemployment 
outside of the basin. This migration threatens the integrity of Lake Victoria and other water-scarce 
areas of the world where populations are beginning to lose access to clean, freshwater resources. 
Lake Victoria’s fishery has been a part of Uganda’s economic system for centuries, mainly 
as a local producer of a tradable commodity and of a major source of protein. During the 1950s, 
the commodity fishery began to grow and it continued to develop well into independence (Awange 
and Ong'ong'a 2006).  During the late 1950s, the colonial government introduced the Nile perch 
(Lates niloticus) in the hope of making the lake’s fishery an economically powerful export industry 
(Mkumbo and Mlaponi 2007). Lake Victoria’s Nile perch populations reached commercial 
66 
 
viability in the late 1970s, leading to fish processing plant development in the 1980s, which 
allowed increased exports of Nile perch (World Trade Organization 2006) throughout the world, 
including to Israel, Japan, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and the United States, with the 
European Union accounting for up 60 percent of fish exports (Awange and Ong'ong'a 2006). 
Exports of Nile perch have risen to the second largest export earner, second only to coffee, in 
Uganda (2004 and 2005 data (Uganda Export Promotion Board 2006)).  
The introduction of this non-native, top-predator species, however, altered the Lake 
Victoria ecosystems upon which subsistence fishermen and the export fishery rely. This is 
evidenced by the decline of the endemic haplochromine (cichlid) fishes. These species constituted 
80 percent of the estimated catch in the 1950s and 1960s but became less than 10 percent of the 
catch by 1987 as many of the haplochromines became extinct (Witte et al. 2007) or regionally 
extirpated within Lake Victoria. During that same period, Nile perch catches increased from non-
recordable catches to 60–80 percent of total catches (Mkumbo and Mlaponi 2007). The economic 
benefits that the colonial government hoped the Nile perch fishery would provide included an 
increase in livelihood for many local fishermen and revenue for the state.  Immigration of 
fishermen from outside the basin to the lake, promulgated by the promise of a share in riches of 
Nile perch, is another indicator of the economic success of the fishery. Immigration of large 
numbers of fishers created exploitative extraction practices that greatly stressed fish stocks, and 
Nile perch caused a major ecological shift in the native ecology of Lake Victoria (see AEHMS 
2007). Further, although beneficial to the country’s foreign direct investment and gross domestic 
product, the financial outcome of the fishery disproportionately benefits the national-level 
government over local fishing communities through higher returns on value added to the fish 
product up the commodity chain. Financial inequality is also caused by the inadequate return of 
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financial support of local management institutions by the national government. The government, 
in this case, does not have an incentive to return funds gained from the fishery sector back into 
fishery management, because the perception is that local communities are self-sufficient in 
managing the fishery as prescribed by the co-management program. It is this perception, however, 
that is creating ineffective management of the fishery, because inadequate finances or judicial 
power is given to local management institutions (Beach Management Units (BMUs)). Without 
proper funding or judicial power, BMUs lose the ability to effectively function. Livelihoods of 
those who depend on the fishery suffer as ineffective management causes a decline of fish stocks 
and therefore wealth generated from the fishery.  
Prior to the late 1990s, fisheries management on Lake Victoria was centralized, determined 
on a country-by-country basis, with each country implementing separate and often conflicting 
fishing regulations, and included little or no community participation (Ogwang' et al. 2009).  This 
parochial management approach is similar to management attempts described in Chapter 2, where 
individual jurisdictions on the Laurentian Great Lakes prior to the creation of the GLFC, 
implemented incongruent regulations, defeating the purpose of lake-wide fishery management.  
Extensive research suggests this approach failed to sustain the fishery for those who depend on the 
resource for their livelihood, which created a distrust of central government and of centralized 
fishery management (Abila et al. 2006; Mkumbo 2006; van der Knaap and Ligtvoet 2006).  This 
distrust, in addition to poor enforcement by the central government, led to a culture of illegal 
fishing, resulting in overfishing, use of illegal gear, and harvesting under-sized fish (Ebong et al. 
2004). Fishing was pursued in a manner that contributed to exploitation at more than twice the 
sustainable level (Hecky 2003), devastating the resource and subsequently diminishing livelihoods 
of those who depend on it most.  
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Acknowledging the dire state of fish stocks of Lake Victoria and to address other factors 
that affect the lake, including increasing poverty among those dependent on it, Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Uganda developed national efforts to address common property fisheries problems. These 
efforts have been funded and influenced largely by the World Bank, including USD 77 million for 
fisheries management on Lake Victoria, of which the government of Uganda received almost USD 
30 million to support its involvement in the first phase of the Lake Victoria Environmental 
Management Project, which includes establishment of a fisheries management program for the 
lake (The World Bank 2006).  
With the financial assistance of the World Bank, in 1996 the three countries created the 
LVFO—the fisheries management arm of the East African Community—to coordinate 
management efforts around the lake. Under its umbrella, the fisheries department of each country, 
fisheries research institutes and other organizations have collaborated to manage the fisheries. In 
particular, development of institutions included both the central government and communities (co-
management) in an attempt to avoid shortcomings of decentralization seen in past social and 
infrastructural programs (The World Bank 1996).  
To manage the fishery, Beach Management Units (BMUs) were created at pre-existing fish 
landing sites (Ugandan Department of Fisheries Resources 2003). The BMUs are community-run 
governing bodies that manage the fishery and share policy development, enforcement and research 
duties with each state’s fisheries department. The BMUs enforce the fishing regulations 
established for the lake, serve as data collection points for monitoring and increase community 
members’ capacity to manage their fishing profits (Ebong et al. 2004). The BMUs were created to 
standardize the regulations of fisheries extraction throughout Lake Victoria, such that illegal 
practices are reduced and fish stocks remain sustainable. The LVFO was designed to coordinate 
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natural resource governance across national borders, between the three governments. The BMUs 
attempt to reduce constant external enforcement by the central government and to internalize 
patterns of behavior with roles, rules, regulations and goals that are created and clearly defined by 
communities (Stein 2008). 
The establishment of Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program was meant to create 
an equitable climate for all stakeholders (specifically the local communities), and sustain the lake’s 
fisheries. Nevertheless, illegal fishing has been continually observed around the lake (Abila et al. 
2005; Abila et al. 2006; Njiru et al. 2006; Njiru et al. 2008; personal observations). The reasons 
for this governance failure are similar to those in the forestry sector: decentralization requires a 
downward movement of not only political authority, including enforcement and monitoring, but 
of revenue. The Government of Uganda—and the other Lake Victoria states—has failed to provide 
enough money to the already limited staff of the fisheries departments. This shortfall has caused a 
two-pronged problem regarding the fishery: (1) a lack of enforcement equipment (e.g. boats, 
engines and fuel) needed for patrolling by the communities and (2) weak incentives for fisheries 
officers not to take bribes from those fishing illegally, which in turn makes illegal fishing 
profitable. Further, the weak devolution of power and financial resources to BMUs does not allow 
them to effectively execute their programs, even though they were relegated to conduct the 
majority of fisheries management activities. National fisheries officers frequently let offenders go, 
which further undermines BMU power and often renders them financially and politically 
powerless (Lawrence 2013).  
The failure to define clearly what co-management on Lake Victoria means, in terms of the 
specific roles of each level of government and of the community, is partially to blame for the 
inefficacy of governance. With communities charged with implementing management activities, 
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and thus given authority to manage their fisheries resource, the central government can claim 
effective implementation of decentralized policies. Co-management, however, requires that each 
partner has a role in resource management. While the Nile perch fishery on Lake Victoria provides 
the three countries with about USD 350 million in export earning per year (Ogwang' et al. 2009) 
(not including the dagaa and Nile tilapia fisheries, both provide substantial income), evidence of 
financial returns from the central government to the BMUs is notably lacking. A study conducted 
from 2009 to 2010 observed inadequate funding for the BMU committees to conduct enforcement 
patrols (Lawrence 2013). Data suggest that the national-level government inadequately finances 
the BMUs, and does not allow sufficient revenue collection by many of the BMUs to conduct their 
operations. The LVFO’s annual budget, previously provided by international donors (ended in 
2009), was USD 8 million, and thus management of Lake Victoria can easily be covered by 
revenue generated from each country through their Nile perch fishing industries alone. 
In summary, the Nile perch fishery produces enough money for the government of Uganda 
to provide sufficient support for fisheries management at the local level. The money, however, is 
not effectively moved from the central government to the fisheries department (Lawrence 2013). 
Further, community-level revenue collection is riddled with corruption, inefficiency and 
disempowerment (Keizire 2002; Lawrence 2013). For example, BMU committee members are 
supposed to collect taxes and fines from fishing activities associated with their landing site. These 
monies, however, are often collected by higher-level government officials, the police or a 
representative of one or the other. The amount of money that BMUs are given in return is usually 
not enough to purchase proper patrol and safety equipment or fuel (Lawrence, unpublished data). 
While the LVFO can suggest an effective governance process, it cannot direct resources from the 
national governments to the BMUs or to national-level fisheries departments. 
71 
 
The formal regulations that are meant to foster legal fishing behavior and allow fish stocks 
in Lake Victoria to regenerate are not being followed. The fisheries example, in which a 
compelling management approach is failing, demonstrates the need to acknowledge context within 
a single resource sector. Further research must be conducted to understand how the market value 
traits of Nile perch alter the original intentions of fisheries management on Lake Victoria. Again, 
‘simple blueprint policies do not work’ (Ostrom 2009) because markets, the lake itself, and the 
outlook of governing institutions change in unpredictable ways, often making governance 
ineffective. 
 
Discussion 
The above case studies demonstrate Uganda’s management approach to fisheries and forest 
resources by various stakeholders—communities and harvesters, local governments, the central 
government and NGOs. In both forestry and fishery cases, the central government remains 
overwhelmingly in charge of monetary resources and policy development and has failed to support 
local natural resource management organizations adequately. 
Uganda’s central government has relinquished much of its management responsibility to 
community organizations, which reduces its cost while still retaining revenues generated by these 
high-value resources sold abroad. Local organizations, thus, have the potential to be effective in 
managing these natural resources. Uganda’s, however, have valuable international markets 
demanding its fish, which makes effective management difficult because of incentives to overfish, 
lax enforcement, and an influx of would-be fishermen seeking relief from poor economic 
conditions from outside the lake’s basin. As a result, management is challenging. In the case of 
forests, the state continues to perceive them as a potential source of economic prosperity, yet 
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similar to the fishery, fiscal support for local management is lacking. In both the forest and fish 
industries, the products go through formal government export channels, and thus the national 
government benefits. The national government, therefore, has less incentive to invest in lower-
level governing entities. Only when resources face depletion does the national government work 
hard to sustain markets through increased management of resources, but often by recentralizing 
efforts.    
Market pressures continue to influence decentralization approaches. Lake Victoria’s Nile 
perch fishery became a high-value, internationally important export requiring need for a strong 
management system to govern multiple groups engaged in activities regarding these natural 
resource. Failure of the co-management institution to curtail illegal fishing is, we argue, a result of 
inefficient execution of the management program and not a weakness in a decentralized, co-
management approach. Specifically, the central government failed to give appropriate financial 
support to lower levels of government and communities, as evidenced by fisheries officers often 
having incentives to cheat the system, take bribes and release offenders, and by their inability to 
conduct their own patrols for lack of resources. Both government entities and BMUs, therefore, 
are undermined authoritatively, which reduces their legitimacy in the eyes of fishermen (Ogwang' 
et al. 2009). Financial support should result in policy abiding officers that have enough equipment 
to patrol the lake and that do not provide incentives to undermine BMU activities.  
Market pressures within the forestry sector, in contrast, are at sharp odds with household-
level subsistence pressures (MWLE 2009). Failure to incorporate the vital role of fuel wood and 
charcoal at the household level, for critical subsistence purposes only, as well as the resources’ 
link with subsistence agriculture practices, has profoundly weakened relevancy and effectiveness 
of decentralized management plans. One persistent trend, in particular, has contributed to this 
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failure. Although forestry export profits are low and subsistence use is high, exotic species are 
profitable. Thus, the central government refuses to allow resource harvesters to decide what 
species they want to plant, and planting exotics is credited as collaborative management. This trend 
is facilitated by two factors: One, the national government vacillates between centralized policy-
making and enforcement and decentralized ‘community-based’ and collaborative management 
approaches, both of which can be favored by the waxing or waning of international interest, a cycle 
that has complicated and hindered successful local forest management. Two, enforcement 
personnel are in short supply at the local level, especially given the diffuse and heterogeneous 
nature of the forestry resource. Decentralized forestry management appears weak as the national 
government retains too much control over resource management, contrary to recommended 
decentralized natural resource management approaches.  
Following many calls for the incorporation of multiple causal factors (Ostrom et al. 2002; 
Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; Janssen et al. 2007), our case studies suggest that decentralized 
management of Uganda’s fishery and forestry sectors has been ineffective because financial 
resource and judiciary power sharing between local management institutions and the national 
government is inadequate and hostile relationships between locals, local government and central 
government are prevalent. Blanket decentralization policies, often instituted in the face of faulty 
centralized policies, provide weak financial and institutional means for resource management at 
the local level to be as successful as intended. 
 
Conclusion 
Centralized management of natural resources in developing countries has largely failed in 
the past due to distrust of central governments by people who depend on the resources for their 
livelihoods. Based on these results, natural resource management evolved to include local 
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communities under the concept that ownership of the resource by those who extract that resource 
would lend local knowledge and reduce pressure on national government investment for support.  
Although the success of decentralized management has not been conclusive (see Brooks et 
al. 2006; Larson and Soto 2008), we consider the theoretical premise is compelling, regardless of 
resource characteristics. Our case studies suggest that while Uganda’s forestry and fishery sectors 
are distinct (e.g. transaction costs), given their shared history of colonial control, they both suffer 
from the same institutional weaknesses: the central government, although ostensibly participating 
in hybrid governance-type partnerships, has not allowed for equitable and sufficient power sharing 
(political or fiscal) (Datta and Varalakshmi 1999; Ribot 2002b; Schneider 2003; Hayes and Persha 
2010).  
We demonstrate that decentralized management of high-value natural resources has created 
incentives for the central government to manage each resource for profit over limiting extraction 
for sustainability. The high value of Uganda’s fishery and forest resources has led to the inadequate 
distribution of judicial power and financial resources to local communities managing them, thus 
making successful decentralized resource management difficult to achieve. The high value of 
natural resources create weaknesses—in an otherwise theoretically sound management 
approach—including (1) inability of local communities to manage the resource because of outside 
pressures (e.g. increased number of harvesters seeking livelihood gains) and (2) demands for 
higher gross domestic product by the national government resulting in little incentive to invest in 
resource management.  
Although difficult, the solution to overcoming poor natural resource management in 
Uganda and meeting objectives of decentralized programs enacted by Uganda’s central 
government agencies, includes the careful development of institutions that limit extractions, for 
75 
 
the benefit of continuing cultural, subsistence and ecological values. Indeed, failure to manage 
based on sustaining the resource and providing for subsistence threatens future gains. The fishery 
and forestry sectors in Uganda illustrate how success of decentralization is dependent upon the 
extent that national governments empower community members and harvesters to manage their 
resources sustainably. The power relationship between the national government and lower-level 
political entities in natural resource management is unbalanced, as evidenced by the lack of trust 
by local communities of national government in addressing natural resource management. 
Decentralization has also often proven ineffective in Uganda’s forest and fishery sectors because 
the national government has withheld funding and judicial power needed for local management 
entities to be effective. Moreover, the national government has little incentive to increase funding 
and authority at the local level because extraction of these resources benefits itself. Until the central 
government relinquishes some control and allows for development of nested institutions, 
ineffective natural resource management will continue. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
 
SELF-ORGANIZATION, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, AND THE 
VALUE OF EXPERIENCE IN LAKE VICTORIA’S FISHERY CO-
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
 
Abstract 
 
Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania created fishery co-management institutions on Lake 
Victoria during the previous 20 years.  Co-management is a partnership between 
government and local communities, whereby the latter are empowered to conduct 
fishery management.  Communities on Lake Victoria are included in fishery 
management through organizations called Beach Management Units (BMUs) 
which are charged with administering fishery management at pre-existing fish 
landing sites around the lake.  At some sites, fishery management existed through 
pre-existing fishery management organizations prior to the creation of each BMU.  
Pre-existing fishery management organizations made efforts to manage fisheries, 
and these efforts have many similar characteristics to co-management programs 
and, therefore, may enhance the chances of co-management success. Success is 
defined by the stated goals of co-management, which are the reduction in illegal 
fishing, the provision of benefits to the community as a result of fishing activities, 
inclusion in decision making, being treated equitably, and having the requisite 
mechanisms for resolving disputes.  This chapter explores what self-organization 
characteristics are associated with pre-existing fishery management organizations, 
and if those characteristics exist at current BMUs.  Results reveal that BMUs which 
had pre-existing organizations fared better than those that did not, exhibiting stronger 
self-organizing characteristics than BMUs that did not have pre-existing 
organizations. 
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Introduction 
Community involvement has emerged during the last forty years as being critical for the 
success of fishery management in Africa.  Historically, political theory assumed that local-
communities were incapable of the self-organization requisite for effective management of common 
property resources, such as fish, without external authority because incentives to over-harvest were 
too great (Ostrom et al. 1992; Ostrom 2009).  Recent research, however, has identified that the 
community, when faced with a social dilemma, may be able to self-organize in the absence of 
external authority, formal efforts, or incentives (Ostrom et al. 1992; Ostrom 1999; Andersson et 
al. 2010).  Communities12 have been shown to effectively self-organize to manage and maintain 
the natural resources on which they depend, including fishing communities on Lake Victoria 
(Ogutu-Ohwayo 2001; Odongkara et al. 2009; Ostrom 2009). 
Self-organization is defined, in part, as a set of activities undertaken by a community to 
collectively manage or influence harvest behavior conducive to the management of a sustainable 
fishery.  Self-organization has a voluntary component, where participation in fishery management 
activities are conducted by community members on behalf of the community and the fishery 
resource, with little or no external influence (Townsend and Shotton 2008).  Communities which 
self-organize are seen to have a set of processes that reflect shared values created by levels of 
interpersonal trust and reciprocity, called social cohesion (Ostrom 2009; Kawachi and Berkman 
2014).  Social cohesion facilitates collective action by individuals and groups, which are likely 
more able to respond and adapt to disturbances—such as over-harvest of a natural resource 
(Fleischman et al. 2010).  Characteristics of community social cohesion and self-organization 
include: participation of community members in decision making; enforcement of regulation 
                                                 
12 “Communities” in this dissertation refers to a group, or groups of people who are engaged in fishery related 
activities and are those belonging to established BMUs on Lake Victoria.  See page 11 for a complete description.    
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compliance of fishers; information flows among community members; equitable treatment of 
community members; ability to resolve disputes and conflict; and economic and social 
development with equitable distribution of benefits (Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989; Pomeroy et al. 
2001; Armitage et al. 2007; Pomeroy 2007). 
The realization that communities self-organize and exhibit characteristics viewed as 
beneficial for the successful management of natural resources has led governments to include 
communities in fishery management programs.  Current efforts in developing countries largely 
incorporate community participation in the administration and function of natural resource 
management (Jentoft 1989).  A prevalent approach of community participation in natural resource 
management in developing countries is called co-management.  Co-management programs use 
sets of institutions to facilitate community-government fishery management activities.  Institutions 
are defined as rules and regulations defining harvest use, roles for community members to 
administer fishery management activities, and organizational structures to assist with interactions 
between various political entities.  
Co-management is the devolution of authority and power to, and shared management 
responsibility between, local communities and governments in the management of a resource (Hara 
et al. 2002; Ribot 2002b; Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Armitage et al. 2007).  Though most definitions 
of co-management include a higher political or administrative authority sharing responsibility with 
communities, administration of fisheries often falls exclusively or mainly to the community.  
Communities, in many cases, are considered the action arm of fishery management (Townsend 
and Shotton 2008).  Regardless of the intent of community participation within co-management, 
there is a component of responsibility in the domain of fishery management: community 
participants must make management decisions and undertake actions without external incentives 
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or assistance (Townsend and Shotton 2008).  Whether sharing responsibility or not, individuals and 
members of communities are expected to develop and administer a set of regulations and functions 
associated with fishery management, often with little or no incentive, oversight, or repercussions.  
Fishery management, in a co-management program, embodies the characteristics of self-
organization and, therefore, a community’s ability to effectively self-organize within co-
management programs is vital.  The necessary characteristics of community participation in co-
management are, thus, also characteristics that a community demonstrates in self-organizing. 
Prior to the establishment of formal co-management programs on Lake Victoria, some 
communities self-organized, undertaking fishery management external to formal management 
influences.  Researchers have, thus, argued whether these pre-existing organizations (local fishery 
management efforts which pre-date co-management) should be a prerequisite for the establishment 
of formal co-management institutions (Geheb et al. 2002; Hara et al. 2002; Wilson 2002).  A 
simple answer does not seem to exist, rather, answers are determined on a case-by-case basis.  An 
example of pre-existing natural resource organizations undermining the efficacy of newly created 
co-management institutions was made by Hara et al. (2002) on Lake Malawi, where the power, 
benefits, and privileges of being a village headmen were interrupted by an artificial hierarchy of a 
new co-management program.  On Lake Victoria, however, Geheb et al. (2002) and Wilson (2002), 
both found that pre-existing organizations have characteristics of self-organization and were 
necessary to enhance the chances of success of new co-management programs.  Communities with 
pre-existing organizations are described as having past experience and social capital; both 
illustrating a community voluntarily (collectively) acting to address natural resource challenges.  
A community that has self-organized has:  
 established a convention of cooperation that provides experience in which to act in 
comparable circumstances;  
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 the ability to address collective challenges and build trust required to confront 
future complex situations; and, 
 a management system rooted in tradition favoring continuity of that scheme 
(Baland and Platteau 2000).   
 
Effective implementation of formal co-management institutions, if not unreasonable, is expected 
when voluntary natural resource management efforts were already established by the community 
(Kooiman et al. 2005). 
The research reported in this chapter focuses on the fishery co-management program on 
Lake Victoria, East Africa.  This setting provides a unique opportunity to study co-management 
because co-management institutions have been implemented around the entire lake, with the 
intention of including all fishers and fishing community members.  Lake Victoria highlights the 
self-organizational narrative which exists in both co-management and pre-existing organizations.  
The fishery management organizations that pre-date BMUs were voluntary and attempted to 
reduce harm to the fishery prior to the formal co-management program. 
This chapter explores the relationship between self-organization and co-management to 
determine if self-organization, prior to the introduction of the formal co-management program, 
increases characteristics of success of the new co-management program.  Success is defined by the 
stated goals of co-management, which are reduction in illegal fishing and provision of benefits to 
the community as a result of fishing activities.  Additionally, co-management promises community 
members being a part of decision making and being treated equitably, and having requisite 
mechanisms for resolving disputes. 
The intent of this chapter is to determine what characteristics increase the chances of self-
organization within the Lake Victoria fishery management program.  To do so, this chapter 
compares BMUs which had pre-existing fishery management organization to those that did not to 
determine the existence of such characteristics.   
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Lake Victoria: Background  
Lake Victoria provides valuable fish resources for communities living on its shores.  The 
lake is dominated by three major commercial fish species, the non-native Nile perch (Lates 
niloticus) and Nile tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus), and the indigenous sardine-like fish 
Rastrineobola argentea. 
The top-predator, Nile perch, was introduced into the lake in the late 1950s and has emerged 
as a globally sought after and valuable fish, providing economic returns for the lake’s national 
governments and local communities.  The Nile perch has also caused what many consider (Witte et 
al. 1992; Goldschmidt 1998) the largest mass extinction event in modern history by destroying large 
numbers of the lake’s endemic haplochromine fish species.   
Though numerous factors such as overfishing and pollution have impacted fish populations 
on Lake Victoria, the decline of Nile perch populations was the impetus for revised management 
efforts on Lake Victoria in the 1990s.  The demand for Nile perch caused increased fishing efforts 
as well as over- and illegal-fishing that depleted its populations (Mkumbo and Mlaponi 2007; 
Mkumbo et al. 2007; Njiru et al. 2007; Ojuok et al. 2007; Witte et al. 2007).  Coordinated federal 
government efforts during this time focused on creation of co-management institutions with 
emphasis on community participation.  Co-management efforts were a result, in part, of past failed 
centralized federal government efforts on Lake Victoria and, in general, efforts by governments in 
developing countries to move toward community engagement.   
Fishery co-management on Lake Victoria was designed to motivate and reinforce legal and 
sustainable fishing behavior through the inclusion of communities.  During 1994, the fishery co-
management institutions on Lake Victoria were created.  Community members—individuals 
engaged in fishery-related activities—were included through local organizations called Beach 
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Management Units (BMUs).  BMUs were first implemented during 1998 through 2002 (LVFO 
2005b) in each of the lake’s three riparian countries: Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.  Standardization 
of fishing regulations among the three countries, and harmonization between each country and their 
respective BMUs, is facilitated by the central fishery management entity called the Lake Victoria 
Fisheries Organization (LVFO).  The LVFO’s aim is to guide BMU committees in implementing 
and enforcing fishery management policies—deemed appropriate for sustainable fishery 
management—by encouraging fishing communities to adapt to the BMU committee structure; 
create required committee membership; conduct appropriate BMU administrative functions; 
establish new by-laws and guidelines for the fishery when appropriate; and, conduct enforcement 
operations.   
BMUs are the lowest administrative entity in fishery co-management institutions.  Located 
at pre-existing fish landing sites, BMU committees are legally empowered, community-run 
organizations responsible for the majority of fishery management activities, such as patrolling, 
enforcing regulations, and—to a lesser degree—punishing offenders on Lake Victoria   (Ugandan 
Department of Fisheries Resources 2003)13.  BMUs consist of two major components: the first is the 
BMU community, the second is the BMU committee.  Though the term “community” can be 
abstract, BMUs were designed to be inclusive of all who are in one way or another engaged in 
fisheries on Lake Victoria, thus “community” is defined by those who are members of a BMU.  
BMU members, or community, include those who are “boat owners, fishing crew members, fish 
mongers, artisanal fish processors, local gear makers and repairers, boat builders, fishing input 
suppliers, and industrial fish processors’ agents” (Ugandan Department of Fisheries Resources 
2003, p. 18).  To administer the activities which take place at the BMU, a BMU committee is 
                                                 
13 There are 1,069 BMUs around Lake Victoria consisting of more than 1400 landing sites (LVFO 2010). 
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democratically elected by the BMU community.  The BMU committee consists of 9-15 members of 
the BMU community.   
The BMU committee is charged with administering specific functions that include: 
monitoring and enforcement of regulations; assisting in collection of fish-catch data; improving 
sanitation and hygiene and other development projects; and making and enforcing fisheries by-laws.  
By-laws are rules that pertain to a specific BMU’s area and community.  By-laws are suggested by 
BMU community members in collaboration with BMU committee members; they are consistent 
with national fisheries regulations and cannot usurp them (e.g. illegal net-size) (LVFO 2005a). 
BMUs are effectively the action arm of fishery management on Lake Victoria.  BMUs were 
designed so that fishers and fishing communities could self-organize.  Individuals, and the 
community as a whole, are asked to voluntarily act on behalf of the fishery and in collective interest 
of the community.  There is no punishment if participants do not successfully administer the 
responsibilities rendered to them by the formal co-management program and, therefore, when self-
organization does take place, it does so in lieu of coercive power.   
Despite creation of BMUs, regulation-breaking continues around Lake Victoria  (Mkumbo 
et al. 2009; Ogwang' et al. 2009).  The evidence that members of BMUs do not, or are not able to, 
self-organize and administer management regulations and programs of the fishery co-management 
program is demonstrated by fishers from some BMUs engaging in considerably higher levels of 
illegal fishing activity than those from others (LVFO 2005a).  Fishers at some BMUs persistently 
use illegal gear, possess illegal fish, and use illegal fishing methods around Lake Victoria (Ogwang' 
and Nunan 2008).   
The impetus for this research were observations that administration of fisheries within 
BMUs is voluntary (community members are not punished for failure to administer functions 
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outlined for BMUs, there is only punishment to those who break the regulations).  Both research 
and observations indicate that BMUs function on a spectrum from poorly run to well-run BMUs.  
My intention, then, is to compare characteristics of self-organization from BMUs which had pre-
existing fishery management organization, and those that did not, to determine if patterns emerge, 
which would demonstrate sites with pre-existing organization are more successful managing their 
fisheries than those without. 
 
Characteristics of co-management and self-organization  
In pre-existing organization situations, like those at many of the landing sites on Lake 
Victoria, influencing behavior of community members depended on social cohesion, which relied 
on the extent of connectedness and solidarity among individuals or groups (Kawachi and Berkman 
2014).  Many studies that focused on natural resource co-management programs and their success 
evaluated many characteristics of community self-organization that might increase successful 
community participation (Ostrom 1990; Dietz et al. 2002). 
Successful co-management therefore, depends on having the same characteristics as 
successful self-organization.  The necessary characteristics of successful community participation 
within a co-management institutions include these six main characteristics:   
 Inclusion of community in decision making 
Participation in the planning and implementation process is directly related to the participants’ 
sense of ownership and commitment to management arrangements, eliciting trust and respect 
among others in the community through these processes (Ostrom 2009).  When participants have 
autonomy to develop and enforce their own regulations, “they face lower transaction costs as well 
as lower costs in defending a resource against invasion by others” (Ostrom 2009, p. 421).  Further, 
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communities which engage in the successful creation of regulations, patrols, and enforcement are 
reported to have a decrease in illegal fishing activities (Wilson et al. 2003). 
 Enhanced enforcement of regulations and increased compliance 
Monitoring and enforcement of regulations are often cited as the most important characteristic for 
successful natural resource management.  Researchers often focus on the ability of community 
members to create credible commitments to each other (regulations), monitor each other’s 
behavior (patrols), and impose sanctions (enforcement and punishment) on individuals who break 
those commitments (Ostrom et al. 1992; Ostrom 1999; Andersson et al. 2010).  The argument that 
if strong enforcement exists, other characteristics are less important is a fallacy.  This fallacy is 
demonstrated by the stark example provided by failed management on Lake Victoria, where 
centralized management of the fishery—whereby fishery management consisted mainly of top-
down enforcement, by the government, of the local-fishers—was rejected by many local 
communities during the colonial era and prior to independence (Abila et al. 2006), resulting in a 
culture of illegal fishing and subsequent exploitation at more than two times its sustainable level 
(Hecky 2003).  State coercion of citizens into conservation is a limiting factor when the 
management of resources, such as fish and wildlife, are “intrinsic to everyday livelihood and 
household budgets” (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, p. 5).  The limits of centralized management “are 
seen starkly when federal governments attempt to discipline resource [harvesters]”, causing 
spectacular failures of conservation programs (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, p. 5).  Centralized 
approaches to resource management have placed humans outside the system (Walker and Salt 
2006), ignoring the social, cultural, political, and economic climate and differences among 
communities. 
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 Similarly, co-management institutions and pre-existing organizational efforts require more 
than strong enforcement capacity; for example, for resource harvesters to follow regulations, a 
mechanism for discussing and resolving conflict and infractions is needed (Pomeroy et al. 2001). 
 Improved information flows 
Community involvement increases an individual community member’s belief in the legitimacy of 
regulations and commitment to them.  This is accomplished through greater participation, where 
community members have a say in creating regulations.  When this occurs, community members 
are more likely to uphold regulations and inform on others who violate regulations.  If resource 
harvesters are not involved in modifying regulations over time, “the information about the  benefits  
and  costs  as  perceived  by  different participants is not fully taken into account in any efforts to 
adapt to new conditions and information over time” (Ostrom 1999, p. 145).  
 Mechanism for equitable treatment of constituents 
Equity has two meanings in the context of co-management.  The first meaning of equity is the 
promise of inclusion of representatives from all community groups in natural resource 
management, especially those who have historically been less powerful, obsolete, or 
disenfranchised.  The second meaning is equitable treatment of members of the community, which 
includes equal application of regulations, enforcement efforts, and punishment.  On Lake Victoria, 
the traditionally neglected involvement of women, fish mongers, and boat and net makers or 
repairers has now been reversed in BMU guidelines, as these groups have representation on the BMU 
committee (LVFO 2005a).   
 Increased ability to resolve disputes and conflict 
Minimizing conflict is often given high priority because disputes often inhibit successful 
mitigation of over-use due to fracturing of social cohesion in natural resource management 
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settings; mechanisms for conflict management and resolution, therefore, need to be established 
formally in co-management institutions (Geheb and Sarch 2002).  In many instances, co-
management institutions have been effective in reducing and managing conflict among fishing 
groups by involving fishers in enforcement and development of fishing regulations (Pinkerton 
1989a; Hara et al. 2002; Jul-Larsen et al. 2003; Wilson et al. 2003).  The inclusion of community 
in natural resource co-management promises an increased ability to resolve disputes through 
increased social cohesion.  
 Improved economic and social development and equitable distribution of benefits 
By involving community in planning and protection of the fisheries, co-management enhances the 
community’s economic development by circulating benefits back into the community (Pinkerton 
1989a).  Without distribution of benefits to community members, individual’s costs—loss of 
potential economic benefit—of following regulations are often not realized by the community.  
This seems to be the outcome of most resource management institutions—benefits of actions taken 
are supposedly for the good of the community for which it was designed.  Without realization of 
benefits, there is little incentive for fishers to comply with management institutions.   
The above characteristics do not exist in isolation, they support and link to one another for 
self-organization and co-management to be effective (Pomeroy 2007).  For example, improvement 
of information flows impacts other characteristics, notably, community decision making, 
compliance, and monitoring of regulations.  Also, mechanisms for dispute resolution allow for other 
characteristics to function.  Discovering indicators of the six characteristics of self-organization is a 
major step in better understanding the relationship between current co-management program, pre-
existing fishery management organizations, and the experiences of fishing communities on Lake 
Victoria.  The questions asked in this research evaluate components of the six characteristics of self-
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Each country was necessary, therefore, the study population was: Kenya n=35; Tanzania n=44; 
and, Uganda n=32 (Table 4.2). 
organization and co-management.  Determining if BMUs with pre-existing fishery management 
organization have these six characteristics associated with them, and BMUs that did not have pre-
existing organization were less successful in these six characteristics, could influence better 
functioning BMUs on Lake Victoria, and motivate creation of new co-management programs for 
other natural resources. 
 
Methods 
The data collected in this chapter are a subset of a broader set of questions (see Appendices 
A and B) used in my questionnaires.  This subset was used to determine which characteristics 
influence the ability of communities to effectively self-organize.  Of the questions identified as self-
organizing, some were excluded because of biases in either how the question was asked or the nature 
of the answers.  The resulting 40 questions (Table 4.1) were then identified as being a component to, 
or reflecting the nature of, one of the six characteristics of co-management and self-organization 
presented above.   
The data for this study were gathered between July 2009 and February 2010 at formally 
established Beach Management Units in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda on Lake Victoria.  Because 
Nile perch was the impetus for creation of the co-management program on Lake Victoria, BMUs 
that had Nile perch as the main target fish species were selected for this study.  For statistical 
significance, I estimated that a minimum sample size of 10 percent of the total number of BMUs in 
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each country was necessary, therefore, the study population was: Kenya n=35; Tanzania n=44; and, 
Uganda n=32 (Table 4.2). 
# Questions/Co-management characteristics n 
DV Did a fish management or protection committee exist before the BMU was created? 216 
1-Inclusion of stakeholders in decision making 
1 Do boat owners ever propose any rules (by-laws) to the BMU? 218 
2 Is there a boat owners group at this BMU 443 
3 Do you belong to the boat owners group at this BMU? 192 
2-Enhances enforcement of regulations and rules compliance 
4 Has illegal fishing increased or decreased since the establishment of you BMU? 217 
5 In your view, is your BMU successful in enforcing fishing rules? 215 
6 Is your BMU successful at arresting offenders? 436 
7 What action is taken if someone is caught with illegal gear or is illegally fishing? 371 
8 Are there punishments if you catch someone using illegal methods (e.g. beating the water)? 423 
9 Are there punishments if you catch someone with illegal sized fish 434 
10 Are there punishments if you catch someone with illegal sized nets? 436 
11 Is your BMU successful at confiscating illegal gear? 436 
12 Do you know any boat owners at your BMU who have illegal gear? 435 
13 Out of all the boat owners you know, how many illegally fish or have illegal fishing gear? 214 
14 Does every boat owner have illegal gear? 250 
15 What happens if illegal gear or fish is found in someone's boat by a community member? 441 
16 Do you turn-in your fellow committee member if found illegally fishing or with illegal gear? 215 
17 If someone has illegal fish at this BMU, are they able to sell it freely at this BMU? 438 
18 Do you take action if you catch a fisher illegally fishing at your BMU? 443 
19 Are patrols for illegal fish and gear conducted at this BMU by the BMU committee? 443 
20 How often do these patrols take place? 369 
21 Do (external) entities consult or involve you when conducting the patrols? 177 
3-Improves information flows 
22 How often does the BMU Executive Committee meet formally? 414 
23 Does the BMU committee hold assembly (BMU Beach) meetings with the BMU members? 442 
24 How often do these meetings take place? 403 
25 Do you keep records of illegal fishing activity at this BMU? 217 
26 Do fishermen tell you if other fishermen are illegally fishing? 217 
27 The BMU gets information on illegal gear and illegal fishing from other fishermen. 213 
28 Can the fishery be protected with such fishing rules? 433 
29 Why is fish data collected? 202 
30 What do you see as the main purpose of the BMU? 440 
4-Increases equitable treatment of constituents 
31 Are everyone's views/opinions valued at this BMU? 438 
32 Is there unequal application of fishing rules to different people in the BMU? 434 
33 Did all the BMU members have the opportunity to participate in the election? 215 
5-Increases ability to resolve disputes and conflict 
34 Is your BMU successful in resolving disputes? 430 
35 What is the reaction of the community when the BMU enforces rules 438 
36 Do you fear retribution when you enforce the rules? 217 
37 Is there any conflict within this BMU? 442  
6-Improves economic and social development and equitable dist. of benefits 
38 From what sources does the BMU bring in revenue? Taxes. 189 
39 From what sources does the BMU bring in revenue? Fines. 189 
40 Does the BMU Committee provide services or infrastructure to the community 440 
Table 4.1. Questions from the survey tested to evaluate characteristics of co-management and self-
organization. 
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Four respondents 
per BMU were surveyed by 
questionnaire (Appendices 
A and B), including two 
committee leaders 
(n=218)14 and two boat 
owners (n=226)15.  Leaders of the BMU committees (chair and secretary) were targeted for 
interviews because of their positions of authority, duties to perform within those positions, and 
subsequent knowledge of the BMU committee’s workings.  Boat owners were chosen because they 
are generally more aware of, and affected by, fishing regulations and punishment imposed on them 
by BMU committee leaders.  These four respondents at each BMU were collectively chosen to 
reduce response bias due to group membership by comparing answers of boat owners, those typically 
being governed, and BMU committee leaders, those typically governing.  Response bias can occur 
when participants self-report, and in this case, the two groups have potentially conflicting interests.  
BMU committee leaders might provide socially desirable responses of a successful BMU based on 
their positions as leaders; boat owners might provide answers contrary to success-oriented responses 
made by committee leaders, as boat owners might feel they are treated unfairly by committee leaders 
or have knowledge of fishing activities that BMU leaders might not be aware of.  Comparing 
responses, thus, can provide a clearer representation of what might actually be occurring at a specific 
BMU. 
                                                 
14 At two sites in Uganda and two sites in Tanzania, a committee member of the BMU refused to show up or was 
unable to meet.  Each BMU is therefore represented, but for two of the BMUs in Tanzania and two of the BMUs in 
Uganda, only one member is represented. 
15 At the first site visited in Uganda, as methods and approaches were being refined, five boat owners were 
interviewed.  All of their data is included in the analysis. 
BMUs   Respondents 
Country 
Total 
#/country 
10%/country  
Committee 
Leaders 
Boat 
Owners 
Kenya 252 35  70 70 
Tanzania 436 44  86 80 
Uganda 317 32  62 67 
Total 1005 111   218 225 
  n=111   n=443 
Table 4.2. Summary of site and respondent numbers for surveys conducted 
on Lake Victoria from July 2009 to February 2010. 
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The questionnaires for BMU committee leaders and boat owners consisted primarily of 
binary answers, where the respondent could answer, “yes” or “no”, “more” or “less”, “increase” or 
“decrease”, “regularly” or “irregularly” (see questionnaires in Appendix A and B).  Some questions 
asked categorical questions, for example, if the respondent thought fish populations were decreasing, 
what was the cause of this decrease (e.g. illegal fishing, pollution, other).  Other questions were 
open-ended, allowing respondents to provide examples of services or infrastructure provided to the 
community by the BMU committee.  Open-ended interview questions were asked about what each 
respondent thought the biggest challenges were to success of their BMU.  Data from these questions 
were used in Chapter 5 and, when appropriate, will inform perspective in this chapter.  
The nature of the data that required a multi-step process to prepare the data for statistical 
analysis.  First, I determined which BMUs had a pre-existing fishery management organization.  
This step allowed me to run comparative analysis between BMUs that had a pre-existing 
organization, and those that did not.  To determine if a BMU had a pre-existing organization prior 
to establishment of BMUs, I asked each BMU committee leader (half of the population) in my 
sample: “Did a fishery management or protection committee [organization] exist before the BMU 
was created?”  The responses were coded “1” if the respondent replied that there was a pre-existing 
fishery management organization prior to the establishment of the BMU and “0” if not.  Because 
these responses were dependent on the knowledge of individuals, responses sometimes differed 
between two members at the same BMU (one respondent indicated “yes” there was a pre-existing 
fishery management organization at the landing site prior to the establishment of the BMU, and 
one respondent indicated “no”).  For analysis purposes, I combined responses within each BMU 
to get a single metric.  Therefore, the dependent variable can have one of three values: a value of 
0 (both respondents indicated there was not a pre-existing organization), 0.5 (one respondent 
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indicated there was, and one indicated there was not), and 1 (both respondents indicated there was 
a pre-existing organization).   
The second step was a two-step process.  Of the larger set of questions from my surveys 
(Appendices A and B), I identified those questions that characterize self-organization activities 
and excluded those questions which exhibited a bias that could be subject to other interpretations16.  
I then identified each question as relating to one of the six characteristics of self-organization and 
co-management.  This process resulted in 40 questions, each one falling under one of the six 
categories of self-organization and co-management (see Table 4.1).   
The third step was to determine which of the 40 questions defined as characteristics of self-
organization were more strongly associated with BMUs that had pre-existing fishery management 
organization.  This third step required statistical analysis.  Two analytical procedures were 
conducted: First, a Pearson’s chi-square test for independence (2=0.05) to determine whether 
there was an association between the dependent variable (pre-existence of fishery management 
organization) and the independent variables (40 questions associated with self-organization).  
Second, basic descriptive statistical analysis, to determine if strong patterns of responses (e.g. little 
variation) emerged. 
For the Pearson’s chi-square test for independence, analysis was conducted at the BMU-level 
(not the individual respondent-level).  So that each BMU would have a single value, I added the 
responses (1=yes and 0=no) from each BMU respondent and recoded these responses into a single 
metric.  Depending on the question, either two or four respondents answered (e.g. some questions 
only asked BMU committee leaders about BMU committee operations).  If the question, for 
example, asked all four respondents “Does your BMU committee effectively arrest offenders?” any 
                                                 
16 Determination of bias included unclear questions that resulted in unclear or multiple-meaning answers;  
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one of five combinations could occur: all respondents could say “yes” = 4, three could say “yes” and 
one “no” = 3 and so on.  Therefore, each BMU could have a score of between 0 and 4 for each 
question, with 4 indicating that all respondents believed their BMU committee effectively arrested 
offenders, and 0 indicating that all respondents believed their BMU committee did not effectively 
arrest offenders.  To simplify the range of responses for analysis, I then translated the whole numbers 
I calculated into a fraction of 1 to represent the BMU respondent’s collective response (e.g. if all 
respondents answered “yes”, the total would = 4, and the metric for analysis would equal 1). 
For the dependent variable (pre-existence of fishery management organization), I accepted 
only the values that equaled 1 and 0, meaning both respondents indicated that there was, or was 
not, a pre-existing fishery management organization.  The BMUs that had metrics of 0.5, which 
indicated “unsure”, were not included in the statistical analysis because there was no way to 
determine which respondent was correct in answering if there was a pre-existing fishery 
management organization.  Likewise, for the independent variables, where the metric could equal 
0.5, indicating opposing responses (e.g. two respondents indicated “yes” and two respondents 
indicated “no” to an answer) there was no way to determine which respondents were correct.  
Therefore, 0.5 data was not included in the analysis unless relevant to a specific question; this 
would also reduce the likelihood that a statistical association would be determined based on data 
characterized as “unsure”.  Response metrics for the independent variables included 0 and 0.25, 
and 0.75 and 1, where 0 and 0.25 indicate a majority of respondents indicated a negative response 
and 0.75 and 1 indicating a majority of respondents replied positively. 
The descriptive statistics identified patterns of some responses where little or no variation 
occurred, for example, all respondents replied 1 at all BMUs.  Results from the descriptive statistics 
were used to clarify, strengthen, or develop the existing data.  To do this, I used frequency tables 
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with a threshold of 80 percent where 80-89 percent is considered a “majority”, and >90 percent is 
considered a “vast majority”.  This was calculated by summing the responses of all individuals 
who answered a specific question and calculating the percentage of each response option.  These 
data often provide additional explanation of the chi-square results. 
The results of the analysis conducted in this study provide a comparison between BMUs 
with and without pre-existing fishery management organizations to determine if self-organizing 
characteristics are more prevalent in one or the other.   
 
Results 
Of the 111 BMUs, responses from 48 indicated fishery management organizations existed 
prior to the fishery co-management program, 44 were unsure, and 19 indicated no pre-existing 
fishery management organization.  The 44 BMUs which indicated they were unsure were not used 
in the analysis, therefore, the study population for this chapter is 67.  These 67 BMUs were subject 
to statistical analysis to determine if there are associations between BMUs which indicated 
presence of pre-existing organization and 40 questions on self-organization.   
The Chi-square test of independence resulted in nine (Table 4.3) of the 40 questions asked 
in this study showing a statistical difference (association) between the two types of BMUs 
(p<0.05).  Fourteen of the 40 questions showed little variation, where a majority (80-89 percent) 
answered in one direction.  Of these fourteen questions, six showed a vast majority (>90 percent) 
of respondents answered in one direction (Tables 4.4-4.8). 
Of the statistically associated questions, committee leaders were asked if boat owners 
propose any by-laws to the BMU committee (question 1, Table 4.1), because the BMU committee 
leaders would be recipients of such requests.  The results (Table 4.3) show that more boat owners 
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at BMUs that had a pre-existing organization proposed by-laws (97 percent) than boat owners at 
 
Q#   Pre-org. 0 1 
1 
Do boat owners ever propose any rules (by-laws) to the BMU 
[committee]? 
0 43.8 56.3 
1 2.6 97.4 
  Note: X2=15.084, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.001). Average=0.687, n=54. 
2 Is there a boat owners group at this BMU? 
0 81.8 18.2 
1 45.7 54.3 
  Note: X2=4.397, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.036). Average=0.313, n=46. 
3 Do you belong to the boat owners group at this BMU? 
0 92.9 7.1 
1 61.1 28.9 
  Note: X2=4.837, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.028). Average=0.224, n=50. 
19 
Are patrols for illegal fish and gear conducted at this BMU by the 
BMU committee? 
0 16.7 83.3 
1 2.5 97.5 
  Note: X2=3.88, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.049). Average=0.806, n=58. 
21 
Do these (external enforcement) entities consult or involve you when 
conducting the patrols? 
0 47.4 52.6 
1 20.8 79.2 
  Note: X2=4.718, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.03). Average=0.716, n=67. 
24 How often do these meetings take place? 
0 30.8 69.2 
1 8.1 91.9 
  Note: X2=4.103, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.043). Average=0.642, n=50. 
26 Do fishermen tell you if other fishermen are illegally fishing? 
0 38.5 61.5 
1 3.2 96.8 
  Note: X2=9.656, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.002). Average=0.567, n=44. 
34 Is your BMU successful in resolving disputes? 
0 22.2 77.8 
1 0 100 
  Note: X2=10.678, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.001). Average=0.881, n=63. 
40 
Does the BMU Committee provide services or infrastructure to the 
community? 
0 50 50 
1 17.1 82.9 
  Note: X2=5.539, df=1 **p<0.05 (0.019). Average=0.537, n=49. 
Table 4.3. Self-organizing characteristics that are statistically associated against the dependent variable: 
“A fish management or protection committee [organization] existed prior to est. of BMU.”  Analysis was 
conducted using Pearson’s chi-square test of independences **p < 0.05.  Comparisons of occurrences 
between BMUs with (1) and without (0) pre-existing fishery management organizations.  Rows = 0 for a 
negative response and 1 for positive response.   
 
T
a
b
le 4
.3
: S
elf-o
rg
a
n
izin
g
 ch
a
ra
cter
istics th
a
t a
re
 sta
tistica
lly
 a
sso
cia
ted
 a
g
a
in
st th
e d
ep
en
d
en
t v
a
ria
b
le 
96 
 
at BMUs that had a pre-existing organization proposed by-laws (97 percent) than boat owners at 
BMUs that did not have pre-existing organizations (56 percent).   
Respondents at BMUs with a pre-existing organization reported that their BMUs more 
often had a boat owners group (54 percent) compared to respondents at BMUs without (18 
percent).  An associated question “Do you belong to the boat owners group at this BMU?” also 
showed significant differences, with a greater frequency of membership for respondents at BMUs 
with pre-existing organizations (29 percent), compared to 7 percent membership at BMUs without 
pre-existing organizations (question 3, Table 4.3). 
One of the major objectives of BMUs is to ensure regulation compliance by fishers.  
Questions focusing on enforcement of BMUs were extensive (Questions 4-22, Table 4.1).  Out of 
these questions, two showed statistical association with BMUs that had a pre-existing fishery 
management organization (questions 19 and 21, Table 4.3).  Responses to question 19, “Are patrols 
for illegal fish and gear conducted at this BMU by the BMU committee?” indicated that more 
BMUs with pre-existing organizations conduct enforcement patrols (98 percent) than those 
without (83 percent).  This question had little variation in responses with 84 percent of all 
respondents indicating that patrols are conducted regardless of pre-existing organizations (question 
19, Table 4.4).  Question 21 “Do [external enforcement] entities consult or involve you when 
conducting patrols?” was asked of only BMU committee leaders; 79 percent of BMUs with pre-
existing organizations consulted by external enforcement entities compared to only 53 percent of 
BMUs without.   
I identified nine of the 23 questions about enforcement that showed little variation in 
responses (>80 percent).  Table 4.4 shows the percentage of all respondents.  These questions  
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indicated that respondents believe punishment or judicial action is taken against illegal fishing 
 
Q# Question n 
yes/increase/action 
taken 
no/decrease/no 
action 
4 
Has illegal fishing increased or decreased 
since the establishment of your BMU? 
205 12.7% 87.3%* 
5 
In your view, is your BMU successful in 
enforcing fishing rules? 
215 74.9% 25.1% 
6 
Is your BMU successful at arresting 
offenders? 
436 72.9% 27.1% 
7 
What action is taken if someone is caught 
with illegal gear or is illegally fishing? 
271 94.6%* 5.4% 
8 
Are there punishments if you catch 
someone using illegal methods (e.g. beating 
the water)? 
423 85.3%* 14.7% 
9 
Are there punishments if you catch 
someone with illegal sized fish? 
434 84.3%* 15.7% 
10 
Are there punishments if you catch 
someone with illegal sized nets? 
436 87.6%* 12.4% 
11 
Is your BMU successful at confiscating illegal 
gear? 
436 71.1% 28.9% 
12 
Do you know any boat owners at your BMU 
who have illegal gear? 
435 see table 9 
13 
Out of all the oat owners you know, how 
many illegally fish or have illegal fishing 
gear? 
214 43.9% 23.4% 
14 Does every boat owner have illegal gear? 250 28.8% 71.2% 
15 
What happens if illegal gear or fish is found 
in someone's boat by a community 
member? 
441 81.2%* 18.8% 
16 
Do you turn-in your fellow committee 
member if found illegally fishing or with 
illegal gear? 
215 89.8%* 10.2% 
17 
If someone has illegal fish at this BMU, are 
they able to sell it freely at this BMU? 
438 41.6% 58.5% 
18 
Do you take action if you catch a fisher 
illegally fishing at your BMU? 
443 84.0%* 16.0% 
19 
Are patrols for illegal fish and gear 
conducted at this BMU by the BMU 
committee? 
443 84.2%** 15.8% 
20 
How often do these [BMU] patrols take 
place? 
369 67.4% 65.48 
21 
Do [external enforcement] entities consult 
or involve you when conducting patrols? 
177 32.64 34.52 
Table 4.4. Enhanced enforcement of regulations and rules compliance as measured by calculating the 
response rate (percent) of all individuals in the study.  * indicates a majority (80-89 percent) or vast 
majority (>90 percent) of respondents answering in one direction (e.g. positive or negatively) for one 
question.  ** indicates that the question was also statistically associated (see Table 4.3) with the dependent 
variable.   
Table 4.4: Response rates of enhanced enforcement of regulations and rules compliance characteristics 
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indicated that respondents believe punishment or judicial action is taken against illegal fishing 
activities or people who have illegal-sized gear or fish (questions 7-10) regardless of BMU type.  
Questions 15, 16, and 18 indicate high rates of community or individual action.  Question 4 
embodies these questions by asking “Has illegal fishing increased or decreased since the 
establishment of your BMU?”  A majority of respondents (87 percent) indicated that illegal fishing 
has decreased, again regardless of BMU type. 
Question 23 (Table 4.1) asked “Does the BMU committee hold assembly (BMU Beach) 
meetings with the BMU members?”  There was no statistical association with pre-existing 
organizations, but a vast majority (92 percent) of all respondents indicated that meetings for both 
BMU types took place (Table 4.5).  The follow-up question “How often do these meetings take 
 
Q# Question n 
yes/often/correct 
answer 
no/irregularly/incorrect 
answer 
22 
How often does the BMU Executive 
Committee formally meet? 
414 88.6%* 11.4% 
23 
Does the BMU committee hold assembly 
(BMU Beach) meetings with the BMU 
members? 
442 91.9%* 8.1% 
24 How often do these meetings take place? 403 87.7%** 12.3% 
25 
Do you keep records of illegal fishing 
activity at this BMU? 
217 89.4%* 10.6% 
26 
Do fishermen tell you if other fishermen 
are illegally fishing? 
217 76.5% 23.5% 
27 
The BMU gets information on illegal gear 
and illegal fishing from other fishermen. 
213 75.6% 24.4% 
28 
Can the fishery be protected with such 
fishing rules? 
433 94.7%* 5.3% 
29 Why is fish data collected? 252 80.2%* 19.8% 
30 
What do you see as the main purpose of 
the BMU? 
440 94.6%* 5.5% 
Table 4.5. Improved information flows as measured by calculating the response rate (percent) of all 
individuals in the study.  * indicates a majority (80-89 percent) or vast majority (>90 percent) of 
respondents answering in one direction (e.g. positive or negatively) for one question.  ** indicates that the 
question was also statistically associated (see Table 3) with the dependent variable.   
Table 4.5: Response rates of improved information flows characteristics 
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place?” (question 24, Table 4.3), however, showed statistical association (the answer for this 
question was “regularly” and “irregularly” where the former was defined as having a regular 
frequency (e.g. “weekly”, “monthly”, or “every two months”).  Unscheduled or unplanned 
meetings, or anything outside of two months, was considered irregular). More BMUs with pre-
existing organizations had regular meetings (92 percent) compared to BMUs without pre-existing 
organizations (69 percent).  
The other statistically associated question in this group of questions was “Do fishermen 
tell you if other fishermen are illegally fishing?” (Question 26, Table 4.3).  This question was 
asked of BMU committee leaders and relates to enforcement, in that it provides information to the 
leaders; however, this question is an improvement of information flow about illegal activity.  
Fishers at BMUs with pre-existing organizations reported more often (97 percent) than those at 
BMUs without (62 percent).  
Seven of the nine questions asked about improved information flows showed little variation 
with a majority or vast majority of respondents answering positively to the questions.  The first 
four questions (22-25, Table 4.5) indicate that both types of BMUs held meetings regularly, with 
the community, and kept records of illegal activities17.  Questions 29-30 also had high positive 
response rates for why fish data is collected and the main purpose of the BMUs (each question 
was unprompted and the researcher waited to hear key words (e.g. fishery protection, 
sustainability, fishery management)).  Question 28 showed that 95 percent of all respondents from 
both types of BMUs believe the fishery can be protected with the established fishing rules (Table 
4.5). 
                                                 
17 The sensitive nature of asking to see records with names associated with illegal activities, and the inability to then 
verify the extent of the records, prevented the researchers from verifying that illegal records were actually kept. 
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Table 4.7: Response rates of ability to resolve disputes and conflict characteristics 
To determine perceived fairness and equality in the co-management program, three 
questions were asked about value and participation (questions 31-33, Table 4.1).  None of the three 
questions showed a statistical association, but question 31 and 33 showed little variation, with the 
first question “Are everyone’s views/opinions valued at this BMU?” showing a vast majority (90 
percent) positive response rate, and the question “Did all the BMU members have the opportunity 
to participate in the election?” receiving a vast majority (95 percent, Table 4.6).  The latter question 
was asked of only the BMU committee leaders. 
To determine a BMUs’ ability to resolve conflicts or disputes, the question “Is your BMU 
successful in resolving disputes?” was asked.  There was a positive statistical association; BMUs 
 
Q# Question n yes no 
31 Are everyone's views/opinions valued at this BMU? 438 89.7%* 10.3% 
32 
Is there unequal application of fishing rules to different 
people in the BMU? 
434 22.1% 77.9% 
33 
Did all the BMU members have the opportunity to 
participate in the election? 
215 94.9%* 5.1% 
Table 4.6. Equitable treatment of constituents as measured by calculating the response rate (percent) of 
all individuals in the study.  * indicates a majority (80-89 percent) or vast majority (>90 percent) of 
respondents answering in one direction (e.g. positive or negatively) for one question.  ** indicates that the 
question was also statistically associated (see Table 4.3) with the dependent variable.   
 
Q# Question n yes/supportive no/unsupportive 
34 Is your BMU successful in resolving disputes? 430 88.6%** 11.4% 
35 
What is the reaction of the community when 
the BMU enforces rules? 
438 68.0% 32.0% 
36 
Do you fear retribution when you enforce the 
rules (arrest people, impose fines, or confiscate 
their equipment/fish)? 
217 54.4% 45.6% 
37 Is there any conflict within this BMU? 442 41.4% 58.6% 
Table 4.7. Ability to resolve disputes and conflict as measured by calculating the response rate (percent) of 
all individuals in the study.  * indicates a majority (80-89 percent) or vast majority (>90 percent) of 
respondents answering in one direction (e.g. positive or negatively) for one question.  ** indicates that the 
question was also statistically associated (see Table 4.3) with the dependent variable.   
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Table 3.8: Response rates of equitable distribution of benefits characteristics 
with pre-existing organizations (100 percent responded positively) had significantly higher 
responses than BMUs without pre-existing organizations (78 percent, Table 4.3).  There was also 
little variation, with 89 percent of all respondents reporting that their BMU is successful in 
resolving disputes (Table 4.7).  The remaining three questions did not show statistical associations, 
nor any other pattern in responses.  
Of the three questions (Q38-40, Table 4.1) asked concerning benefits, two showed 
statistical or descriptive trends.  The first question “From what sources does the BMU bring in 
revenue?” shows that a vast majority of respondents (97 percent) indicated “taxes” (Table 4.8).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
The answer of “fines” showed no trends. More BMUs that had pre-existing organizations reported 
the BMU providing services or infrastructure to the community (83 percent) compared BMUs 
without pre-existing organization (50 percent, Table 4.3).   
 
Discussion 
Results from this research show that half of the questions about self-organization activities 
showed little variation, demonstrating that all BMUs, to some degree, have characteristics 
 
Q# Question n yes/taxes/fines no/taxes/fines 
38 
From what sources does the BMU bring in 
revenue? Taxes. 
189 96.8%* 3.2% 
39 
From what sources does the BMU bring in 
revenue? Fines. 
189 51.9% 48.2% 
40 
Does the BMU Committee provide services 
or infrastructure to the community 
440 65.5% 34.6% 
Table 4.8. Equitable distribution of benefits as measured by calculating the response rate (percent) 
of all individuals in the study.  * indicates a majority (80-89 percent) or vast majority (>90 percent) 
of respondents answering in one direction (e.g. positive or negatively) for one question.  ** indicates 
that the question was also statistically associated (see Table 4.3) with the dependent variable.   
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identified with increasing success in co-management.  BMUs that had pre-existing organizations, 
however, demonstrated higher rates for nine additional characteristics of self-organization, 
mirroring the characteristics identified as being important in successful co-management programs: 
inclusion of stakeholders in decision making, enhancing enforcement of regulations compliance, 
improving information flows, increasing equitable treatment of constituents, increasing ability to 
resolve disputes and conflict, and improving equitable distribution of benefits. 
 
Inclusion of stakeholders in decision making 
Co-management promises to include community members in management of the fishery.  
By design, Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program tries to include all community 
members engaged in the fishery into the BMU.  To get an indication of whether boat owners were 
included in community decision making and not simply included as rhetoric, it was important to 
determine if they participated in creating by-laws.  As proposing by-laws is voluntary, and captures 
the spirit of involvement, I expected that BMUs with pre-existing organization would have higher 
rates of boat owner participation in the form of proposing by-laws and indeed, they did.  The ability 
of boat owners to propose by-laws is an indicator that members of the BMU are listened to and 
that their opinions are valued (this is also supported by question 31 (Table 4.6) which asked if 
everyone’s views and opinions are valued at their BMU).  A vast majority (90 percent) of 
respondents indicated that everyone’s views/opinions were valued at their BMU, regardless of 
whether a pre-existing organization existed or not.  The initial purpose of question 31 was to 
determine equity among BMU community members and whether they felt the environment of 
participation was such that they could contribute.  These two questions (regarding proposal of by-
laws and value of opinions) indicated that members of all BMUs felt they were able to give their 
103 
 
opinions or views; those at BMUs with a pre-existing organization propose by-laws more than 
those at BMUs without.  These results are expected, as social cohesion of the community would 
give the capacity and legitimacy to their views at these BMUs.  Supporting the notions of boat 
owner participation are the results of the existence of boat owners groups.   
Community inclusion through informal groups was determining by asking participants 
whether a boat owners group existed and whether they participated in the group.  A boat owners’ 
group is not a formal construct, and the existence of one demonstrates a level of local self-
organization and is more common in BMUs with pre-existing organizations.  The presence of boat 
owner’s groups was affirmed by determining if most of the boat owners were members of the 
group.  Both were significant, showing that boat owners groups with high-levels of active 
participation occur at BMUs with pre-existing organization.   
This set of questions builds support for the notion that pre-existing organizations 
contributes to the effective participation of stakeholders in decision making.  The creation of 
informal boat owners groups and participation in that group, show the strongest level of self-
organization out of the set of self-organizing characteristics in this study.  Inclusion of stakeholders 
in decision making, and their participation in creating groups that assist in doing so, likely facilitate 
other self-organization characteristics, such as enhancement of enforcement, improved 
information flows, equitable treatment of each other, and the ability to resolve disputes.    
 
Enhances enforcement of regulations and rules compliance 
 A BMU's ability and willingness to conduct monitoring for illegal fishing is a major 
component of fishery management on Lake Victoria.  One of the most important components of 
the Lake Victoria fishery management program is to provide authority and means for BMUs to 
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administer enforcement activities.  Without enforcement activities (e.g. patrols and punishment), 
and in the absence of strong social norms that would prohibit illegal behavior, I posited that illegal 
fishing would take place at a greater rate and with a lack of consistent enforcement in BMUs 
without pre-existing organizations.  The set of questions, therefore, was developed to determine 
the degree to which BMUs conducted enforcement or other judicial action.  Notably, the question 
“Are patrols for illegal fish and gear conducted at this BMU by the BMU Committee?” was critical 
in determining if the BMU committee took it upon themselves to conduct patrols for illegal fishing.  
BMUs with a pre-existing organization had higher levels of reported patrols than BMUs without 
one.  This is likely one of the more important questions with a significant association.  Patrolling for 
illegal activities at the local level by the local level, is a primary purpose of co-management.  
Conducting patrols, in a way, is a signal that community participation is established as intended.  
Over reporting likely took place because the socially acceptable response for a successful BMU 
committee would be to patrol for illegal gear.  Though, statistical association reveals that, patrols do 
take place not by chance, and pre-existing organizations likely have an impact on whether BMUs 
patrol.  The difference between patrolling and enforcement, however, are important.  Patrolling for 
illegal activity is vastly different than punishing community members for breaking the regulations.  
Indications of discordant responses were noted between questions 7-10 (Table 4.4), which indicated 
that legal action or punishment takes place (response rates above >80 percent) if fishers are caught 
illegally fishing, using illegal methods, or in possession of illegal sized fish or nets and questions 5 
and 6, which asked respondents if they believe their BMU is successful at enforcing the rules and 
arresting offenders.  Questions 7-10 had high rates of respondents indicating action and punishment 
took place for illegal activities, gear, and fish, but questions 5 and 6 did not indicate success at 
enforcing fishing rules and arresting offenders.  The discrepancy in these answers might be due to 
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the degree of enforcement that takes place at each BMU.  For example, when an enforcement entity 
punishes someone in the fishing community, the fishers and the community often disagree with those 
actions because preventing fishery harvest is often seen as taking away someone’s livelihood.  
Retaliation, therefore, takes place.  If the enforcer is a community member (from the BMU), then 
punishment might be mitigated by that community member in fear of retaliation or other social 
consequences.  I tried to address this in the survey by asking the reaction of the community when 
BMU committee leaders enforces the rules, whether the BMU committee leader fears retribution.  I 
also asked if there is any unequal application of the fishing rules to different people, anticipating that 
community leaders might have to be lenient on members of their family or friends (or community 
members in general if community members disagree with enforcement).  None of these questions 
had any statistical associations.  It is difficult to infer these contrary data, though the wording of the 
questions might have had some effect on the responses.  For example, questions which asked if 
“punishment” and “action taken” if illegal gear, activity, or fish are discovered, could have been 
interpreted as any informal punishment (e.g. scolding, temporarily seizing gear, or paying small 
fines). However, any formal punishment (as worded in questions 5-6 (where words such as 
“enforcing fishing rules” and “arresting offenders”) connotes punishment beyond what the 
community would find acceptable.  Arresting offenders and confiscating illegal gear are actions 
associated more with formal enforcement agencies and might have influenced the lack of statistical 
power.   
 Another important factor in enforcement of the fishery is the proposed relationship between 
higher levels of government and BMUs; the relationship between the two should be clear and 
consistent so as not to create confusion within the system.  As I show in Chapter 5, confusion takes 
place mostly between members of the BMUs and mid-level government (those entities such as the 
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DOF and police) whose authority in fishery matters is not always well defined (see Chapter 5).  
Having clear and consistent lines of authority are necessary at this level because: 1) having the proper 
authority allows the BMUs to act as legitimate management entities, and 2) a strong relationship 
between authorities historically deemed legitimate and the BMUs demonstrates that BMUs are 
regarded as legitimate management entities.  The question to determine if external enforcement 
entities consulted or involved the BMU committee when conducting their patrols was targeted to test 
this relationship.  I expected to see a strong and clear relationship between the appropriate higher 
entities and the BMU, particularly for BMUs with pre-existing organizations. These BMUs had a 
higher level of coordination with external entities during enforcement operations, indicating external, 
higher level enforcement entities, more often consulted with, and jointly conducted patrols with these 
BMU committees.  A BMU that had a pre-existing organization and, thus, from the previous 
responses, punish those members who have illegal fish, nets, or gear, likely also have lower levels 
of illegal fishing.  Along with lower levels of illegal fishing might come some degree of credibility 
from external enforcement entities.  Regardless, external enforcement entities coordinate at a higher 
rate with BMUs that had pre-existing organizations than those that did not.  This relationship likely 
has multiple attributes that are positively associated with successful fishery management. 
  Associated with the previous questions about illegal activity and punishment is the question: 
“Has illegal fishing increased or decreased since the establishment of your BMU?” (Question 4, 
Tables 4.1 and 4.4).  I did not independently determine if illegal fishing actually decreased or 
increased at a particular BMU; perception of members of a BMU was the only indication.  The 
high response rate of all respondents (87 percent) indicate that there is a belief that illegal fishing 
has decreased.  Determining the degree to which illegal fishing decreased on Lake Victoria is 
another matter.  Bi-annual surveys, conducted at each BMU by the LVFO, departments of 
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fisheries, and research institutes of each country indicated in their summary report that levels of 
illegal gear (specifically illegal nets (determined by mesh size) and illegal hooks (determined by 
hook size)) have decreased from their 2008 to 2010 surveys (LVFO 2010a).  The perception of a 
decrease of illegal fishing activity could certainly be a function of pre-co-management 
arrangements that led to the establishment of the BMUs.  As previously noted, overfishing took 
place to a degree that was unsustainable; numerous fish factories closed, and the imminent collapse 
of the fishery was reported (Abila 2002; Abila 2004).   Though reports of illegal fishing continue, 
fisher’s report enforcement (whether formal or informal) where enforcement previously exist, or 
did so in a weakened state. 
 I suspect, however, that over-reporting of a decrease in illegal fishing could be taking place, 
and two examples highlight this suspicion.  First, when asked if the BMU is successful at 
decreasing illegal gear on their beach, 71 percent of BMU committee leaders indicated that they 
are successful (question 11, Table 4.4).  In one instance, a committee member indicated he and his 
fellow BMU committee members were successful at confiscating illegal gear.  When asked why 
active illegal gear was sitting on the beach, in plain sight of the survey takers, one committee leader 
responded that the BMU guidelines state that, by a certain date, the BMUs will have decreased the 
amount of illegal fishing gear by 70 percent.  The BMU committee leader then indicated that they 
had successfully reduced illegal fishing gear by 70 percent, and what the surveyors were seeing 
was the remaining 30 percent.  This anecdote can still be an accurate indicator of decreased illegal 
gear at a beach, or an indicator of bias and cover-up.  In addition to this single anecdote, during 
collection of data for this research, my team and I observed numerous sites with illegal gear drying, 
being repaired and made, or lying prepared in boats for fishing.  The interviewees often cited that 
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appropriate actions took place to confiscate or punish people with illegal gear, which may be a 
sign that informal, community level punishment takes place.  
Another indicator of over-reporting was observed from BMU Committee responses to the 
question “Out of all boat owners you know, how many illegally fish or have illegal gear?” and 
were given options: “none”, “only a few”, “less than half”, “half”, “more than half”, and “all”. 
When these results were aggregated, 23 percent of respondents indicated that they knew “none” 
who had illegal gear or illegally fished, leaving 77 percent of respondents knowing at least one 
person who did (Table 4.9 and question 12, Table 4.4).  The aggregate indicates a large number of 
BMU Committee members acknowledged existence of illegal gear, but contradicts the higher 
numbers of both BMU and boat owners who indicate that enforcement and punishment at their 
BMUs takes place (Table 4.6).  I associated all “punishment” or “action taken” to be a formal 
construct.  As in most institutions that are trying to change human behavior, it appears that a margin 
of acceptance of illegal gear is allowed; responses do not necessarily indicate a high degree of 
illegality at a BMU, but rather, an acceptable level of fishing practices.  A parallel example might 
be speed limits.  Breaking the letter of the law means going even one mile an hour over the speed 
limit, but it can be argued that going over the speed limit by 5mph is acceptable, both socially, and 
by formal law enforcement officials.   
 
 
Question None 
A 
few 
<half half >half All Ttl 
Do you know any boat owners at your 
BMU that have any fishing gear? 
23 44 19 5 5 4 100 
Table 4.9. Reporting rates—percentage table—of responses from BMU committee members only.  
Seventy-seven percent of respondents know at least one boat owner who has illegal fishing gear. 
Table 4.9: Reporting rates of boat owner with illegal gear 
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Improves information flow 
 Institutional continuity is one measure to determine success in administering a fishery 
management program.  BMU committees are designed to meet formally among themselves, and 
also to hold assembly meetings with all BMU members.  Whether there was over-reporting or all 
BMU committees meet in one manner or another was not clarified during data collection, so the 
high response rates could be an indication that each respondent witnessed at least one meeting of 
the BMU committee and BMU committee with assembly.  A better measure was to determine if 
BMU committees meeting with the assembly took place on a regular basis.  Again, a high rate of 
respondents indicated that these meetings took place regularly, but this question was also 
statistically associated, meaning that BMUs with pre-existing organizations met more regularly 
that those that did not have one.  Combined with the first three questions in this study (boat owner 
proposing by-laws, a boat owners group, and high rate of boat owners belonging to the boat owners 
group) indicate that, at the least, meetings of organized groups (boat owners and BMU community) 
take place and do so regularly.  Social cohesion likely cannot take place without the ability of its 
members to participate, and these meetings and their frequency facilitate such cohesion. 
 The degree of reporting of illegal gear and activity, and the source of reporting (e.g. formal 
patrols or informal community reporting) can be a part of determining community support and 
self-organization.  It is necessary to have multiple vectors of information about illegal fishing 
activities beyond formal mechanisms such as patrols. It is also necessary to have the authority to 
enforce fishing rules so that punishments can be vetted consistently by the BMU committee. Both 
of these increase legitimacy of the BMU, because violators understand that the BMU will not only 
learn about their illegal behavior but will also be able to take action (from questions 7-10). The 
question “Do fishermen tell you if other fishermen are illegally fishing?” is a critical component 
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in self-organization and fishery co-management.  This question was initially asked to determine if 
community members within a BMU were comfortable enough reporting fellow community 
members (without reprise).  The weaknesses of this question occurs when determining who the 
fishers might be reporting.  Fishers often regard other fishers in their community as one group, and 
fishers who do not belong to their community as “outsiders”.  This question is statistically 
associated with BMUs that had a pre-existing organization, however, the realization that 
respondents likely report outsider fishermen still indicates social cohesion within a BMU 
(especially one with a pre-existing organization (protecting their interests in their area of fishing)), 
and supports the notion that regulations transgressions by members of your own BMU is not the 
same as regulations transgressions by outsiders.   
 
Increases equitable treatment of constituents 
I expected that each of the three questions about equitable treatment of constituents would 
be more strongly associated with BMUs which had pre-existing organizations because of 
potentially stronger social cohesion within those communities.  The questions were developed to 
determine if BMU committee members were neither able nor willing to administer fishery 
management because of fear of retribution from individuals for dispensing punishment.  The 
questions about equity address observations by Hara et al. (2002) on Lake Malawi, where new co-
management institutions were infringing on the powers and privileges that village headman had 
prior to co-management implementation.  Similar concerns of abuse of power and privilege on 
Lake Victoria are present and whether favoritism towards a BMU committee leader’s friends or 
family members—leniency regarding enforcing regulations or punishment—undermines the 
fishery management program.   
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But leniency might be necessary: the LVFO (2005) found that, in Tanzania, elected BMU 
committee leaders that were committed to eradicating illegal fishing gear, specifically the removal 
of beach seines, may become involved in sustained and often personal conflict with many of their 
relatives, neighbors or friends.  Therefore, to avoid conflict, and retribution for enforcing the “letter 
of the law”, everyone is treated equally, that is leniently.   
I believe over-reporting of equal views and opinions occurred, it is likely that these are 
valued because they conform to the community’s acceptance of socially acceptable breaking of 
regulations.  These management actions might not be the intended actions of the co-management 
program, but are a form of social-cohesion, a manner in which behavior is influenced to a degree 
that is possible.   
The question “Did all the BMU members have the opportunity to participate in the 
election?” was only asked of BMU committee leaders.  Over reporting here is in the best interest 
of the respondents, as the elections are a democratic mechanism for their position.  It looks good 
for the BMU committee members to answer positively to this question.  High response rates of 
participation in elections could, however, be accurate.  BMUs are relatively recent constructs and 
thus community members might be eager at the opportunity to elect leaders to an organization that, 
from the findings in this research, can protect the fishery, includes them in decision making, 
increased information flows, and improves equitable distribution of benefits. 
 
Increases ability to resolve disputes and conflict 
The LVFO found that conflict among members and between other BMUs was a 
contributing factor to the early collapse of some BMUs in Tanzania (LVFO 2005a).  The LVFO’s 
findings support the notion that conflict between members of a BMU could decrease the likelihood 
112 
 
of successful administration or enforcement.  As with the other characteristics, I expected that 
BMUs with pre-existing organizations would also have higher success at resolving disputes 
because of social cohesion.  As with the other self-organizing characteristics in this study, this 
characteristic is linked to other attributes of the BMU, for example, equal application of rules, 
valued opinions, ability to participate in decision making, and information flow.  That respondents 
at BMUs with pre-existing organizations reported conflict resolution at higher rates than BMUs 
that did not have pre-existing organizations is congruent with what was expected.   
That the two other questions concerning community support and fear of retribution when 
rules are enforced were not statistically significant nor had low variation, might be cause for 
concern.  Both of those aspects of community-run resource management programs have been cited 
as causing conflict (e.g. LVFO (2005) caused by enforcement of rules by BMU leaders).   
An optimistic interpretation of the findings of the questions under conflict resolution is that 
BMUs that had pre-existing organizations have experience resolving disputes, even those caused 
by enforcing rules that are not popular by the fishers.  Strength of community through social 
cohesion, and the inclusion of stakeholders in decision making, improved information flows, 
equitable treatment of community members, and improved distribution of benefits all result in the 
ability to also resolve conflict.  It must be recognized, however, that conflict resolution may have 
been over reported.  Conflict or disputes, at least concerning fishery matters, might not be an issue 
because BMU committee leaders can only enforce rules to a degree that does not prompt negative 
reaction from the community (thus keeping their support) nor breed contempt by the fishers.  This 
may require BMU committee leaders to weaken enforcement efforts.  Data from the enforcement 
characteristics indicate that, while their BMUs punish fishers with illegal gear or fish, or 
conducting illegal activities, they do not arrest offenders nor confiscate illegal gear at as high of 
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rates as expected.  Dispute resolution, therefore, might be a function of tempered enforcement by 
the BMU committee. 
 
Improves economic and social development and equitable distribution of benefits 
The result of high response rate of tax collection is likely due to the high use of established 
landing sites where fish are brought to be weighed and sold on the market; when this is done, taxes 
are collected.  Though movements of fish to illegal, unregistered sites takes place, most fish are 
transferred to processing plants and regulated, through landing sites.  BMUs are thus able to collect 
taxes more often than fines.  Fines are likely not a major contributor to BMU funding as a result 
of punishment at the BMU-level taking place in the form of confiscation or destruction of fishing 
gear or fish and not the collection of monetary fines.    
One of the expected outcomes of a successful co-management program is sharing in the 
benefits resulting from collective action of the community through revenue generation from the 
fishery.  Many of the benefits realized by BMUs come from improvements (physical and 
concerning welfare) at the BMU by the BMU committee leadership.  To determine if such benefits 
were being realized, I asked three questions about social development and revenue generation.  
Two questions (Table 4.1, questions 39, 40) were about revenue generation and where the most 
revenue was generated.  These questions also gauged the degree to which BMU committee leaders 
were administering their duties as leaders by conducting revenue generating activities (e.g. 
collecting taxes or fines during patrols).   
The third question directly asked respondents whether “the BMU committee provided 
services or infrastructure to the community?”  It was expected that BMUs that had pre-existing 
organizations would have higher reported rates of services and infrastructure for the community 
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and the data shows this association.  Examples of benefits include social benefits, such as beach 
cleaning (by paid beach cleaning crews), security patrols (to protect nets and equipment from being 
stolen at night), and welfare and education programs for poorer community members and orphans.  
Infrastructure included: latrines, water collection systems, and other fish processing related 
structures or areas.  These benefits could be misreported by some respondents because 
improvements at some BMUs were provided by external entities, such as the government, NGOs, 
and multi-national organizations.  Such improvements are often noted by signs or plaques affixed 
to the structures (e.g. latrines, medical facilities, or fish processing areas).  It is also unclear how 
these benefits are reported to BMU community members.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to determine if pre-existing organizations at fish landing 
sites on Lake Victoria contributed to the successful implementation of the current formal, fishery co-
management program on the lake.  This chapter demonstrates that self-organization is critical for 
successful fishery co-management to take place at the local level.  My results indicated that BMUs 
which had pre-existing organizations fared better than those that did not, exhibiting nine self-
organizing characteristics more often than BMUs that did not have pre-existing organizations. 
Though overall success of the BMUs, as measured by a reduction in illegal fishing, a major 
component of the co-management program on Lake Victoria, could not be measured, these self-
organizing characteristics demonstrate a level of self-organization that is often attributed to social 
cohesion and a communities’ ability to change fisher’s behavior.  In terms of “successfully” 
administering a fishery management program, or adapting to formal institutions, this research 
determines that those communities which had a pre-existing organization, seem to function well.  
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Additionally, there were indications that some of these characteristics contributed to the success of 
the current co-management program through a reduction in illegal fishing and improved economic 
and social benefits. 
An unexpected finding in this research emerged with 20 of the characteristics associated with 
self-organization being attributed to a majority of BMUs in this study, regardless of pre-existing 
organizations and might be an indication that communities within the co-management program, 
regardless of pre-existing organizations, are effective in many ways.  This finding refutes the notion 
that communities are unwilling to self-organize held by some studies, the media, and some 
politicians (for example Matovu 2007).  This was most evident in questions relating to taking judicial 
action, or some form of punishment, against fishers who have illegal gear, are illegally fishing, or 
have illegal sized fish.  Further, respondents indicated that they believe the fishery can be protected 
with the fishing rules that have been created within the fishery co-management program. 
The downside of these findings is that illegal gear and fish have been observed on the lake 
to a degree that scientist’s feel is not sustainable (Mkumbo and Mlaponi 2007; Mkumbo et al. 
2007; Njiru et al. 2008), leading to a few possible conclusions.  One possible conclusion is that 
illegal fishing might be acceptable to a degree over what is intended by the fishery co-management 
program.  Responses indicating successful control of illegal fishing might be based on 
unacceptable fishing practices established by the communities, which may be well beyond the co-
management program’s established rules.  Also, some results from this study might have been 
over-reported due to respondents providing socially desirable responses.  Regardless of these 
biases, I show that self-organizing characteristics exist at BMUs that had pre-existing organization 
and contribute positively to the co-management program. 
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One measure of success for BMUs was the inclusion of community members in decision-
making, equitable treatment of all members, and mechanisms to effectively resolve conflict.  
Additionally, success was defined as the reduction in illegal fishing and providing benefits to the 
community (both major purposes of fishery co-management).  Both of these characteristics were 
reported by members of BMUs which had pre-existing organizations on Lake Victoria. In the case 
of Lake Victoria, the components of successful co-management are represented by characteristics 
of self-organization, and were associated with those communities who had fishery management 
efforts prior to co-management being established formally. 
The results of this research have identified that pre-existing organizations are associated 
with self-organizing characteristics and positively influence fishery co-management on Lake 
Victoria, however, it was not determined why BMUs with pre-existing organizations contributed 
to this phenomenon.  The literature used in this study identified communities who self-organized 
prior to a formal management program being a result of communities experiencing similar 
activities prior to BMUs.  Similarly, it could be because there is greater social cohesion and norms 
institutionalized from previous organizations that allow BMUs to operate better.  Or, communities 
might have a smaller learning curve due to having experience in management-type experience?  
There are hypotheses that BMUs that self-organize might have access to better education, or have 
higher economic status.  Or are we looking at a path-dependent effect which shapes the BMUs so 
they are more successful?  With no detail on the nature of pre-existing organizations, or the effort 
that was put into fishery management prior to co-management, it is difficult to determine what 
elements contributed to the characteristics in this research. 
To enhance the findings of my research, future efforts should focus on characteristics of 
communities who have or had informal management efforts prior to a formal management 
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program, to determine what characteristics allow them to be more effective.  Such an approach 
would focus on whether communities become legitimate because of greater social cohesion, or 
norms of self-organizing become institutionalized in those communities.  Possibly increased 
success is because experience in managing provides a smaller learning curve when a formal 
program is implemented.  Such information could be gathered through semi-structured interviews 
with communities familiar with their histories 
Though there still needs to be work done to reveal the characteristics of self-organizing 
communities, my research reveals that there is a relationship.  I recognize, however, that the nature 
of my results make it difficult to implement these findings ex post facto.  Revealing that a 
management program will benefit from circumstances that existed prior to the creation of the 
program seems to have limited applicability.  But the results have led to three realizations:  
1) Future co-management programs should focus on communities who have had pre-
existing organizations of management; future research will hopefully reveal the 
specific characteristics that determine success in a formal program; 
2) The current Lake Victoria program is, at this moment, creating experience for 
communities on Lake Victoria.  Therefore, if past experience is a variable for future 
experience, then Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program will improve as long 
as the management program exists; and, 
3) Future research to determine the characteristic that make pre-existing organizations or 
experience beneficial to self-organization. 
 
Policy recommendations:  
The very nature of the co-management program, where communities are currently engaged 
in fishery co-management—whether successfully or not—has value in creating experience of this 
paper reveal circumstances of existing BMUs—those that had pre-existing organizations—a 
number of strategies can still be used to inform successful community self-organization in the 
current program.  The LVFO, in partnership with the lake’s national governments, must ensure 
that the characteristics of self-organization are functional at each BMU.  Through surveys, similar 
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to those used in this chapter, identification of such BMUs could be accomplished.  Where 
deficiencies in self-organization are observed, incremental efforts to gradually build experience in 
self-organization, or social cohesion, could be conducted.  The characteristics of self-organization 
should be viewed as mechanisms to help community members to pursue a particular course of 
behaviors to accomplish tasks (Agrawal and Gibson 2001).  Ensuring elections or training leaders 
to be competent is likely a good step in this process and ensuring equal application of the fishing 
rules to the BMU communities.  This characteristic, combined with successful resolution dispute 
mechanisms appear to drive much of the successful BMUs on the lake and might then lead to a 
decrease in illegal fishing and increased benefits. 
Management and policy implications from this study can certainly inform future co-
management approaches in Africa’s great lakes region.  Notably, practitioners on Lake Tanganyika 
are discussing fishery management approaches with the intention of implementing a co-management 
program (van der Knaap 2013).  Researchers have noted that communities around the lake have been 
instigating efforts to manage the fishery in their geographical areas, with village and other 
community organizations addressing overfishing specifically.  Though it is likely impossible for 
practitioners implementing a co-management program to integrate only communities that have or 
had pre-existing, community-led, resource management organizations, this research urges the 
consideration that pre-existing organizations can benefit formal co-management programs.  
Practitioners, governments, and the communities themselves should focus on the strengths of 
community inclusion, strengthening stakeholder decision making, enhancing enforcement, 
improving information flows, increasing equitable treatment of stakeholders, increasing conflict 
resolution, and improving distribution of social and economic benefits.   
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CHAPTER 5:  
 
TAKING THE “CO” OUT OF “CO-MANAGEMENT”: INVESTIGATING 
LEGITIMACY AND FISHING COMMUNITIES ON LAKE VICTORIA, 
EAST AFRICA18 
 
Abstract 
 
The creation of the fishery co-management program on Lake Victoria is intended 
to manage the lake’s fisheries while providing livelihood and development 
opportunities for those engaged in the fishery.  Co-management’s major tenet is the 
sharing of authority between the central government and community organizations 
in an effort to manage natural resources.  Fishery co-management, therefore, 
requires a strong relationship between the national-level government and local 
communities, realized through organizations called Beach Management Units 
(BMUs). The co-management program on Lake Victoria, however, has been 
ineffective in many regards, specifically challenges to the legitimacy and 
accountability of BMUs which have been delegated to conduct fishery 
management.  Weakness in this relationship can cause the management by BMUs 
to be ineffective because legitimacy of BMUs is, in part, the acceptance by fishers 
of the authority of BMUs.  This chapter studies the state of Lake Victoria’s fisheries 
co-management program at the community-level.  Findings indicate that two major 
problems exist: (1) lack of support from higher political authorities undermines 
enforcement power at the local level; and, (2) lack of financial returns from both 
the fishery and higher political authorities reduces the BMU’s ability to function.  
In many cases, these two weaknesses caused de-legitimization of BMUs, rendering 
them ineffective in implementing the proposed fishery management duties.   
  
                                                 
18 This chapter was previously published as: Lawrence, T. (2013). Taking the 'co' out of 'co-management': The 
deligitimization of fishing communities on Lake Victoria, E. Africa. Water Co-Management. G. Krantzberg and V. 
I. Grover. Boca Raton, FL, CRC Press: 168-196. 
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Introduction  
Fishery co-management institutions—rules of fishing created through the relationship 
between central governments and local resource users—have been created to manage freshwater 
fisheries in developing countries.  Despite the creation of these institutions, or programs, many 
factors inhibit them from being fully effective (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Kaimowitz and Ribot 
2002; Jul-Larsen et al. 2003).  Factors of legitimacy and accountability are cited as being critical 
aspects of a successful fishery management program.  Legitimacy and accountability include state 
accountability to the local level (Ribot 2002a); legitimacy of local-level crafted rules by higher-
level government (Ostrom 2009); legitimacy of the whole institution as viewed by all stakeholders; 
and legitimacy of the rules by the users.  Understanding legitimacy, however, is weakest when 
determining the legitimacy of local organizations (the lowest political enforcement entity (Beach 
Management Units)) by the resource users.  In the course of study on institutions, legitimacy of 
local organizations within the larger fishery co-management program does not receive the attention 
necessary to develop a suitable explanation of why these institutions fail.   
On Lake Victoria, East Africa, a co-management program was established to create a 
relationship between national governments and community organization called Beach Management 
Units (BMUs) to manage the lake’s important and valuable fishery.  As in many co-management 
programs, authority was devolved to the BMUs and their major charge is to enforce fishery 
regulations.  The effectiveness of fishery management, therefore, largely relies on the legitimacy of 
BMUs by the fishers (those who are governed).  Negative perceptions by fishers of the BMU’s 
authority have emerged, however, threatening the legitimacy of BMUs and, thus, the efficacy of 
fishery management.  Legitimacy is defined as the acceptance by fishers of the regulations, rules, 
and authority that govern the fishery (Tyler 1990).  Legitimacy, as the power or authority at the 
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interface of the enforcer (managers) and the enforced (resource extractors), is one of the most critical 
aspects of resource management institutions. Without legitimacy, fishers will have no reason to 
assume ramifications for circumventing the regulations.  Legitimacy has two important components: 
personal experiences by the fisher and procedural fairness (Nielsen 2003).  This chapter identifies 
two factors on Lake Victoria that undermine legitimacy at the local level: (1) lack of support from 
higher political authorities; and, (2) lack of financial returns from both the fishery and higher 
political authorities, reducing the BMUs’ ability to function.  Each of these two weaknesses causes 
delegitimization of the BMUs, rendering many of them ineffective in their charge to sustainably 
manage the fishery resources.  
While legitimacy is a necessity at all levels of fishery management, the relationship between 
higher levels of government and community is essential for legitimacy to exist, because management 
authority has been transferred to the communities where the majority of enforcement and 
management activities are expected to occur.  Legitimacy, however, is often negatively affected at 
the local level by higher levels of government, because national governments often transfer 
insufficient judicial authority and financial resources to lower levels of government (cf. Ribot et al. 
2006; Chapter 3: Lawrence and Watkins 2012).   
The 2010 biennial lake-wide survey, administered by the Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organization (LVFO), indicated that, while fishers and numbers of boats have decreased since 2008, 
use of illegal gear and fishing techniques continues (LVFO 2010a); additionally, 77 percent of the 
study sites in this research, were observed or had reports of illegal fishing or fishing gear.  Qualitative 
data from this research shows that not all individual fishers around Lake Victoria comply, or are able 
to comply, with the management regulations designed on Lake Victoria; data from this research 
indicates that illegal fishing by individuals is due to weakness at some BMUs resultant from mid-
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level government entities either interfering with, or not providing enough support to the BMUs.  This 
causes delegitimization of the BMUs, decreasing the ability of the BMUs to clearly and consistently 
enforce regulations and conduct management activities.   
To understand the notions of legitimacy on Lake Victoria, I examined the relationship 
between higher levels of government and the BMUs.  Higher levels of government include the 
ministries of fisheries, departments of fisheries (DOF), and other non-local, mid-level, enforcement 
agencies such as police, army, and village committees.  Using data collected on Lake Victoria during 
2009-2010, this chapter describes two major factors that undermine legitimacy of BMUs within Lake 
Victoria’s co-management institutions: a lack of support from higher political authorities—in the 
form of unclear lines of authority—and, a lack of financial returns from fishery and higher political 
authorities.  The lack of clear judicial authority in Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management 
institutions leads to delegitimization of BMUs when mid-level enforcement entities (police, army, 
DOF officers) interfere with BMU committee enforcement, creating inconsistent procedures, 
consequences, or unrecognized or confusing authority.  The inability of fishermen to determine who 
the authority is, leaves offenders in the system to continue illegally fishing and the act of allowing 
fishermen to continue fishing illegally (defined as using illegal-sized gear or practices or harvesting 
illegal-sized fish) undermines and delegitimizes the BMU’s authority, thus rendering the BMU 
impotent.  The lack of financial resources is a weakness in that: (1) BMUs lack the ability to conduct 
patrols, administer their functions, or conduct other business because of a lack of money, which (2) 
leaves offenders in the system to continue illegally fishing, thus (3) undermining BMU legitimacy 
and rendering the BMU impotent.  Judicial weakness and financial insufficiency by higher level 
government, undermines the BMUs’ authority over the fishers, thus rendering the BMU ineffective 
at implementing fishery management duties.   
123 
 
In the following sections, legitimacy is defined and its conceptual basis given, its place within 
co-management, and its importance at the local level are detailed and characterized.  Then the 
concepts of community participation and co-management and how each inform the Lake Victoria 
fishery co-management institutions and the historical process and factors that led to its creation, 
including current theoretical notions of cooperation between national government and local 
communities, are described.  Data is then presented and synthesized to determine how legitimacy of 
the BMUs is affected through the current relationship with higher levels of government on Lake 
Victoria and how these relationships affect how fishery management is conducted. 
 
Methods 
Because of the prominence and importance of the Nile perch—the species that has most 
heavily influenced the current fishing co-management institutions on Lake Victoria—study sites 
were selected based on fishing beaches on which the majority of fishing activity targeted Nile perch.   
Data were collected using semi-formal qualitative interviews and a combination of 
ethnographic research methods including quantitative participant surveys and site observations.   
A structured interview-survey instrument was created to gain data on multiple variables.  The 
survey instrument is primarily quantitative, with a short section of open-ended interview questions 
to gain richer qualitative data (Appendices A and B).  The qualitative data were particularly useful 
in revealing important information about authority, funding, and legitimacy within the BMUs. 
Participants were asked: “What changes need to take place at your BMU for a healthy fishery?”, 
“Mention the most important problems at your BMU”, and “How would you fix these problems?”  
All qualitative data were entered into Nvivo computer software and coded for numerous variables 
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that emerged from primary data analysis.  Data from the qualitative data were used to inform this 
study.   
Using Nvivo software, several analytic tools were used, including constant comparison 
analysis, text search, and comparative matrix queries (Leech et al. 2011).  Word search and 
comparative matrix queries were conducted to determine the number of respondents stating specific 
problems and the reasons why the problems occurred.  Coding of the accumulated qualitative data 
was undertaken to establish patterns of financial and authoritative weaknesses. 
All interviews were confidential due to the nature of information gathered, specifically 
addressing knowledge of illegal fishing activity and performance of BMU committee leaders in 
regard to interaction with boat owners and other community members and these activities.  The 
names and other identifying information19, therefore, are withheld. 
 
Legitimacy in institutions 
Participation in the regulation-creating process, leads to fishers who are more likely to adjust 
and follow those regulations (Nielsen 2003).  Acceptance of the regulations is created through 
fishers’ perceptions of legitimate regulations and regulations-making.  Co-management institutions 
often include numerous mechanisms for all stakeholder inclusion, as is the case on Lake Victoria.  
In particular, democratic decentralization allows fishers to participate in elections of local 
organizations, and, therefore, engage in the management program of their natural resources.  
Personal experience and involvement by the harvester is essential to improving legitimacy (Jentoft 
1989; Ribot 2002a).   
                                                 
19 BMU names are also withheld since it would be easy to identify BMU committee leader respondents using this 
information. 
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To be perceived as fair by the resource harvester, procedures need to be consistent and 
transparent (Nielsen 2003).  Procedural fairness is necessary so that resource harvesters understand 
that breaking the regulations result in administrative or judicial action.  If executed correctly, the co-
management institutions are perceived as legitimate because authority through action has been 
executed by the relevant (legitimate) authority.  Procedural fairness often determines the personal 
experiences of the harvester, and, thereby, resource harvest behavior.  Procedural fairness, then, 
determines legitimacy.   
Incentives are generally essential in guiding resource harvest behavior.  Most incentives in 
natural resource management involve punishment and enforcement (or the disincentive to break 
regulations).  Punishment is the direct consequence of harvesting natural resources outside of 
established regulations, and enforcement is the action of catching regulation-breakers.  Procedural 
fairness is the ability to enforce regulations.  Transparency and consistency is determined by the 
perceived judicial authority that the enforcement entity has and the financial resources available for 
that entity to execute the enforcement procedures authorized for them to administer.  Procedural 
fairness, therefore, is the determining factor in the success of many co-management institutions, and 
is influenced, in large part, by the strength of the national government’s willingness to provide 
resources and clear lines of authority to local entities, thus allowing the local organizations 
themselves to conduct transparent and consistent procedures. 
 
Legitimacy and authority  
Without delegated authority, local governments will not be downwardly accountable—the 
obligation or responsibility to report or justify actions to higher level authorities—and will not have 
legitimacy to effectively represent harvesters (Ribot 2002a).  Without legitimacy, local governments 
126 
 
cannot compel fishers to follow the regulations and, who may therefore, try and find ways around 
the regulations.  In this case, coercion becomes the only basis for local involvement in natural 
resource (Therkildsen 1992 in Ribot 2002a). Within a strong, legitimate system, resource harvesters 
are less likely to try and find ways around the regulations or to cheat the system.  
Authority can be described in two ways.  First, as the legal (judicial) authority bestowed upon an 
entity or individual to administer punishment or reward upon others, and second, as the perceived 
authority that the entity or individual has over others.  The first is provided through legal 
arrangements and can be implemented instantly and has been done so on Lake Victoria.  The second 
requires the recognition of that authority by the people upon whom it is delegated or imposed. 
Judicial authority is the power pertaining to the administration of punishment or reward.  
Here, judicial authority is framed as the authority to administer punishment where it has been legally 
granted to the lowest-level of fishery management organization that will implement patrols and 
enforcement.  In the case of Lake Victoria, the BMUs are the lowest political authority.  Legitimacy 
of the BMUs requires that there are clear lines of authority between the fishers (those who can be 
punished) and the BMU committee (those who enforce the regulations and punish offenders) 
allowing recognition of consistent and transparent authority.  
The perceived authority of the BMUs by the fishers is of greater concern, because having the 
legal authority to punish fishers does not necessarily mean having the ability to use that authority.  
As will be shown below, although the BMUs have the legal authority to punish offenders vested in 
them by the national government, many of the fishers do not always recognize this authority, because 
of a lack of legitimacy often resulting from interference by higher levels of government. 
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Legitimacy and financial resources 
Sustaining the fishery resources on Lake Victoria depends somewhat on how the fisheries 
co-management institutions are funded.  Without proper, sustainable financial resources, it is 
difficult or impossible to administer management activities, especially those activities which create 
legitimacy and allow regulations to be enforced.  Therefore, financial resources are a key 
component to legitimacy of fisheries co-management institutions, especially at the local level 
where the administration of enforcement activities occurs (using personnel, boats, engines, fuel, 
and safety equipment). 
Therkildsen (1993, p. 76) takes the ability of local authorities to collect tax as an indication 
of the local authorities’ legitimacy: “. . . if local authorities cannot mobilize local revenues it 
indicates a lack of legitimacy which, in turn, constrains their ability to be effectively involved in 
NRM [natural resource management] on a consensual basis.” Moore (1997) makes a 
complementary argument that taxation engages the resource harvester with the acting authority, 
creating a basis on which to legitimately expect the authority to provide services (in Ribot 2002a, 
p. 43).  Similarly, allowing the local organizations to collect taxes on their own, demonstrates that 
authority has been given by higher level government and trust to execute those activities exists. 
On Lake Victoria, the primary source of funding for BMUs is collection of licensing, taxes, 
and fines at the local level through legal authority vested in the BMU committee.  As will be shown 
below, BMU funding is insufficient and dependent on the will of a higher government authority.  
This lack of funding prevents BMUs from conducting routine procedures, and the government’s 
unwillingness to allow BMUs to collect the requisite funds, compromises the legitimacy of the 
BMU. 
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Challenges of decentralization and co-management institutions 
Despite the compelling notions of inclusiveness and cooperation inherent in co-
management, weaknesses within the approach have been observed and often lead to failure of 
natural resources management. 
Legitimacy is an integral component of successful fishery co-management.  Without proper 
resources to implement decisions and create authority, “then discretionary powers have not been 
effectively transferred” (Ribot et al. 2006, p. 1866).  Successful co-management depends on the 
political commitment of the national government of each partner country, including the appropriate 
legislation and adequate technical and financial resources (Bwathondi et al. 2001; Lawrence and 
Watkins 2012).  “Seldom, however, is adequate attention given to the establishment of 
administrative and policy structures that define the legal status, rights, and authorities essential for 
the effective performance of local organizations” (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, pp. 469-470).  
National government shortcomings on Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management institutions reduce 
the legitimacy of the BMUs, undermining the intent of their existence.  
 
Lake Victoria’s fishery and co-management institution  
Summary of Lake Victoria fishery co-management 
Each partner state on Lake Victoria has a BMU statute defining the powers of the BMU 
committee.  At the local level, legitimacy is critical to the success of BMUs.  Lake Victoria’s co-
management institutions were developed to give authority and ownership to the community while 
reducing costs of enforcement to the government.  The mechanisms for allowing BMU committees 
to collect taxes, however, are ineffective because mid-level governmental entities interfere with 
what would normally be a clear and consistent tax collection operation by the BMU committee.  This 
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redirects the BMU committees’ ability to administer clear and consistent operations, and, thereby, 
rendering them illegitimate by the fishers.  Of the 111 BMUs, respondents from 106 BMUs (95 
percent) indicated that a lack of funding of the BMU and lack of equipment were the biggest 
barriers to carrying out successful operations of the BMU.  The problems with the fishery co-
management institutions on Lake Victoria appear to emanate from the mid-level entities the 
expropriation of tax collection duties (either directly or through tenders) that these entities possess.  
The BMU guidelines state that “[t]he BMU Committee shall in the performance of its functions 
consult and cooperate with local governments, relevant agencies of national government and lead 
agencies”, it goes on to say that “for effective participation of various stakeholders in fisheries co-
management, each party must understand its own role, that of others and the relationship and links 
between them” (LVFO 2005d, p. 15).  Guidelines provide no further clarification of who local 
entities should cooperate with. 
  
Results 
The following data reveal two components that cause delegitimization of BMUs: unclear 
judicial authority and financial insufficiency.  In 2005, participants of the Regional Workshop on 
Legal and Operational Framework for BMUs in East Africa noted that fisheries officers viewed 
the newly established BMUs as “enemies” and that one of the challenges to the success of BMUs 
was the failure to welcome them by government and local leaders (ILEG 2005, p. 17).  Perceptions 
of BMUs being illegitimate organizations by higher level government persisted in 2009-2010, the 
time of this study.  The fishing communities are often viewed as being ill equipped and unable and 
unwilling to manage the fishery effectively, even under the current fishery management program 
(pers. comm. with fishery officers; regional newspaper articles).  Indicative of research conducted 
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by Ribot, Agrawal et al. (2006) perceptions if legitimacy like those stated above, often lead to 
distrust of, and insufficient granting of authority to, local organizations by the national 
government.  More than 78 percent of respondents in this study indicated that illegal fishing takes 
place at their BMU, and frame surveys (LVFO 2010b), conducted by the fisheries departments 
and LVFO, indicate high levels of illegal gear (a quarter of all nets) are present around the lake.  
 
Authority real and perceived: 
Lake Victoria’s fishery is high-value and there is incentive for other authoritative entities, 
such as the police, army, or others to relatively easily gain from the fishing industry.  Three 
attributes of conflict between BMU committee authority and higher authority exists, thus reducing 
the BMU’s legitimacy: (1) lack of clear or consistent lines of authority by police or army force; 
(2) inconsistent or corrupt relationship between BMU and fisheries officers, and (3) inconsistent 
lines of authority between village committee and BMU (mostly in Tanzania).  These attributes 
delegitimize the BMU in relation to the fishers, reducing effective fishery management activities. 
 Lack of clear and consistent lines:  None of the policies guiding the development of the 
fisheries co-management institution on Lake Victoria address the participation of police or army 
personnel (see example of organizational structures of fishery management, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda in Bwathondi et al. 2001, pp. 53-55).  Inconsistent lines of authority in Lake Victoria 
fishery co-management institutions have created a failure to execute enforcement at the local level.  
The BMUs were given authority, but intervention by police and army personnel confuse and 
delegitimize that authority.  Where authority confusion exists between higher authorities, 
punishment imposed by these entities sets precedent over lower authorities, such as BMU 
committee members.  Such actions, both procedurally and authoritatively inconsistent, decrease 
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the authority and legitimacy of BMU committee members, as a BMUs punishment will likely 
never be stricter than that of a higher-authority.  A BMU committee member in Tanzania described 
an instance where the BMU committee arrested illegal fishers and took them to the police, but “the 
police took a bribe and released them.  We now don't have any punishment at our BMU because 
we have been disempowered by the police.” (Respondent T17-CM-01).  In Kenya, a boat owner 
said that “police are not entitled to prosecute fisheries offenses and, thus, most of them take bribes” 
(Respondent K23-BO-01).  Others agree, stating that police are corrupt and take bribes instead of 
prosecuting the offense, and that the police do not consult the BMUs (Respondent K30-CM-01).  
In Uganda too, a committee member expressed that the police take bribes and “suck the morale 
from the BMU” (Respondent U04-CM-01). 
Inconsistent and corrupt relationships: District fisheries officers are able to arrest 
offenders (or as discussed above, BMUs have to consult with DOF to institute punishment).  There 
are numerous instances from BMU committee interviews where corruption from higher political 
levels, mostly department of fisheries officers, was cited.  One of the most common complaints 
among committee members was that actions taken from higher political levels delegitimized their 
efforts to control illegal fishing, collect taxes, or have any influence overfishing activities in 
general.  “We are disempowered . . . last year in March, we caught 28 illegal gears (sic) and took 
them to fisheries officers, the day after, the gear was being sold to other fishermen by the 
department” (Respondent T17-CM-01).  Another committee member said that “it is discouraging 
to arrest illegal fishers because they are released by fisheries officers after taking bribes; illegal 
fishers are not prosecuted due to corruption at the department of fisheries” (Respondent T11-CM-
03). 
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Inconsistent lines of authority:  In addition to unclear lines of authority between higher 
political levels and BMUs, there was confusion as to who has authority at the local level, 
specifically in Tanzania where village committees exist to govern local social and political issues.  
Often, newly established BMU committees and village authorities conflict in Tanzania, similarly, 
instances were recorded less frequently in Uganda and Kenya.  Village committees appear 
politically stronger in Tanzania than Uganda and Kenya most likely due to legislative powers 
granted them by the Local Government (District) Authorities Act of 1982 and other acts that 
outline a well-designed, formal system for community involvement (Lawyers' Environmental 
Action Team 2012).  This formal recognition gives village committees authority through electing 
local members as officials who then comprise a village assembly (forming the village committee) 
which govern local social and political affairs including planning, finance, economic, social 
services, security and some resource management (e.g. forest protection and water resources) 
(Lawyers' Environmental Action Team 2012; Commonwealth Local Government Forum 2012a).  
Though Uganda has similar efforts to involve the village level, it appears that the village level is 
“consulted” by the next higher political level, the parish or ward, and not a strong political entity 
itself (see Ministry of Local Government 2003; Commonwealth Local Government Forum 2012b), 
and Kenya has no constitutional provisions for local government and no recognition of village 
political entities outlined in its structure of government (see Commonwealth Local Government 
Forum 2012c).  Formal recognition of village communities, by the national government, may be 
the difference between increased conflict between village committees and BMU committees in 
Tanzania and not in Uganda and Kenya.  
In numerous interviews in Tanzania, both boat owners and committee members stated that 
village authority overrides BMU committee authority.  Boat owners and committee members also 
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stated that efforts by BMU committee members to punish fishers for illegal activity were often 
negated by village chiefs or elders, especially those village authorities who were involved in the 
fishery (e.g. owned illegal nets).  Village committees also often own lake-front land, which is used 
for BMU activities.  Land ownership becomes contentious, taxes or rent must be paid by the BMU 
committee to the village committee, or the village committee supersedes tax collection and collects 
fishery-related monies themselves (Respondent T34-CM-02).  Other respondents—both 
committee members and boat owners—simply explained that “the village government doesn’t 
want to cooperate with the BMU committee on [the village government’s] premises” (Respondent 
T32-CM-01), there is “conflict between local [village] leadership and [the] BMU” (Respondent 
T17-BO-01), and “the village committee criticizes the BMU and disempowers the BMU” 
(Respondent T40-CM-01). 
Specific lines of authority need to be clearly determined so that BMU authority is not 
undermined, whether accidentally or on purpose.  Whether it is during patrol or judiciary action, 
any activity or situation that reduces the legitimacy of the BMU undermines the purpose of the 
fishery management institutions.  In the case of Lake Victoria, legitimacy is being challenged 
because the government often undermines BMU efforts.  Ninety three percent of all respondents 
in the study believe that the Lake Victoria fishery is in trouble, and of those respondents, 76 percent 
indicated that the reason was because of illegal fishing activities.  Yet, participants in the fishery 
are willing and wanting to have effective co-management institutions – they see the benefits of 
legal fishing and sustainability, but are unable to control illegal fishing because of the 
circumstances (e.g. delegitimization and a lack of resources from the government).  Indeed, 75 
percent of fishermen indicated that to protect the fishery, stronger enforcement measures, 
including increasing law enforcement activities, patrols, punishment, and preventing the sale of 
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illegal gear, are necessary.  Of the total number of respondents, 92 percent believe that the fishing 
regulations (preventing illegal fishing gear and practices) are important, and 95 percent believe 
that the fishery can be protected with the established fishing regulations, if they are enforced and 
followed. 
 
Financial systems, real and perceived:  
 The BMUs receive income generated from the fishery at the local level (e.g. licensing, fish 
tax, fines). This source of revenue is, theoretically, an indicator of legitimacy, demonstrating that 
the government trusts the BMUs to conduct their operations, and in that the BMU can be trusted 
with their own revenue generation, legitimacy is created by those that expect services—the fishers.  
Though the BMUs on Lake Victoria have been designed to fund their own operations through the 
collection of taxes and fines, they are largely underfunded and perceived to be so by both BMU 
committee members and boat owners.  Three factors result in, and support, this view (1) with poor 
fish catches, there are fewer taxes to collect, (2) taxes that are collected, are done so by higher 
government representatives, or (3) taxes are collected by the BMUs who then are required to hand 
over all taxes to higher level government, and then receive in return a percentage of those taxes.     
 Government, at district, regional, and sub-county levels, are identified by the national 
governments of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as the level of government “collecting the revenues 
necessary to ensure sustainable local government, and to reinvest in fisheries development.” 
(Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries 2004, p. 17).  In the interview-
surveys, however, there was no mention of financial assistance from higher levels of government, 
other than that money which is collected by a government representative (tender) at the BMU and 
circulated back to the BMU as a percentage of total collection (money from the local level 
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redistributed by higher level government).  While this tender-collected money is “contribut[ing] 
to the revenue required by local government to fuel the development and administration processes” 
(Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries 2004, p. 18. Emphasis added) 61 
percent of the respondents in this study (34 percent BMU committee members), stated that the 
money that is obtained by the BMU committees is insufficient to run BMU operations, including 
enforcement activities. Furthermore, the portion of the taxes returned to the BMU is often only 25 
percent of the total revenue collected at the beach.  In effect, this creates a negative cycle: The 
BMU committee is supposed to, in part, collect taxes and fines at the beach; from the monies 
collected, the BMU conducts patrols with purchased patrol equipment (fuel, boat, engine) in which 
the BMU committee can further collect fines.  However, a large percentage (or all, in some cases) 
of the money the tender collects is not returned, thus reducing the efficacy of the BMU’s ability to 
patrol and collect fines.   
The Department of Fisheries, which is understaffed and has limited equipment, is funded, 
in part, by taxes and fines collected at the BMUs.  Corruption by higher political entities (e.g. the 
Department of Fisheries) was reported by 21 percent of the BMU committee members and boat 
owners.  Out of 25 regions studied, only four regions reported no corruption from higher level 
government. Five regions (one in Tanzania, and two in Kenya and Uganda each) reported non-
existent fishery management activities, such as patrols, meetings, or any other management 
activity, and high levels of bribery and corruption by officers and politicians. 
   A BMU committee member at a Tanzanian beach said that “the [district] government 
tenders a person to collect taxes from fisheries activities and he [the tender] keeps half and gives 
half to the government.  The BMU used to collect taxes and were planting trees and educating 
orphans, but that has stopped” (Respondent T04-CM-02).  At another BMU, the committee 
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chairman again explained that there is no collection of taxes because the “district council does not 
return the percentage that it is supposed to return”.  This member explained that the BMU is 
required to, at minimum every month, collect and provide to the government, 177,000 TSh to 
receive 5 percent in return.  If the BMU provides the government with less than 177,000 TSh they 
will not receive their share, however, in this case, the committee member also said that “whether 
we make the 177,000 or not” we never get our percentage returned (Respondent T15-CM-01).  
Another committee member concluded: “No taxes are being collected for fishing activity by the 
BMU, [the councilor (through an agent) does the collection].  “Our BMU’s only source of revenue 
is a monthly fee for members.  The police and department of fisheries officers conduct patrols to 
collect bribes; the government has let us down” (Respondent T15-CM-01).  The fact that the 
national government has a hand in collecting and dispersing the fish catch taxes and fines reduces 
the local-level ownership of the fishery, and lessens the notion of responsibility by the fishing 
communities.  Intended or not, political delegitimization of the BMUs occurs. 
   
The balance between unsupported BMUs and over-supported BMUs 
Legitimacy lies in the balance, in part, of fisher’s perceptions of the BMUs relationship 
with the higher level government.  Appropriate authority must be carefully delegated so that clear 
lines of authority are present, and consistent punishment exists.  When BMUs are under-supported 
through either lack of financial resources or unclear lines of authority, their legitimacy is 
undermined.  Undermined authority results for two reasons: first, procedural fairness is absent if a 
BMU committee cannot conduct critical operational functions from lack of financial resources.  
Second, authority is absent when higher level government (e.g. police or DOF officers) 
inappropriately interfere with BMU authority, confusing the line of authority. 
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Discussion 
Legal authority has been delegated to the BMUs.  This authority, however, is often not 
recognized by the harvester (fishers) for reasons emanating from weaknesses observed in the Lake 
Victoria fishery co-management institutions’ higher level authority, where:  
 a) weak judicial action is taken by higher level officers as seen when fisheries officers 
undermine BMU efforts by releasing offenders with little or no punishment;  
 b) corruption by higher level officers and others in authority, demonstrated when 
fisheries officers are corrupt and take bribes or sell confiscated illegal gear;  
 c) unclear lines of authority, where police, army, department of fisheries officials, or 
village authority confuse fishery management actions reserved for BMU committee 
members; and,  
 d) circumventing tax and fine action of the BMU by higher level authority tenders who 
collect money at the local level, undermining the BMU committee’s authority and 
reducing their capacity to administer consistent enforcement procedures, this leads to 
insufficient financial resources to the BMUs which creates the inability to conduct 
consistent enforcement procedures. 
The governments of Lake Victoria have provided some judicial authority to the BMUs, but 
the actions of higher political authority have subsequently taken that same authority away.  Higher 
level government actions, and unclear lines of authority, have undermined the authority of the 
BMUs; no matter what stated authority the BMU committee members have, that authority is often 
not realized.  Revisiting Ribot et al. (2006), they explain that “effective decentralization requires 
the construction of accountable institutions at all levels of government and a secure domain of 
autonomous decision making at the local level”. 
The central argument of legitimacy comes from the answer of a Tanzanian BMU 
committee member who stated that “the district council should give the revenue collection 
activities of the beach to the BMU [committee]” and that fisheries management “patrol[s] should 
be conducted jointly with the department [DOF] since they have better equipment” (Respondent 
T11-CM-03).    For the local level to have legitimacy, there appears the need for balance between 
autonomy—granted to the BMUs by higher level government as a demonstration that the 
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government values and trusts the BMUs—and government support—a demonstration that the 
government is in a partnership with the BMUs to effectively manage the fishery. 
The result of giving BMUs power of tax and revenue collection is the perceived legitimacy 
of the BMUs by the fishers, because it is also perceived that the government realizes the BMU as 
a legitimate entity.  Further, with joint patrols between the BMU and higher level authorities (e.g. 
police or DOF officers), demonstrates the legitimacy of the BMU through the partnership, as the 
DOF provides protection of the BMU committee and allows effective execution of regulations 
when rule-breakers are caught. 
Disallowing the BMU committee to collect taxes can be perceived as a lack of faith in the 
BMU by higher authorities.  The inability to collect their own taxes and fines means that the BMU 
does not have enough financial resources to then conduct patrols and enforcement activities; 
therefore, the BMU committee is unable to conduct consistent enforcement activities, reducing the 
committee’s legitimacy by the fishers.  Further, there is no promise that a more effective BMU is 
delegated more money if a tender is in place, as the amount of money collected by higher level 
authorities is often less than that which is returned to the BMUs.  This is a case of a lack of 
transparency in the tax system.  Allowing BMUs to collect their own taxes creates incentive for 
the BMUs to patrol and enforce more effectively because taxes and fines would be collected as the 
BMUs become more effective. 
In the case of Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management institutions, lake-level revenue 
collection and control must be in the hands of the BMUs and patrols, arrests, and judicial activities, 
executed by the BMU must be supported by higher level government in the form of appropriate 
punishment through laws, security of BMU patrols, and equipment and fuel in partnership with 
the appropriate higher political authority.   
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Conclusion 
Where government was once viewed as an obstacle for its unpopular, coercive, top-down 
fishery management arrangements, today the lack of appropriate government engagement is the 
obstacle.  Insufficient financial resources and unclear judicial authority have delegitimized the 
local management arm of co-management on Lake Victoria.  
Insufficient and unclear power transfer by the national government leads to the 
delegitimization of the BMUs.  While the members of the BMUs have the will to administer fishery 
management, they lack the ability, precisely because of insufficient and unclear judicial authority 
and insufficient financial support.  Effective fishery co-management institutions require a strong 
positive relationship between the national government and the local level.  Within Lake Victoria’s 
co-management fishery institutions, relationships between those who are governed and those who 
govern are strengthened by legitimacy, or fishers’ acceptance of the regulations and authority that 
governs the fishery; and legitimacy is created by the strong positive relationship between the national 
government and the local level.   
Legitimacy is a critical component of co-management.  When fishers do not believe that 
consistent and transparent socio-political natural resource management institutions exist, illegal 
resource harvest behavior may not change and the resource will be compromised.    
A transparent system will reduce incidences of corruption at the mid-political levels.  The 
fishery earns enough money, both at the local level and at the national level, to fund the 
management program.  But a clear tax structure must be created, with local taxes being collected 
at the local level and higher-level taxes being collected at the appropriate levels (e.g. taxation of 
exporters through national exportation tax structures).  Additionally, a clear responsibility structure 
must be created—if BMU committees are in charge of fishery management then it must be made 
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clear what authority others (e.g. police, army) have, so that their involvement does not undermine 
BMU efforts, but rather, compliments it.   
BMUs need to control revenue collection, but patrols should be conducted in conjunction 
with the appropriate government entities (police or DOF officers).  Both actions demonstrate that 
government is invested in protecting the fishery, provides legitimacy and support to the BMUs, 
and allows effective execution of regulations when it comes to arresting offenders. 
The government must share in the responsibility as well as the management of the resource.  
The fishery resource should be viewed as a tool for the development of the communities around 
the lake and can serve, if managed appropriately, as a sustainable source for economic growth.  
Weakness at the top will surely create weakness at the local level.  With the loss of legitimacy 
comes the failure at all levels to successfully manage the resource. 
While this chapter investigates factors that weaken the co-management institution on Lake 
Victoria, it must be acknowledged that co-management indeed, has had an overall positive benefit 
to Lake Victoria’s fishing communities, national development, and to some extent, reducing over-
harvest.  Results, observed by the author and well documented by others (see Odongkara et al. 
2009; personal observations; Ogwang' et al. 2009), demonstrate that the Lake Victoria fishery 
contributes to each of the partner country’s GDPs; income and revenue generation at local and 
regional levels; provides employment and produces foreign exchange (Odongkara et al. 2009); 
increases fisheries infrastructure and development; alleviates poverty among fishing community 
members; includes the disenfranchised (Ogwang' et al. 2009), and has likely prevented the collapse 
of Lake Victoria's Nile perch fishery.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
 
EVALUATION OF FISHERY CO-MANAGEMENT ON LAKE VICTORIA, 
EAST AFRICA: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS 
OF A COMMUNITY-PARTICIPATION APPROACH 
 
Abstract 
 
Lake Victoria’s fishery management program is based on broad approaches 
influenced by international aid agencies that provide financial and technical 
assistance to developing countries.  These approaches—including decentralization 
and co-management—were created using paradigms from economic theory that 
predominately ignored the basic tenants of economic change in developing 
countries largely resulting in failed African states.  These same approaches, 
however, have been used in the creation of Lake Victoria’s fishery management 
program with some success.  This chapter compares the differences in applying 
decentralization to social and infrastructural programs and natural resource 
programs to determine if a) they are mutually exclusive, where the approach works 
well on one set of programs, and not another; b) there are inherent faults in 
decentralization and co-management, relegating Lake Victoria’s fishery 
management program to a predetermined failure in the future, and c) if failed status 
of social and infrastructural programs had an effect on the fishery and subsequent 
management efforts.  Because the research contained in this dissertation 
approached decentralization by looking at the existing fishery management 
program, finding both weaknesses and strengths, it was necessary to determine if 
any weaknesses emanated from the theoretical construct of the program.  Therefore, 
this chapter compares implementation with theoretical notions of these programs; 
looks at the practical applications and limits of the programs and the entities within 
(especially the BMUs); and determines success and the potential for other stressors 
influencing success.  This chapter concludes by discussing the applicability of the 
co-management program on Lake Victoria, how some of the challenges identified 
in this study might be addressed, and how co-management might be replicable on 
other common property resources.  
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Part I: Introduction 
Approaches to Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program emanate from the 
recognition that the lake’s fishery contributes to the income, food security, development, and 
employment of millions of people in the region and contributes millions of dollars annually to the 
East African Community.  The lake’s management program emerged from the crisis of overfishing 
of a highly valuable fish—the Nile perch—and previous failed attempts of centralized 
management to rectify this crisis.  Similar to the Laurentian Great Lakes, there were multiple 
attempts at lake-wide fishery management programs (Gaden et al. 2012).  It was not until, in part, 
the imminent collapse of the highly valued Nile perch, with investments and interest from the 
international community, that the current program launched in 1996.   
Much of the promise of my research depends on the notion that decentralization is an 
effective approach to Lake Victoria’s fishery management program.  Therefore, in this section I 
revisit (from Chapter 2 and 3) decentralization and focus on community participation.  Up until 
this chapter I have been casual in my acceptance of the concept of decentralization.  I did not ask 
whether decentralization is an approach with inherently faulty notions, or whether decentralization 
has influenced how Lake Victoria’s fishery management program has been developed.  For 
example, decentralization is a major concept that has been implemented in developing countries 
since the 1980s to help alleviate poverty.  However, decentralization has been criticized as an 
ineffective approach because it used economic models that did not transfer well to developing 
countries’ social, economic, and political systems (Stein 2008).  In this research I have approached 
decentralization as a compelling arrangement without investigating whether there might be 
inherent weaknesses that cannot be overcome.  In this chapter, therefore, I look at how 
decentralization has been developed and applied in East Africa to determine if small changes in 
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the current fishery management program can overcome the challenges identified in this research, 
or if there are intrinsic problems with the approach that might not be improved through institutional 
fixes.  I conclude this chapter by synthesizing my findings from the entire dissertation and by 
providing suggestions for future management and research based on these findings.  
 
Part II: Revisiting decentralization 
Decentralization: Failure of economy 
Development in East Africa, and specifically on Lake Victoria, has been heavily influenced 
by international aid agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) that 
provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries with the goal of reducing 
poverty.  These two organizations have strong economic backgrounds20, and their approaches to 
development and poverty alleviation emerged from the dominant paradigm of neoclassical 
economic theory and focused largely on free-market programs called structural adjustment (Stein 
2008). 
Structural adjustment is based on free-market programs and characterized by 
conditionalities to ensure that money lent to developing countries would be spent in accordance 
with the overall goals of the World Bank and IMF.  Conditionalities, as the term implies, are 
restrictions placed on the receiving country, constraining the country to implementing programs 
and policies dictated by the donor agency in return for continued assistance.  Conditionalities, and 
the structural adjustment programs, were intended to reduce poor fiscal decision making by 
developing countries to assist in their long-term economic growth using privatization and 
deregulation measures (Stein 2008). 
                                                 
20 A more in depth discussion of the historical background of economic influences forming World Bank policies and 
approaches can be found in Stein (2008), Platteau (2000), and Bauer (1972). 
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Literature criticizing structural adjustment programs often focus on conditionalities and 
free-market-like approaches not applying well to developing countries.  Structural adjustment 
policies generated a set of tools that ignored characteristics of developing countries necessary for 
understanding the process of economic change and are seen as a major cause of many social and 
infrastructural sectors failing in Africa (Platteau 2000; Stein 2008).  For example, structural 
adjustment is an approach that neither understands the problems occurring in developing countries, 
nor comes up with viable alternatives; structural adjustment addresses theoretical problems with 
solutions that emphasize financial variables in a hypothetical, axiomatic21 world (Stein 1995; Stein 
2005a; Stein 2008).   
The misgivings of structural adjustment programs are often associated with health, social, 
and infrastructural programs.   Such programs are seen as uniform and thus amenable to delivery-
oriented approaches, with regular, recurring activities and the need of foreseeable investment, 
regular planning (usually annual), and programming cycles; characteristics that can in general be 
prescribed by a central planning process (Kaimowitz and Ribot 2002).  Recall, contrastingly, that 
a centralized approach to management failed when applied to natural resource management on 
Lake Victoria (Chapter 2, p. 42); but when decentralization was applied as a market-based 
approach to social well-being, such as health care, education, roads, and agriculture, the market 
began excluding those who could not afford it (Stein 2008).  Decentralization led to inaccessible 
education and healthcare, and agriculture emphasized mono-culture and cash crops22 which did 
                                                 
21 A self-understood truth; exists because it exists.  
22 The argument against structural adjustment policies, mono-culture, and cash crops involves the ramifications of 
liberalization on local farmers.  Since structural adjustment policies call for reduction of subsidization of fertilizers 
and pesticides by the state (the market will take care of this), farmers must pay, and thus reduce their profit margin 
from successful crops. In many developed countries (e.g. the U.S.) farmers are still subsidized, and can out 
developing country farmers with quality of product.  Further, World Bank and IMF approaches to crops were to urge 
countries to grow specific crops (e.g. coffee, tea); when it was time, each country put their product on the market, 
flooding the market and driving the price down, because global demand did not increase in relation to increased 
supply. 
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not function well in the international market (Bauer 1972).  Decentralization was supposed to 
enhance delivery of social services and markets (Ndegwa 2002), but it instead lead to 
unemployment, a reduction in education and preparation for future employment, and a reduction 
in crops and other livelihoods.  Structural adjustment programs misread and mis-conceptualized 
the problems, solutions, and abilities in Africa (Stein 2005b).   
The result of structural adjustment’s failed policies is, in part, attributed to many of the 
stressors that threatened the ecological sustainability of Lake Victoria.  For example, the poor 
economic conditions created by the curtailment of formal sector employment opportunities, the 
reduced production within the agricultural sector due to poor market performance, and decreasing 
youth opportunities in rural areas led to populations seeking employment opportunities.  These 
dire circumstances occurred during the 1980s, concurrent with domestic and international growth 
in demand of the highly valued Nile perch23.  The fishing industry created opportunities for those 
seeking better economic conditions, jobs, or simply natural resources to sustain their livelihoods.  
All of these circumstances contributed to a general human migration toward freshwater resources 
as access to clean water, alternative livelihoods, and other resources became limited (Stein 2007) 
in other sectors.  The resulting annual growth rate of human populations in many of Lake Victoria’s 
cities was high—approximately three percent (Njiru et al. 2006).  Lake Victoria, an open-access24 
resource, provided large numbers of people escaping poor economic conditions valuable fish that 
benefited them immediately through payments at the beach, and lead to overfishing of the lake at 
more than two times the sustainable level (Hecky 2003). 
                                                 
23 The beginning of the lucrative Nile perch fishing effort took place at the beginning of the 1980s (see p. 66) 
24 Lake Victoria is not strictly “open-access” (see p. 49), but the cost of accessing the resource is minimal, and 
restrictions to enter not inhibiting. 
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Increased human populations around Lake Victoria also contributed to other environmental 
stressors which led to a decline in fish populations, such as environmental degradation of wetlands 
and other spawning areas (Njiru et al. 2008), introduction of exotic species (Njiru et al. 2005), and 
eutrophication (Njiru et al. 2008).  These contributions to the decline in the fisheries have been 
acknowledged by fishers, scientists, and other stakeholders in Lake Victoria’s fishery program 
(LVFO 2005c); the Entebbe Declaration (LVFO 2005e), for example,  indicated that the East African 
Community “should take measures” to address these concerns.  Though fishery populations have 
declined because of these other factors, the apparent lack of authority of the fisheries sector towards 
other sectors (e.g. agriculture, a major cause of eutrophication) is minimal.  Efforts to address these 
issues are not a formal component of the co-management program, though disparate efforts to reduce 
their impacts have taken place25.  
The failure of decentralization of social and infrastructural programs in East Africa 
contributed to the failure of poverty alleviation efforts.  The economic and social stressors that 
resulted from these failed efforts led large human populations to seek easily accessible 
employment and food security.  They did so by accessing Lake Victoria, leading to overfishing 
and the increased need for fishery management efforts as the incentives to sell fish were high.  At 
the same time decentralization programs were failing on social and infrastructural programs, they 
were also being implemented on natural resource management programs, including Lake 
Victoria’s fishery. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 For example, see LVBC (2007), which addresses country-level attempts at controlling the invasive plant 
Hyacinth.  Hyacinth has led to a decline if fish species. 
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Decentralization: Promise of natural resource management 
Though decentralization has been criticized as a failure for social and infrastructural 
programs, other studies have focused on the notion that decentralization is a necessary approach 
to sustainable resource management (Kaimowitz and Ribot 2002; Ribot 2002b).  The differences 
between decentralized approaches for social services and infrastructure—described above in terms 
of health care, education, and agricultural sectors—and natural resource management, diverge in 
many respects and can thus be treated differently.  First, social and infrastructure programs can be 
defined as uniform, where national curriculums, health programs, and construction prototypes can 
be designed at scale for an entire country.  To the contrary, natural resources are considered 
variable, where the nature of natural resources requires greater local knowledge for their 
management as they vary spatially and temporally, making them less amenable to central 
standardization (Kaimowitz and Ribot 2002).  These spatial and temporal variations lead to a need 
for greater degree of local knowledge in their management, planning and implementation 
(Kaimowitz and Ribot 2002).  Management decisions must be made in response to variations or 
fluctuations in the resource, flexibility and “responsiveness to cope with the contingencies of 
nature” is necessary (Kaimowitz and Ribot 2002, p. 2) making them more amenable to localized, 
or community management.  Second, differences between social programs and natural resources 
can be defined by their financial characteristics.  Social services and infrastructure are net sinks 
for financial resources (e.g. payment for a road), whereas natural resources are sources of income 
and wealth for national governments as well as local populations (Kaimowitz and Ribot 2002).  
Natural resources that are wealth generators create incentives for those who benefit directly from 
the resource to manage it sustainably. 
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In addition to the arguments that Kaimowitz and Ribot (2002) make concerning the 
necessity of community participation in natural resources management, and Lake Victoria meeting 
those requirements, past centralized management efforts have failed on Lake Victoria.  The lake’s 
fishery, because of its varying nature, does not appear to be amenable to centralized management, 
and thus the alternative of decentralization is a compelling approach.    
The goals of Lake Victoria’s decentralized, fishery co-management program are to create 
more employment opportunities, alleviate poverty, and sustain the fishery.  The benefits of 
sustainable fishing practices were intended to benefit the fishers through continued catches of the 
valuable Nile perch and the central government would benefit too from foreign exchange.  To 
gauge success based on these goals, it must be determined whether poverty has been alleviated, 
foreign exchange earned, and fisheries sustained, and to what extent.  Fishery yields and 
subsequent income around the lake has been substantial, with fisheries contributing significantly 
to the national economy through export, employment, and food security (Nunan and Scullion 
2004). In 2002, for example, the highest contribution to the Ugandan economy (over the usually 
highest coffee export) was fishery exports, bringing in USD 90 million (Ugandan Department of 
Fisheries Resources 2003).  Production of fish within Uganda contributed to the economy more 
than exportation of fish, equaling 12 percent of the GDP (Ugandan Department of Fisheries 
Resources 2003).  The fishery directly supports 3-6 million people in the basin (Awange and 
Ong'ong'a 2006) while fish from the lake provide nutrients and protein to 17 million Ugandans.  
Similarly, on the Kenyan side of the lake, fishery exports earned USD 125 million (Awange and 
Ong'ong'a 2006).  The Nile perch fishery is a multi-million dollar export industry supporting about 
20 fish filleting factories on Lake Victoria (Geheb et al. 2007).  Lake wide, Nile perch yields are 
between 700,000 to 1,000,000 t (see FAO 2010a-e; LVFO 2012) and valued between USD 350-
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450 million at the local level beaches and USD 250 million in export earnings (LVFO 2012).  
Speaking only of the fishery, an argument can be made that alleviating poverty and foreign 
exchanged earned has worked to some extent. 
Determining success based on community empowerment can be done through observations 
of BMUs and co-management.  The BMUs are not only the action arm of Lake Victoria’s fishery 
co-management program, these organizations are also the personification of the co-management 
approach.  Chapter 4 demonstrates that BMUs are implementing co-management through 
participation in fishery management activities.  Their implementation ranges from designed roles, 
such as those established by the program (e.g. elections); to broader notions of self-organization 
and implementation of the fishery management program (e.g. conflict resolution).  Chapter 4 
established that, among the characteristics of co-management, BMUs with pre-existing 
organizations showed stronger notions of self-organization, including increased decision making, 
enhanced enforcement of regulations, improved information flows, equitable treatment of 
constituents, ability to resolve disputes, and distribution of benefits.  Regardless of pre-existing 
organizations, many of the BMUs are successfully implementing, to some degree, co-management 
activities.  
 It is unclear what would have occurred on Lake Victoria if donor agencies did not push a 
fishery co-management program.  It is difficult to imagine a program without a coordinating 
organization like the LVFO; if the past is any indication, disparate efforts by various jurisdictions 
sharing the same resource often result in uncoordinated fish management attempts (Chapter 1).  
Without multi-jurisdictional harmonization, each separate country likely would have established 
their own centralized fishery management program (as in the past) and two inefficiencies would 
likely have emerged: 1) the often observed incongruences of separate sovereign states attempting 
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to manage a single, common-property resource, leading to disparate policies and unequal fishing 
efforts; and 2) the previously observed failure of top-down managerial approach which saw a 
backlash by resource users towards the government, leading to overfishing.  Either way, continued 
failed management would likely have taken place based on past experience.  If these are the likely 
outcomes of management without co-management, then the observed successes of BMUs is a 
positive outcome. 
 
Conclusion of decentralization and co-management 
Decentralization has inherent flaws when applied to social programs in developing 
countries.  In East Africa, these flaws caused social and economic circumstances that led to a 
general human migration toward Lake Victoria and its freshwater resources.  The resulting 
overharvest of the lake’s valuable fish was an impetus for improved management.  Because of the 
varying nature of the fishery, because the fishery is a wealth generator, and because of proven 
failed approaches of centralized management on Lake Victoria, decentralization appears to be an 
appropriate approach for fishery management.        
I have concluded that successes and challenges in the fishery management program on 
Lake Victoria are not inherent weaknesses of decentralization, but rather, institutional in nature, 
where inappropriate devolution of resources or unclear roles need to be addressed (see Chapters 3 
and 5). In other words, decentralization will not necessarily create an atmosphere of failure for 
fishery co-management on Lake Victoria, but rather has inefficiencies that can be overcome 
through institutional solutions.  The following section proposes some of those solutions based on 
finding in Chapters 3 through 5. 
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Part III: Synthesis-Recommendations 
The literature on decentralization and co-management lacks many empirical studies, 
instead often addressing theoretical problems and hypothetical variables.  This study improved the 
understanding of some of the critical variables that affect fishery co-management.  Though 
numerous variables exist, many researchers categorize them into causal classes, reflecting the 
notion that these numerous variables influence management programs in predictable ways.  For 
example,  Bene (2003), Ostrom (2005, 2009), and Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) created diagnostic 
approaches with broad causal classes relating to biophysical (resource mobility, visibility, 
reproductive capacity), institutional (enforcement capability, level of authority), infrastructural 
(access to markets), demographic (human populations, education), economic (value of fish, 
alternative livelihoods), and socio-political and cultural (community response and awareness to 
fishing regulations and enforcement) characteristics.   
My studies looked at variables and characteristics in each of the above causal classes and 
determined specific weaknesses and strengths based on the responses of the resource harvesters.  
Though many more variables exist which challenge Lake Victoria’s co-management approach26, 
my findings demonstrate there is a need to: strengthen conventions of formal transfer of authority, 
create accountability, and focus on local-level institutions; use the capacity afforded by existing 
socially cohesive community engagement to inform and strengthen the co-management program; 
and clarify roles of all entities engaged in fisheries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Future analysis will reveal more variables that are critical, but without attending to some of the findings in this 
dissertation, progress at many BMUs is inhibited. 
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1. Formal conventions, accountability, and, local level institutions: 
In Chapter 3 I demonstrated that for decentralization of fishery co-management to function 
properly, adequate authority and financial resources must be devolved or distributed to lower-level 
administrative entities and to the BMUs.  It is the government’s responsibility to distribute 
appropriate revenue to entities and organizations to function in a cooperative manner as defined 
by the co-management program (LVFO 2001).  My findings, however, demonstrate that central 
government kept disproportionately more financial resources than lower level management 
entities, and the central government remained overwhelmingly in charge of policy development.  
These weaknesses resulted in decreased ability to conduct fishery management activities due to 
limited resources to enforce regulations or participate in policy development.  I determined that 
successful natural resource decentralization requires strengthening and empowering the BMUs 
with increased cash flow, enforcement, monitoring, and judicial powers. To accomplish these, 
central government priorities toward BMUs must change, but changing priorities of government 
entities seems impractical.  Therefore, I suggest strengthening mechanisms of accountability 
between stakeholders as a reasonable approach.  Similar to findings in Chapter 5 on legitimacy, 
accountability entails expectations of actions taken by collaborating partners.  Accountable 
representation, and an understanding of the extent to which fiscal, administrative, and political 
control is transferred, strengthens expectations (Schneider 2003).  To do this, Ribot (2002) 
suggests that securing authority transfer through formal conventions (e.g. constitutional, judicial, 
or decrees) enhances the means to which authority transfer occurs.  I suggest, therefore, that the 
stakeholders on Lake Victoria, led by the LVFO: 
 Ensure that mechanisms of authority and resource transfer are improved so that 
financial resources can be effectively distributed, and 
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 Identify accountable representation (also similar to Chapter 5, in which roles must 
be clarified) so a specific entity or individual is accountable when inadequate 
distribution occurs.   
The intent of Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program is sustainability of the 
resource for development and benefit of communities, and if the co-management program is to 
rely on communities to be the action-arm of resource management, then proper authority and 
resources must be delegated to the community level (Chapter 3).  A strong relationship between 
higher-level government entities and communities is critical (Ribot 2002b). 
  
2. Harness experience, familiarity, and social cohesiveness of communities: 
Chapter 4 focuses on BMUs and the fishing communities.  These communities, through 
the BMUs, are charged with administering fishery management.  At some sites, fishery 
management efforts were in place through pre-existing organizations prior to the creation of each 
BMU.  These pre-existing organizations made efforts to manage the fishery, and these efforts had 
many similar characteristics to co-management programs.  I found that BMUs that had pre-existing 
organizations also had enhanced community involvement in the administration of fishery 
management, such as inclusion in decision making, equitable treatment of others, having 
mechanisms for resolving disputes, and increasing valuation of member’s opinions and views.  The 
results of such involvement include the reduction in illegal fishing and the provision of benefits 
derived from fishing activities to the community.  Results reveal that BMUs which had pre-existing 
organizations fared better than those that did not, exhibiting stronger self-organizing characteristics. 
The results of this research identified that pre-existing organizations were associated with 
self-organizing characteristics and positively influenced fishery co-management on Lake Victoria, 
however, I did not determine why BMUs with pre-existing organizations contributed to this 
phenomenon.  The literature used in this study identified pre-existing organizations as likely 
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contributing to enhance co-management performance due to similarities between previous efforts 
of management and management efforts of the BMUs.  Similarly, enhanced performance could 
have resulted from greater social cohesion and norms institutionalized from previous organizations 
that allow BMUs to operate better.  Possibly BMUs that self-organize had access to better 
education, or had higher economic status.  With no detail on the characteristics of each community 
where BMUs were established, the nature of pre-existing organizations, or the effort that was put 
into fishery management prior to co-management, it is difficult to determine what elements 
contributed to enhanced administration of BMUs. 
Though my research could not determine the reasons why pre-existing organizations led to 
enhanced administration of the co-management program, I determined that a relationship exists.  
The nature of my results make it difficult to implement these findings ex post facto.  Revealing 
that a management program will benefit from circumstances that existed prior to the creation of 
the program seems to have limited applicability on Lake Victoria, but the results have led to three 
realizations:  
1) Future co-management programs should focus on communities which have had pre-
existing organizations of management, while future research may reveal the specific 
characteristics that determine reasons for success of these communities; 
2) The current Lake Victoria program is creating experience for communities on Lake 
Victoria.  Therefore, if past experience leads to more effective future management, then 
Lake Victoria’s fishery co-management program will improve over time; and, 
3) Future research is necessary to determine which characteristic make pre-existing 
organizations or experience lead to increased self-organization abilities and better 
performance in co-management programs.   
The characteristics of self-organization should be viewed as mechanisms to help 
community members to pursue a particular course of behaviors to accomplish tasks (Agrawal and 
Gibson 2001).  To enhance the findings of my research, future efforts should focus on 
characteristics of communities that have or had informal management efforts prior to a formal 
management program to determine what characteristics allow them to be more effective.   
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Management and policy implications from this study can certainly inform future co-
management approaches in Africa’s great lakes region.  Notably, practitioners on Lake Tanganyika 
are considering fishery management approaches with the intention of implementing a co-
management program (van der Knaap 2013).  Researchers have noted that communities around the 
lake have been instigating efforts to manage the fishery in their geographical areas, with village and 
other community organizations specifically addressing overfishing.  Though it is likely impossible 
for practitioners implementing a co-management program to integrate only communities that have 
or had pre-existing, community-led, resource management organizations, I urge managers to 
consider that pre-existing organizations can benefit formal co-management programs.  Indeed, prior 
experience enhances community inclusion, strengthens stakeholder decision making, enhances 
enforcement, improves information flows, increases equitable treatment of stakeholders, increases 
conflict resolution capabilities, and improves distribution of social and economic benefits in the co-
management program.     
 
3. Clarifying roles of all stakeholders 
Co-management’s major tenet is the sharing of authority between the central government 
and community organizations in an effort to manage natural resources.  Fishery co-management, 
therefore, requires a strong relationship between higher authorities and BMUs.  Weakness in these 
relationships can cause the management by BMUs to be ineffective because BMUs need 
acceptance by fishers of their authority to administer management.  Findings in my research 
indicate that two major problems exist: (1) lack of support from higher political authorities 
undermines enforcement power at the local level; and, (2) lack of financial returns from both the 
fishery and higher political authorities reduces the BMU’s ability to function.   
156 
 
While legitimacy is a necessity at all levels of fishery management, the relationship between 
higher levels of government and community is essential for legitimacy to exist, because management 
authority has been transferred to the communities where the majority of enforcement and 
management activities are expected to occur.  Legitimacy, however, is often negatively affected at 
the local level by higher levels of government, because national governments often transfer 
insufficient judicial authority and financial resources to lower levels of government.  The three main 
culprits in the delegitimization of BMUs were:   
1) Unclear lines of authority, where police, army, department of fisheries officials, or 
village authorities confuse fishery management actions reserved for BMU committee 
members;  
2) Corruption by higher level officers and others in authority, demonstrated when fisheries 
officers are corrupt and take bribes or sell confiscated illegal gear.  These weaknesses 
often lead to weak judicial action, such as releasing offenders with little or no 
punishment, thus undermining stricter BMU efforts; and,  
3) Circumventing tax and fine action of the BMU by higher level authority tenders who 
collect money at the local level, undermining the BMU committee’s authority and 
reducing their capacity to administer consistent enforcement procedures.  This leads to 
insufficient financial resources to the BMUs which creates the inability to conduct 
consistent enforcement procedures. 
Legitimacy is created through consistent ability to function, whether the collection of taxes 
and fines, or functioning as an enforcement entity.  The interferences listed above interrupt the 
consistent functioning of BMUs, often delegitimizing BMUs.  As maintained in Chapter 5, 
consistency must include recognizable and consistent authorities.  Remedies for these interruptions 
must create clear roles, and in the case of corruption, better oversight.  Recommendations, then, 
focus on: 
1) Entities that have historically had authority, such as the police, must be given clear 
roles within the fishery co-management program.  This research identifies local police 
officers as being one such entity that must be deterred from rogue enforcement unless 
called upon to conduct official fishery enforcement duties. 
2) A clear tax structure must be created, with local taxes being collected at the local level 
and higher level taxes being collected at the appropriate levels (e.g. taxation of 
exporters through national exportation tax structures).  Similar to suggestions for the 
national level, it is likely necessary to identify accountable representation so a specific 
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entity or individual is accountable when inappropriate collection and distribution 
occurs.   
3) To address conflict between village committees and BMU committees, I suggest a 
formal “bridge” be created, where members of one committee becomes a member or 
advisor on the other’s committee.  Facilitation of communications would likely be a 
first step in reducing conflict.   
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
This dissertation serves as a case study to contribute to prevailing research on common-
property natural resource management with inclusion of communities in developing countries.  I 
focused much of my efforts on looking at various works, such as those done by Ostrom, Agrawal, 
Pinkerton, Platteau, Ribot, and others in advancing the knowledge and approaches for 
understanding these complex, social-ecological systems, and transferring them onto large-
freshwater fishery systems.  I recognize that there is no quick fix for solving natural resource and 
community dilemmas.  The fishery management program on Lake Victoria, however, is an 
ongoing experiment that has demonstrated both strengths and weaknesses.  Findings in the final 
chapter of this work demonstrate that the weaknesses in the program are not inherently detrimental, 
and thus, there is not an apparent need to disband current co-management efforts.   
The findings in this research also indicate that without thoughtful and careful creation of 
fishery management institutions, conflict can arise and the institutions designed to influence 
harvest behavior can be inefficient.  This is evidenced by the level of inefficiency observed on 
Lake Victoria, with illegal fishing and resulting decline of the Nile perch.  Even when carefully 
crafted and implemented, co-management results will rarely produce the intended results (Geheb 
et al. 2007), reflecting the discordant nature of relationships between the community and 
government levels, the varying challenges at the community level, and the complexity of 
communities themselves.  Success has been observed on Lake Victoria, however, and 
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inefficiencies are representative of any program that consists of such complex relationships as 
those on Lake Victoria.   
Though fishery co-management on Lake Victoria to date has flaws, it must be acknowledged 
that these management efforts have likely prevented the total collapse of the current fishery.  
Respondents throughout my research indicated that, without BMUs, fishing effort would be chaotic 
and unsustainable.  Efforts of the LVFO, the fishery research institutes, the communities, and the 
national governments of each country should be met with commendation.  Inefficiencies exist, but 
most often because of unforeseen considerations.  In fact, the fishery co-management program on 
Lake Victoria is remarkable, as beaches around the lake are part of an established BMU, fishers are 
largely a part of the fish management program, and those historically disenfranchised have been 
included.  Though there is a range of successful and unsuccessful BMUs around the lake, most often, 
those BMUs that are less successful suffer from a lack of ability, not will.  Whether BMUs administer 
the program as intended, or in a manner suitable for their own needs, co-management on Lake 
Victoria has successfully changed behavior to decrease unfettered and chaotic fishing practices.  Co-
management, if nothing else, has been a mechanism that allows those who are engaged in the fishery 
to be a part of management operations of their fishery.  Sometimes this approach overlaps with the 
overall intended purpose of Lake Victoria’s fishery management program, and sometimes it does 
not, or cannot.  Regardless, the spirit of management takes place.  
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APPENDIX A:  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BMU EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE LEADERS 
----QUESTIONAIRE FOR BMU EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER(S)---- 
Survey Questionnaire for Investigating Lake Victoria’s Beach 
Management Units, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania: Behavioral assessment of 
Lake Victoria Fishers. 
 
 
Names of enumerators:___________________________________ 
 
Date: _______________________ 
 
Country (UGANDA     KENYA     TANZANIA) 
 
Name of the District____________________ 
 
Name of Beach Management Unit__________________ 
 
 
  
Executive Committee Member Information:  
 
1. Respondent number ______ 
 
2. The respondent’s position on the BMU Executive Committee 
__________________________ 
 
3. Sex 
_____ M) _____ F) 
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GX: General information: 
GX1: How many boats are currently registered at this BMU? 
 _____# 
_____ Don’t know 
 
GX1.1: Were there fewer boats registered at this BMU five years ago? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ same) _____ don’t know) 
 
GX2: How many committee members are there on the BMU executive committee? 
 _____ # 
 
GX3: How many women are committee members of the BMU committee? 
_____ # 
 
GX4: How many Boat Owners are on the BMU committee? 
_____ # 
 
GX5: When was the BMU formed at this landing site?  
_____ Year of formation 
 
GX6: When were the last committee elections? _____ month/year 
 _____ correctly identified 
 _____ incorrectly identified 
 
GX7: did all the BMU members have the opportunity to participate in the 
election? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
GX8: When are the next committee elections? _____ month/year 
 
GX9: Among the boat owners, is there a predominant tribe (more than 50%)?  
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
GX10: How many different tribes are at this BMU? 
 _____ # _____ don’t know 
 
GX11: What are the major tribes at this BMU 
 __________ 1 
 __________ 2 
 __________ 3 
 
PX: Personal Information 
PX1: How old are you? 
 _____ age in years _____ refuses 
 
 
 
 
 161 
 
PX2: Education level of participant: 
  _____ None 
_____ Primary 
_____ Secondary 
_____ Tertiary or above 
 
PX3: What tribe do you belong to? 
  __________ name of tribe (e.g. Luo) 
 
PX4: How long have you lived at this landing site? 
 _____ 0-5 years _____ 6-20 years _____ >20 years 
 
PX5: Was your father in the fishery? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
PX5.1 Have you been in the fishery since childhood (16 years of 
age)? 
_____ y) (go to PX5) _____ n) (go to PX4.2) 
 
PX5.2 What did you do before you were involved in the fishery? 
 _____ Farmer/herder 
_____ Business 
_____ Civil servant 
_____ Student 
_____ Other (not fishing) 
 
PX6: Do you own any boats? 
_____ y)(go to PX6.1) _____ n) (go to PX9) 
 
PX6.1: How many? 
_____ #  
 
PX6.2: Who fishes with these boats? 
 _____ self  
 _____ family 
 _____ friends; specify relationship __________________ 
 _____ Renters (not friends)  
 _____ employed fishermen 
 
PX6.3: On an average day, how many kilos of N. perch fish do your 
boats bring in? 
  _____ over 100 Kilos 
_____ 61 – 100 Kilos 
  _____ 31 – 60 Kilos 
  _____ 10 – 30 Kilos 
  _____ Under 10 Kilos 
_____ not sure 
_____ refuse to answer 
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PX7: Are any of your boats used for N. perch fishing? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
PX7.1: What gear is used in your boats for N. perch fishing? 
 _____ nets _____ long lines/hooks 
 
PX8: Do you fish now? 
 _____ y) _____ n) (go to PX10) 
 
PX8.1: How often do you fish? 
 _____ daily 
 _____ per week 
_____ per month 
 
PX9: Did you fish when you were not on the committee? 
 _____ y) _____n) 
 
Biophysical 
A1: How has the N. perch catches changed compared to the past two years? 
_____ improved from the past 
_____ remained the same 
_____ become worse 
 
A2: Have fish catches increased compared to last year? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ the same) _____ don’t know 
 
A2.1: five years ago? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ the same) _____ don’t know 
 
A3: Do fishermen fish more this year than last? 
_____ more _____ less _____ the same _____ don’t know 
 
A4: Do fishermen fish more this year than they did 5 years ago? 
_____ more _____ less _____ the same _____ don’t know 
 
A5: Do you think there are more fish in the lake than last year? 
_____ more _____ less _____ the same _____ don’t know 
 
A6: Do you think there are more fish in the lake than 5 years ago? 
_____ more _____ less _____ the same _____ don’t know 
 
A7: Do you think there will be more fish to catch next year? 
 _____ more _____ less _____ the same _____ don’t know 
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Demographic 
B1: Are there more fishermen at this BMU than two years ago? 
_____ more _____ less _____ the same _____ don’t know 
 
B2: Do you think there will be more fishermen on LV next year? 
_____ y) _____ n)_____ the same) _____ don’t know 
 
B3: Do you think an increasing number of fishermen will put the fishery in 
trouble?  
_____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
Economic 
C1: Are there other major income generating activities in this BMU? 
 _____ y) _____ n) (go to C2)  
   
C1.1: What activity or activities? 
  __________ 1 
  __________ 2 
  __________ 3 
 
C1.2: Are fishermen involved in any of these income generating 
activity outside the fishery? 
 _____ y) (Go to C1.3) _____ n)(Go to C1.4) 
  
C1.3: What activity or activities? 
  __________ 1 
  __________ 2 
  __________ 3 
 
C1.4: If the fishery was closed, would the fishermen become involved 
in these other income generating activities? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
C2: If the fishery were closed, would the fishermen still fish? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
 
 
Infrastructure 
D1: If someone has illegal fish at this BMU, are they able to sell it 
freely at this BMU? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know _____ refuses 
 
Socio-political I 
E1: Do you think that the fishery is in trouble? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
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E1.1: What is the biggest threat to the fish population of N. perch?  
 _____ over fishing 
 _____ pollution (water hyacinth, factory effluence) 
 _____ illegal fishing  
 _____ other; specify ____________________ 
 
E2: Do you think that the Nile perch fishery will provide you benefits 
after the next ten to fifteen years? 
 _____ yes  _____ if management does/not work 
_____ no    
 
E3: How do you picture your child’s connection/involvement in the fishery 
in fifteen years to come?   
 _____ a) future  
_____ b) no future (go to E3.1) 
 
E3.1 Why no future? 
 _____ they mention fish collapse 
 _____ other 
 
Socio-political II 
F1: Is there a boat owners group at this BMU? 
_____ y)_____ n) (go to F2) 
 
F1.1: Do you belong to the boat owners group at this BMU? 
_____ y)(go to F1.2) _____ n) (go to F2) 
 
F1.2: Are all boat owners members of this group? 
_____ y) ____ n) 
 
F2: Do you know any boat owners at your BMU who have illegal gear? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
F3: Does every boat owner have some illegal gear? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
F4: Do you take action if you catch a fisher illegally fishing at your 
BMU? 
____ y) (go to F5) ____ n) (go to F4.1) _____ refuse 
 
 F4.1: Why would you not take action on illegal fishing? 
_____ fear of retribution 
_____ family or friend (relation) 
_____ No enforcement 
_____ everyone is doing it 
 _____ other ______________ 
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F5: What happens if illegal gear or fish is found in someone’s boat by a 
community member? 
 _____ reporting takes place 
_____ no reporting takes place  
 
F6: What is the reaction of the community when the BMU enforces rules? 
 _____ supportive 
 _____ non-supportive 
 
F7: Do you encourage your community to legally fish? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
F8: Do you turn-in your fellow committee member  
 If found illegally fishing or with illegal gear? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
Institutional I 
G1: Are patrols for illegal fish and gear conducted at this BMU by the BMU 
committee? 
 _____ y) _____ n) (go to G2) 
 
G1.1: What equipment do you use in the patrol? (check all that 
apply) 
_____ boat w/motor 
_____ boat w/o motor 
_____ boat w/sail 
_____ foot 
_____ land observations 
 
G1.2: How often do these patrols take place? 
 _____ frequently(go to G1.5) 
 _____ Not frequently (go to G1.3) 
  
G1.3: What is the limiting factor for not patrolling frequently? 
(check all that apply) 
 _____ cost of fuel 
 _____ lack of equipment 
 _____ lack of personnel 
 _____ other; specify ____________________ 
 
G1.4: What action is taken if someone is caught with illegal gear or 
is illegally fishing?  
 _____ nothing, no legal ramifications 
_____ legal action (arrest, fine, gear or fish confiscation) 
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G2: In the last year, how many people has the committee punished for 
illegal fishing or gear? 
_____ none 
_____ 5 or fewer 
_____ between 6 - 30 
_____ over 30 
_____ don’t know 
 
G3: Do other entities like the police, department of fisheries, or army 
conduct patrols here? 
 _____ y) Independently of BMU (go to G3.1) 
_____ y) Jointly with BMU (go to G3.1) 
_____ n) (go to G5) 
 
G3.1: Who conducts these patrols (check all that apply)? 
 _____ Dept. of Fish 
 _____ Police 
 _____ Army 
 _____ sub-county BMU 
 _____ Other 
  
G3.2: How often is the patrol undertaken? 
 _____ regularly _____ irregularly 
 
G3.3: Do these entities consult or involve you when conducting the 
patrols 
 ______y) _______n) _____ sometimes 
 
G3.4: What happens if they catch someone with illegal gear or fish?  
 _____ nothing, no legal ramifications 
_____ legal action (arrest, fine, gear or fish confiscation) 
 
G3.5: In the last year, how many people have other entities punished 
for illegal fishing or gear? 
_____ none 
_____ 5 or fewer 
_____ between 6 - 30 
_____ over 30 
_____ don’t know 
 
G4: Do the fishermen know when fish patrols will occur? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
G5: Are there punishments if you catch someone with: 
 
G5.1: Illegal sized nets: 
_____ punishment _____ no punishment _____ don’t know 
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G5.1.1 Is this punishment: 
_____ Too severe 
_____ Fair 
_____ Too lenient  
 
G5.2: Illegal sized fish: 
_____ punishment _____ no punishment _____ don’t know 
 
G5.2.1 Is this punishment: 
_____ Too severe 
_____ Fair 
_____ Too lenient  
  
G5.3: Illegal methods (beating the water - tycooning) 
_____ punishment _____ no punishment _____ don’t know 
  
G5.3.1 Is this punishment:  
_____ Too severe 
_____ Fair 
_____ Too lenient  
  
G6: Do fisherman tell you if other fishermen are illegally fishing? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
  
G7: Do you fear retribution when you enforce the rules (arrest people, 
impose fines, or confiscate their equipment/fish)? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
  
G7.1: From who? 
_____ That specific fisherman whom you turned in 
_____ other fishermen? 
_____ the boat owner? 
_____ other: specify ____________________ 
  
G8: Out of all of the Boat Owners you know, how many illegally fish (or 
have illegal fishing gears)? 
_____ none 
_____ only a few 
_____ less than half 
_____ half of them 
_____ more than half 
_____ all of them 
  
G9: Does the Chairman (or other people on the BMU Executive committee) 
have the power to enforce the fishing rules? 
_____ Yes, full powers to enforce (can arrest) 
_____ Yes, some powers to enforce (cannot arrest) 
_____ Yes, but only limited powers to enforce are present 
_____ No, no enforcement powers are present 
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G10: How does the BMU get information on illegal gears and illegal fishing 
(other than patrols)? (check all that apply) 
_____ other fishermen tell 
_____ observations  
_____ patrols by BMU 
_____ patrols by fisheries or police dept. 
_____ at collection points 
_____ Sting operation 
 
Institutional II 
H1: Does one have to be a member of this BMU to land fish here?  
_____y) _____n) 
 
H2: What are the minimum mesh sizes for the N. Perch net?  
 _____ correctly identified 
 _____ incorrectly identified 
 _____ don’t know 
 
H3: Is beach seining allowed? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
H4: What is the legal sized N. perch you can catch? 
 _____ correctly identified 
 _____ incorrectly identified 
 _____ don’t know 
 
H5: What is the purpose of the fishing rules? 
_____ mentions fishing sustainability or health 
_____ doesn’t mention fishing sustainability 
 
H6: Are the rules important? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
H7: Can the fishery be protected with such fishing rules? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
C3: Do the fishermen earn less because of the fishing regulations? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ same) _____ don’t know 
 
C4: Do you think the fishermen will earn more or less in the future 
because of the BMUs and the fishing regulations? 
 _____ more _____ less _____ same _____ don’t know 
 
H8: Is there unequal application of the fishing rules to different people 
in the BMU? 
_____y) _____n) 
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H9: Have the fishing rules made the fishermen’s life better, the same, or 
worse? 
_____ better (go to H9.1) 
_____ same 
_____ worse (go to H9.2) 
 
H9.1: Why better: _____ mentions fisheries health/financial gain 
 
H9.2: why worse: _____ mentions restrictions to fishing 
 
H10: Would you like some rules to be changed? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
H10.1. Which ones would you change? 
_____ change mesh size 
_____ change mesh type 
_____ change fish size 
_____ change method 
 _____ other; specify 
 
H11: How did you learn the fishing rules and regulations for Lake 
Victoria? 
 _____ government (or other outside org) sponsored workshop 
 _____ BMU sponsored workshop or meeting 
 _____ BMU Committee 
_____ Pamphlets or signs 
 _____ Word-of-mouth 
 _____ don’t know 
 _____ other; specify ____________________ 
 
H12: Have you been a part of any training session that concerns fishing 
practices? 
_____ 1) yes (go to H11.1)   _____ 2) no 
 
 H12.1: How many trainings? 
  _____ # 
 
Institutional III 
J1: Does the BMU Executive Committee formally meet? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
J1.1: How often does the BMU Executive Committee formally meet? 
 _____ regularly (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly) 
 _____ irregularly (yearly, every six months, does not meet) 
 _____ don’t know 
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J1.1.1: Do you attend the meetings? 
  _____ y, always 
_____ y, sometimes 
_____ n, never 
 
J1.2: Does the committee maintain records of its meetings? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know  
 
  J1.2.1: Are they available for everyone (all community)? 
  _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
J2: Does the BMU committee hold assembly (BMU Beach) meetings with the BMU 
members? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
J2.1 How often do these meetings take place? 
  _____ regularly 
  _____ irregularly 
  _____ don’t know 
 
J2.2: Is everyone invited to the meetings? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
 
J2.2.1: Why are these meetings called? 
  _____ BMU business 
  _____ enforce rules 
  _____ when concern arises 
  
J2.2.2: Who calls the meetings? 
  _____ BMU chairman 
  _____ anyone with concern 
  _____ committee as a whole 
_____ when necessary __________ explain which circumstances 
 
J3: How do you communicate the BMU fishing rules to the fishermen and Boat 
Owners? 
 _____ by holding group meeting 
 _____ by other means; specify ____________________ 
 
J4: How often do you communicate with the BMU Boat Owners? 
 _____ in every meeting 
 _____ when there are concerns 
 
J5. Are everyone’s views/opinions valued at this BMU?  
_____ y) _____ n) 
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J6. What is the degree of boat owners participation in fisheries 
management at this BMU? 
_____ Zero: no participation in resource management 
_____ Low: some people participate but mostly elite 
_____ Widespread participation 
 
J7: How often does the committee take fish weight for data collection 
purposes? 
_____ daily 
_____ weekly x _____ 
_____ monthly x _____ 
_____ they are not weighed 
_____ don’t know 
 
J8: Why is fish data is collected? 
 _____ mentions management of fishery 
 _____ does NOT mention management of fishery 
 
J9: Do the Boat Owners ever propose any rules (by-laws) to the BMU? 
 _________Y) __________N) (go to J9.1) 
 
J9.1 what limits them? 
 _______don’t attend meetings 
 _______their views not considered 
 _______others specify ____________  
 
J10: Do you ever propose any rules (by-laws) to the BMU committee? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
Institutional IV 
K1: In your view, is your BMU successful in enforcing fishing rules? 
_____y) _____n) 
 
K2: Is your BMU successful at resolving disputes? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
K3: In your view, is your BMU successful in receiving visitors? 
_____y) _____n) _____ don’t know 
 
K4: Is your BMU successful at arresting offenders? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
K5: Is your BMU successful at confiscating illegal gear? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
K6: Does the BMU Committee provide services or infrastructure to the 
community? 
_____y) _____n) 
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K7: Has the existence of the BMU made life better, the same, or worse for 
people here? 
_____ better 
_____ same 
_____ worse  
 
K8: How much revenue does the BMU bring in monthly? 
   UGANDA   KENYA     TANZANIA  
_____ 0     0      0 
_____ under 100,000   Under 4,000    Under 70,000 
_____ 100,001–500,000   4,001-20,000    70,001-350,000 
_____ 500,001–1,000,000  20,001-40,000    350,001-685,000 
_____ 1,000,001–5,000,000  40,001-200,000    685,001-3,430,000 
_____ over 5,000,000   Over 200,000    Over 3,430,000 
_____ don’t know   don’t know     don’t know 
 
K8.1: From what sources does the BMU bring in revenue? 
_____ taxes (on fish, licensing of boat, etc)  
_____ fines for illegal activity 
_____ other __________ 
 
K8.2: Where does this revenue go? 
_____ to BMU committee 
_____ to treasure 
_____ buy equipment (boats, engines) 
_____ other; specify ____________________ 
 
K8.3: Are there examples of revenue investment? 
_____ y) _____ n) (go to K12) 
Give examples _________________ (e.g. new office, office 
furniture, sanitation (latrines, landing for fish), patrol 
boat, motors, docks, shelters, equipment, etc.) 
 
K9: If the BMU did not exist, how would the well being of the community be 
affected? 
_____ negatively  
_____ positively 
_____ it would not be affected 
_____ don’t know 
 
K10: Are you paid to be on the BMU Committee? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ refuse to answer 
 
K10.1: how much per month? 
 _____ amount _____ refuse to answer 
 
K11: Do you keep records of illegal fishing activity at this BMU? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
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K12: Has illegal fishing increased or decreased since the establishment of 
your BMU? 
_____ increased  
_____ decreased  
_____ stayed the same 
_____ don’t know 
 
Institutional V 
L1: What do you see as the MAIN purpose of the BMU?  
_____ Mentions fish management or control illegal fishing 
_____ Does not Mention fish management or control illegal fishing  
 
L2: Did a fish management or protection committee exist before the BMU was 
created? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
Institutional VI 
M2: Do you know who the following are? 
  
M2.1: Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization is? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
 
 M2.2: (Na, KM, Ta) Fisheries Research Institute is? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
 
 M2.3: Fisheries Department is? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
 
M2.4: Has any of these organizations been involved in the 
development or function of your BMU? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
 M2.4.1: Which one(s): 
 _____ LVFO 
 _____ Fisheries Research Institute 
 _____ Fisheries Department 
 
M2.4.1.1: How often does this/these organizations visit 
your BMU?  
   _____ regularly _____ irregularly LVFO  
_____ regularly _____ irregularly FRI  
_____ regularly _____ irregularly Fish. Dept.  
 
M2.4.1.2: Does this/these organizations take into 
account your opinion and interest? 
   _____ y) _____ n) LVFO  
   _____ y) _____ n) Fisheries Research Institute  
   _____ y) _____ n) Fisheries Department  
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M2.4.2: Has any other organization been involved in the 
development or function of your BMU? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
  
  M2.4.3: Name them: (e.g. OSIENALA) 
  __________ name 1 
  __________ name 2 
 
M2.4.3.1: How often does this/these organizations visit 
your BMU?  
   _____ regularly _____ irregularly name 1  
_____ regularly _____ irregularly name 2 
 
M2.4.3.1: Does this/these organizations take into 
account your opinion and interest? 
   _____ y) _____ n) __________ name 1  
   _____ y) _____ n) __________ name 2  
 
Institutional VII 
N1: Is there any conflict within this BMU? 
 _______y) __________n) __________don’t know 
 
N1.1: What is the level of conflict at this BMU? 
_______1) There is violence among subgroups or individuals 
_______2) There is no violence but significant tensions that can 
erupt into violence sometimes 
_______3) There is limited conflict: No violence has been witnessed, 
but some tensions among some groups exist 
 
N2: Is there any conflict between this BMU and other BMUs? 
_____ y _____ n _____ don’t know 
 
N2.1: What kinds of conflicts take place between this BMU and other 
BMUs? 
_____ violent conflict with other BMUs occurs 
_____ significant tensions that can erupt into violence sometimes 
_____ limited: no violence has been witnessed, but some tensions 
with some other groups exist 
 
N3: Have there been any conflicts between the committee and other 
government agencies?  
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
N3.1: If yes, on what issues have there been conflicts? 
 ____________________ 
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Qu. Qualitative questions 
Qu1: What are the benefits of illegally fishing?  
 
 
 
 
Qu2: What changes need to take place for a healthy fishery? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu3: Mention the three most important problems of your BMU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu4: How would you fix these problems? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QU5: If the BMU did not exist, would people fish differently? 
_____ yes, they would fish more 
_____ yes, they would fish with different gear 
_____ no, they would fish the same 
 
--END SURVEY--
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APPENDIX B:  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BOAT OWNERS 
 
 
 
----QUESTIONAIRE FOR BOAT OWNERS/MANAGERS---- 
 
 
Survey Questionnaire for Investigating Lake Victoria’s Beach 
Management Units, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania: Behavioral assessment of 
Lake Victoria Fishers. 
 
 
Names of enumerators:___________________________________ 
 
Date: _______________________ 
 
Country (UGANDA     KENYA     TANZANIA) 
 
Name of the District____________________ 
 
Name of BMU:_________________________ 
 
 
 
  
Boat Owner Information:  
 
1. Respondent number ______ 
 
3. Sex 
_____ M) _____ F) 
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PX. Personal Information: 
PX1: How old are you? 
 _____ age in years 
 _____ refuses 
 
PX2: Education level of participant: 
 _____ None 
 _____ Primary 
 _____ Secondary 
 _____ Tertiary or above 
 
PX3: What tribe do you belong to? 
 __________ name of tribe (e.g. Luo) 
 
PX4: How long have you lived at this site? 
 _____ 0-5 years _____ 6-20 years _____ >20 years 
 
PX5: Was your father in the fishery? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
PX5.1 Have you been in the fishery since childhood? 
_____ y)(go to PX6) _____ n) (go to PX5.2) 
 
PX5.2 What did you do before you were involved in the fishery? 
 _____ Farmer/herder 
_____ Business 
_____ Civil servant 
_____ Student 
_____ Other (not fishing) 
 
PX6: Are you a member of this BMU? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
PX7: How many boats do you own? 
_____ # 
 
PX8: How many of your boats are used for N. perch? 
 _____ #  
 
PX9: What gear is used for N. perch fishing? 
 _____ nets _____ long lines/hooks 
 
Biophysical 
A1: How have the N. perch catches changed compared to the past two years? 
_____ improved from the past 
_____ remained the same 
_____ become worse 
 
A2: Are you catching more fish this year than last? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ same) _____ don’t know 
 178 
 
A3: Are you catching more fish this year than 5 years ago? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ same) don’t know 
 
A4: Have you increased the number of gear you own in the past two years? 
_____ yes (go to A4.1) 
_____ no (go to A4.3) 
 
A4.1: Why have you increased the number of gear you own in the past two 
years? 
_____ because of decreasing fish catches 
_____ money/business decision 
_____ Other 
 
A4.2: Have you caught more fish because you have increased the number 
of gear in the past two years? (check all that apply) 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
A4.3: Why have you not increased the number of gear you own in the past 
two years? (check all that apply) 
_____ because of decreasing fish catches 
_____ get more money/business decision 
_____ Other 
 
A5: Have you increased the number of boats you own in the past two years? 
_____ yes (go to A5.1) 
_____ no (go to A5.3) 
 
A5.1: Why have you increased the number of boats you own in the past 
two years? (check all that apply) 
_____ because of decreasing fish catches 
_____ get more money/business decision 
_____ Other 
 
A5.2: Have you caught more fish because you have increased the number 
of boats in the past two years? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
A5.3: Why have you not increased the number of boats you own in the 
past two years? (check all that apply) 
_____ because of decreasing fish catches 
_____ money/business decision 
_____ Other 
 
A6: Do you think there are more or fewer fish for you to catch now, than last 
year? 
_____ more _____ fewer _____ the same _____ don’t know 
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A7: Do you think there are more or fewer fish for you to catch now, than 5 
years ago? 
_____ more _____ fewer _____ the same _____ don’t know 
 
A8: Do you think there will be more fish to catch next year? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
Demographic 
B1: Are there more or fewer fishermen than two years ago? 
_____ more _____ fewer _____ the same _____ don’t know 
 
B2: Do you think there will be more fishermen on LV next year? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
B3: Are you worried about more fishermen catching your fish? 
_____ y) _____ n)  
 
B3.1: Will you buy more gear or boats this year, knowing that there 
will more fishermen on the lake next year? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
Economic 
C1: Why do you fish for N. perch and not other species? 
_____ higher return 
_____ don’t know anything else 
_____ no other alternatives 
 
C2: Are you involved in other major income generating activities? 
 _____ y) (go to C2.1) _____ n)(go to C3) 
  
 C2.1: What activity or activities? 
  __________ 1 
  __________ 2 
  __________ 3 
  (Go to C4) 
 
C3: If the fishery was closed, are there other major income generating 
activities that you could become involved in? 
  _____ y) (go to C3.1) _____ n) (go to C4) 
 
  C3.1: What activity or activities? 
  __________ 1 
  __________ 2 
  __________ 3 
 
C3.2: Would you become involved in these income generating 
activities if the fishery was closed? 
_____ y) (go to C2.2.2) _____ n) (go to C2.2.1) 
 
C4: If the fishery was closed, would you still fish? 
 _____ y) (go to C5) _____ n)(go to 4.1) 
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C4.1: What would you do with your boats? 
 _____ Sell boats 
 _____ use for different purpose (not fishing) 
 
C5: On an average day, how many kilos of N. Perch fish do your boats bring 
in? 
 _____ over 100 Kilos 
_____ 61 – 100 Kilos 
 _____ 31 – 60 Kilos 
 _____ 10 – 30 Kilos 
 _____ Under 10 Kilos 
_____ not sure 
_____ refuse to answer 
 
C6: How often are your fish weighed and data collected? 
_____ daily 
_____ weekly x _____ 
_____ monthly x _____ 
_____ they are not weighed 
_____ don’t know 
 
C7: Where do you invest your money? (Check all that apply) 
 _____ saving/bank 
 _____ school fees 
 _____ buy animals 
 _____ buy land 
 _____ more fishing equipment 
 _____ pay employees 
 _____ other 
 
Infrastructure 
D1: If someone has illegal fish, are they able to sell it freely at this BMU? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know _____ refuses 
 
Socio-political I 
E1: Do you think that the fishery is in trouble? 
 _____ y) (go to E1.1) _____ n) (go to E2) 
 
E1.1: What is the biggest threat to the fish population of N. perch?  
 _____ illegal fishing    
_____ pollution (water hyacinth, factory effluence) 
 _____ over fishing (too many boats, too many gear) 
 _____ other; specify ____________________ 
 
E2: Do you think that the Nile perch fishery will provide you benefits after 
the next ten to fifteen years? 
 _____ yes, a lot of benefits 
_____ yes, some benefits 
_____ no, it will not provide any benefits 
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E3: How do you picture your child’s connection/involvement in the fishery in 
fifteen years to come?   
 _____ a) future  
_____ b) no future (go to L8.1) 
 
E3.1 Why no future? 
 _____ they mention fish collapse 
 _____ other 
 
E4. Do you think that your child will be involved in the fishery in 10 years? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
Socio-political II 
F1: Is there a boat owners group at this BMU? 
_____ y)_____ n) 
 
F1.1: Do you belong to the boat owners group at this BMU? 
_____ y) (go to F1.2) _____ n) (go to F2) 
 
F1.2: Are all boat owners members of this group? 
_____ y) ____ n) 
 
F2: Do you know any boat owners at your BMU who have illegal gear? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
F3: Does every boat owner have some illegal gear? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
F4: Do you report illegal fishing or gear at your BMU? 
____ y) (go to F5) ____ n) (go to F4.1)  
 
 F4.1: Why would you not report illegal fishing? 
_____ patrols or someone else does it 
_____ fear of retribution 
_____ family or friend (relation) 
_____ weak enforcement 
_____ everyone is doing it 
 _____ other 
 
F5: Do other community members report illegal gear or illegal fish? 
 _____ reporting takes place 
_____ no reporting takes place  
 
F6: What is the reaction of the fishing community when the BMU enforces 
rules? 
 _____ supportive 
 _____ non-supportive 
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Institutional I 
G1: Are patrols for illegal fish and gear conducted at this BMU by the BMU 
committee? 
 _____ y) (go to G1.1) _____ n) (go to G2) 
 
G1.1: What happens if they catch someone with illegal gear or fish?  
_____ legal action (arrest, fine, gear or fish confiscation) 
_____ nothing, no legal ramifications 
 
G1.2: How often do patrols take place? 
_____ daily 
_____ weekly 
_____ monthly 
_____ yearly  
 
G2: Do other entities like the police, department of fisheries, or army 
conduct patrols here? 
 _____ y) Independently of BMU (go to G2.1) 
_____ y) Jointly with BMU (go to G2.1) 
_____ n) (go to G3) 
 
G2.1: Who conducts these patrols? 
 _____ BMU members 
 _____ Dept. of Fish 
 _____ Police 
 _____ Army 
 _____ Other 
  
G2.2: What happens if they catch someone with illegal gear or fish?  
_____ legal action (arrest, fine, gear or fish confiscation) 
_____ nothing, no legal ramifications 
 
G2.3: How often do patrols take place? 
_____ frequent 
_____ not frequent 
_____ not at all 
 
G3: Is there punishment if you are caught with: 
 
G3.1: Illegal sized nets: 
_____ punishment _____ no punishment _____ don’t know 
 
G3.1.1 Is this punishment: 
_____ Too severe 
_____ Fair 
_____ Too lenient  
 
G3.2: Illegal sized fish: 
_____ punishment _____ no punishment _____ don’t know 
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G3.2.1 Is this punishment: 
_____ Too severe 
_____ Fair 
_____ Too lenient  
 
G3.3: Illegal methods (beating the water) 
_____ punishment _____ no punishment _____ don’t know 
 
G3.3.1 Is this punishment:  
_____ Too severe 
_____ Fair 
_____ Too lenient  
 
G4: In the last year, how many people has the committee punished for illegal 
fish or gear? 
_____ none 
_____ 5 or fewer 
_____ between 6 - 30 
_____ over 30 
_____ don’t know 
 
G5: In the last year, how many people have other entities punished for 
illegal fish or gear? 
_____ none 
_____ 5 or fewer 
_____ between 6 - 30 
_____ over 30 
_____ don’t know 
 
Institutional II 
H1: What are the minimum mesh sizes for the N. Perch net?  
 _____ correctly identified 
 _____ incorrectly identified 
 _____ don’t know 
 
[minimum mesh size 5 inches (12.7cm)] 
 
H2: Is beach seining allowed? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
H3: What is the legal sized N. perch you can catch? 
 _____ correctly identified 
 _____ incorrectly identified 
 _____ don’t know 
 
[Above 20 inches (127cm)] 
 
H4: What is the purpose of the fishing rules? 
_____ mentions fishing sustainability or health 
_____ doesn’t mention fishing sustainability 
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H5: Are the rules important? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
H6: Can the fishery be protected with such fishing rules? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
H7: Do you earn less because of the fishing rules/regulations? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
H8: Do you think you will earn more or less in the future because of the BMUs 
and the fishing regulations? 
 _____ more _____ less _____ don’t know 
 
H9: Have the fishing rules made your life better, the same, or worse? 
_____ better (go to H9.1) 
_____ same 
_____ worse (go to H9.2) 
 
H9.1: Why better:  
_____ mentions fisheries health/financial gain 
H9.2: why worse:  
_____ mentions restrictions to fishing 
 
H10: Would you change the rules if you could? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
H10.1. How would you change them? 
_____ change mesh size 
_____ change mesh type 
_____ change fish size 
_____ change method 
 _____ other; specify 
 _____ get rid of them 
 
H11: How did you learn the fishing rules and regulations for Lake Victoria? 
 _____ government (or other outside org) sponsored workshop 
 _____ BMU sponsored workshop or meeting 
 _____ BMU Committee 
_____ Pamphlets or signs 
 _____ Word-of-mouth 
 _____ don’t know 
 _____ other; specify ____________________ 
 
H12: Have you been a part of any training session that concerns fishing 
practices? 
_____ 1) yes (go to H11.1)   _____ 2) no 
 
 H12.1: How many trainings? 
  _____ # 
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H13: Did you personally have a part or say in making the current BMU rules? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
H14: Is there unequal application of the fishing rules to different people in 
the BMU? 
_____y) _____n) 
 
Institutional III 
K1: Does the BMU Committee formally meet? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
K1.1: How often does the BMU committee formally meet? 
 _____ regularly 
 _____ irregularly 
 _____ don’t know 
 
K2: Does the BMU hold assembly (BMU beach) meetings? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
K2.1 How often? 
 _____ daily 
 _____ monthly X_____ 
 _____ yearly X_____ 
 
K2.2: Is everyone invited to the meetings? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
K2.3: Do you attend the meetings? 
 _____ y, always 
_____ y, sometimes 
_____ n, never 
 
K2.4: Does everyone attend the meetings? 
_____ y) _____ n)  
 
K3. When were the last elections for the BMU committee officials held?  
_____ Month/Year 
 
K3.1: Did you participate in the election? 
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
K3.2: Do you think the elections were fair? 
_____y) _____n)_____ refused to answer 
 
K4: Who is your representative on the BMU Executive Committee? 
_____ Correctly identified  
_____ Incorrectly identify 
_____ Does not know 
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K4.1: Does your BMU representative inform you of BMU Committee  
business?  
_____y) _____n) 
 
K4.1.1: How often 
  _____ regularly 
  _____ irregularly 
 
K5: Does the committee maintain records of its meetings? 
_____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know  
 
 K5.1: Are they available for you to see? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
K6. Are the fishermen (boat crew)’s views/opinions valued at this BMU?  
_____ y) _____ n) 
 
Institutional IV 
L1: Is your BMU successful at resolving disputes? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
L2: In your view, is your BMU successful in receiving visitors? 
_____y) _____n) _____ don’t know 
 
L3: Is your BMU successful at arresting offenders? 
 _____ y _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
L4: Is your BMU successful at confiscating illegal gear? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
L5: Does the BMU Committee provide services or infrastructure to you and the 
community? 
_____y) _____n) 
 
L6: Has the existence of the BMU made your life better, the same, or worse? 
_____ better 
_____ same 
_____ worse  
 
Institutional V 
M1: What do you see as the MAIN purpose of the BMU?  
_____ Mentions fish management or control illegal fishing 
_____ Does not Mention fish management or control illegal fishing  
 
M2: Who is the BMU chairman? 
_____ successfully identified 
_____ unsuccessfully identified 
 
M3: When was this BMU formed?  
_____ (Year of formation) _____ don’t know 
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Institutional VI 
N1: Do you know who the: 
N1.1: Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization is? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
 
 N1.2: (Na, KM, Ta) Fisheries Research Institute is? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
 
 N1.3: Fisheries Department is? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
 
N1.4: Has any of these organizations been involved in the development 
or function of your BMU? 
 _____ y) _____ n) 
 
N1.4.1: Which one(s): 
 _____ LVFO 
 _____ Fisheries Research Institute 
 _____ Fisheries Department 
 
N1.4.1.1: How often does this/these organizations visit 
your BMU?  
   _____ regularly _____ irregularly LVFO  
_____ regularly _____ irregularly FRI  
_____ regularly _____ irregularly Fish. Dept.  
 
N1.4.1.2: Does this/these organizations take into account 
your opinion and interest? 
   _____ y) _____ n) LVFO  
   _____ y) _____ n) Fisheries Research Institute  
   _____ y) _____ n) Fisheries Department  
    
N2: Has any other organization been involved in the development or function 
of your BMU? 
  _____ y) _____ n) 
 
 N2.1: Name them: (e.g. OSIENALA) 
  __________ name 1 
  __________ name 2 
 
N2.1.1: How often does this/these organizations visit your 
BMU?  
   _____ regularly _____ irregularly name 1  
_____ regularly _____ irregularly name 2 
 
N2.1.2: Does this/these organizations take into account 
your opinion and interest? 
   _____ y) _____ n) __________ name 1  
   _____ y) _____ n) __________ name 2  
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Institutional VII 
O1: Is there any conflict within this BMU? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
O1.1: What is the level of conflict within this BMU? 
_____ there is violence among subgroups or individuals 
_____ there is no violence but significant tensions that can erupt into 
violence sometimes 
_____ there is limited conflict: No violence has been witnessed, but 
some tensions among some groups exist 
 
O2: Is there any conflict between this BMU and other BMUs? 
 _____ y) _____ n) _____ don’t know 
 
O2.1: What kinds of conflicts take place between this BMU and other 
BMUs? 
_____ violent conflict with other BMUs occurs 
_____ significant tensions that can erupt into violence sometimes 
_____ limited: no violence has been witnessed, but some tensions with 
some other groups exist 
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Qualitative questions 
Qu1: What are the benefits of illegally fishing?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu2: What changes need to take place for a healthy fishery? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu3: Mention the three most important problems of your BMU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu4: How would you fix these problems? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu5: If the BMU did not exist, would you fish differently (check all that 
apply)? 
_____ yes, I would fish more 
_____ yes, I would fish with different gear 
_____ no, I would fish the same 
 
 
--END SURVEY--
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